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Preface
However, responsibility for the final report lies with 
the editorial team and the Globelics Secretariat.
The editors drew substantial input from the Glo-
belics seminar on learning, innovation, and low-
carbon development held in Copenhagen 2-4 April 
2013. The round table discussion on innovation, 
learning, and low-carbon development, held on 
11 September at the Globelics Annual Conference 
2013 in Ankara, was also a key source. We thank 
all of the participants for their valuable inputs and 
comments. 
The editors are also thankful to Nina Kotschen-
reuther and Shagufta Haneef for editorial support 
and to Leticia Nogueira and Tadeo Fernando for 
the identification of Globelics Conference papers 
within the field of low-carbon development.
The purpose of the Thematic Review is to in-
spire future Globelics research and to influence pol-
icy. It is not intended to give detailed and specific 
advice to donor and development organisations 
in the field of low-carbon development. Instead, 
the intention is to offer practitioners insight into 
Globelics is a worldwide community of scholars 
who place learning, innovation, and competence-
building systems at the heart of the development 
process. Over the years, Globelics has been a forum 
for bringing together the two rather different tradi-
tions of innovation studies and development stud-
ies. The community incorporates a range of social 
science disciplines and approaches in the analysis of 
learning, innovation, and competence building. 
The objective of the annual Globelics Thematic 
Review is to communicate insights from the com-
munity to policy circles and development donor 
organisations. Each review focuses on a separate 
theme, in a format relevant and accessible to users 
outside academic circles. It gives an overview of 
research outcomes as well as reflections on policy 
implications. 
Rasmus Lema, Björn Johnson, Allan Dahl An-
dersen, Bengt-Åke Lundvall, and Ankur Chaudhary 
edited this Thematic Review. The report reflects the 
insights from papers on low-carbon development 
presented at Globelics conferences and meetings. 
some of the general principles for policy formula-
tion that follow from an innovation perspective 
on low-carbon development. We hope that the 
analysis will inspire the design and development 
of new and more effective strategies for low-car-
bon development.
Bengt-Åke Lundvall
Secretary General, Globelics 
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Executive summary
1. In this review we use the concept of learn-
ing, innovation, and competence-building 
systems (LICS) as an analytical tool and as a 
framework for defining low-carbon policies 
and development strategies. Improved sys-
tems of innovation and competence building 
are essential to low-carbon development. The 
concept is a dynamic and interactive perspec-
tive in which technologies and institutions 
co-evolve and it indicates that policies need 
to operate on both the demand and the sup-
ply side. 
2. The learning, innovation, and competence-
building system (LICS) perspective adapts the 
systems of innovation notion to a develop-
ment perspective. In developed economies the 
low-carbon challenge means re-orientation 
of the management of innovation system. In 
less developed economies, the attention shifts 
from system management toward system 
building and strengthening and from the de-
velopment of new technology to competence 
building and absorption of technologies de-
veloped abroad.
3. In this Thematic Review we communicate 
relevant insights from the Globelics research 
community to policy circles and develop-
ment donor organisations. The key issues 
addressed are, firstly, how the notion of LICS 
can help us understand the challenges of low-
carbon development (LCD), and secondly, a 
discussion of the design of support structures 
for the building of LICS that contribute to 
low-carbon development. 
Low-Carbon Development 
4. Climate change is just one of several threats to 
sustainable development. However, it is the 
most urgent since the boundaries for a safe op-
erating space for humanity have already been 
crossed when it comes to climate change. Em-
phasis is on what kinds of action are required 
at different levels (global, regional, national, 
and local) and by different types of actors (gov-
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ernments, transnational corporations, NGOs, 
and organisations). 
5. Low-carbon development is defined as strat-
egies that mitigate emissions to avoid danger-
ous climate change while at the same time 
achieving social and economic development. 
In this report we point to patterns of structur-
al change that would reduce the consequenc-
es of economic growth upon climate change 
or even support a positive climate effect. 
Globally differentiated problems   
and responsibilities  
6. Different regions and countries play different 
roles – not only when the causes and effects 
of the climate change problem are discussed – 
but also when contributing to their solution. 
While the wealthy countries are major con-
tributors to the problem, the poorest coun-
tries are those that will suffer most from the 
consequences. 
7. The processes of innovation, diffusion, and 
building production capacity in the South and 
in the North must take place in interaction 
between North and South. These processes 
should be interconnected and take place in 
parallel, rather than in sequence. Countries 
at different levels of development will play 
different roles when it comes to the develop-
ment, dissemination, and use of low-carbon 
technologies. As new competences are built in 
the South, the international division of labour 
change over time. 
8. The advanced economies are in a strong 
position to invest further in research and de-
velopment of new green industries and in-
frastructures necessary to make low-carbon 
technologies competitive with fossil fuel. 
Emerging economies are increasingly engag-
ing in competition with the advanced econo-
mies when it comes to the production of the 
new technologies. As consequence there is 
large scope not only for the emerging econo-
mies own reduction in contribution to global 
warming, but also for innovation that reduces 
the price of low-carbon solutions and for the 
development of technologies that are particu-
larly relevant in poor countries.  
9. Low and middle income economies will 
need to build both adaptive and innovative 
capacity in the enterprise sector in combina-
tion with upgrading the skills of end users. 
Capabilities should be directed toward low-
carbon which combines energy poverty sup-
port reduction, economic development and 
climate change motivation and adaptation. 
Technological needs in those countries typi-
cally have an emphasis on affordable access 
to energy and to small-scale decentralised en-
ergy sources, particularly in rural areas. 
Learning, innovation, and    
low-carbon technology
10. The term low-carbon technology refers to 
technologies that exploit renewable resources 
such as wind, solar, and water as well as tech-
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nologies that help to reduce the climate im-
pact of fossil fuel technologies. The develop-
ment, dissemination, and use of low-carbon 
technologies are important prerequisites for 
tackling climate change.
11. It is not feasible to limit the discussion to the 
technical aspects of learning, innovation, and 
competence building. It is necessary to rethink 
substantial parts of the development process 
as a learning process. There are numerous 
sources of learning spanning from outcomes of 
scientific research to the development of new 
skills among end-users. Shifting the attention 
toward learning and innovation capabilities is a 
way to increase the effectiveness of deployment 
and use of low-carbon technologies. 
12. Low-carbon development requires organi-
sational and institutional change as well as 
changes in the realms, instruments, and tech-
niques of policy making. Low-carbon develop-
ment requires a radical and complex process of 
change. Innovation systems at different levels 
will be involved (including the regional, na-
tional, and even global levels), and many sec-
tors and technologies will be affected. Rapid 
structural change is needed, as are high and 
continually increasing rates of investments 
and, not least, accelerated rates of learning 
among individuals and within organisations. 
13. The future demand for low-carbon technolo-
gies will reflect values as well as policy inter-
ventions. Both the consumerism in wealthy 
countries and its role as a model of aspiration 
for the growing middle classes in the emerg-
ing economies need to be changed. Strategies 
that foster such a change need to combine 
regulation with public information and with 
citizen involvement. Key issues include the 
linking of collective responsibility to private 
self-preservation, and the interaction between 
more strict regulation and the formation of 
new routines and norms. 
14. A realistic assessment of barriers to the de-
velopment and diffusion of low-carbon tech-
nologies is required. Some barriers reflect gov-
ernance problems with national and vested 
interests obstructing change. Others reflect 
path dependency and the fact that the existing 
energy infrastructure is streamlined to fit the 
use of carbon-based technologies. The intro-
duction of innovative solutions to overcome 
these barriers are necessary for progress in the 
struggle against global warming. 
15. It is equally important to understand the driv-
ers that may help accelerate the development 
and use of low-carbon technologies. First-mov-
er advantages in the production of low-carbon 
technologies may stimulate private initiative 
as well as national policies building produc-
tion capacity. Critical consumers and citizens 
may force the business sector actors to engage 
in the promotion and use of low carbon tech-
nologies. In the current situation with ‘free 
resources’ in terms of unemployment and big 
corporate savings in search of profitable new 
investment opportunities, a new green model 
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of economic development may open a path 
out of a threatening global stagnation. 
16. Inspiration for new strategies in development, 
such as those outlined in this review, ultimate-
ly depends on a change in perceptions of the 
nature of low-carbon innovation. Partners and 
stakeholders need to be convinced that inno-
vation is a comprehensive and interactive 
process – which is not only, or even primar-
ily, about breakthrough ‘high tech’ equipment 
emerging from R&D labs. Innovation is step-
wise improvement and depends on change in 
values, policies, institutional frameworks, cul-
tures, and economies. 
Innovation policy and low-carbon   
development
17. Innovation policies must address both spe-
cific low-carbon technologies and the infra-
structures within which they are deployed. De-
veloping and disseminating renewable energy 
systems may prove ineffective, even impossi-
ble, for energy sector transformation, if it is not 
complemented by appropriate infrastructure 
transformation.
18. There is need for differentiated policy inter-
vention. The distinction between different 
types of innovation – incremental innovation, 
disruptive innovation, and radical innovation 
– allows us to see the need for different types 
of policy intervention. Innovation may take 
different forms depending on the renewable 
technology in question. 
19. Market-based instruments such as carbon 
taxes and renewable energy quotas can induce 
incremental innovation. Disruptive innova-
tions and their dissemination require technol-
ogy-specific policies, market formation, and 
public procurement to stimulate competence-
building and nascent markets. 
20. Internationally coordinated and government-
driven mission-oriented programs are re-
quired to initiate radical change in the sup-
ply of low-carbon energy. Radical low-carbon 
energy innovation calls for investments in a 
range of diverse and experimental avenues of 
research. To give new direction to development 
in the direction of low-carbon development, 
the individual initiatives by private actors are 
insufficient due to market failure; in these cases 
there is a need for an ‘entrepreneurial state’. 
Building low-carbon energy systems 
21. The transformations of energy systems are 
critical to low-carbon development. Transfor-
mation involves innovation and innovation 
policy measures along at least four broad lines: 
i) the energy supply side and energy access, ii) 
energy demand, energy efficiency and social 
legitimacy, iii) development and dissemina-
tion of low-carbon infrastructures to facilitate 
changes in the supply and demand sides of en-
ergy, and iv) the dismantling of high-carbon 
energy systems.
22. On the supply side, policy makers need to 
understand the long run interplay between 
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carbon-based technologies and renewable en-
ergy technologies. The current cost structure 
does not reflect externalities, such as global 
warming, and therefore it serves as an im-
portant incentive for the use of inexpensive 
carbon-based technologies. Investments made 
today will reduce the long-run cost of tack-
ling climate change. Over time, innovation 
and technological learning combined with the 
deployment and use of renewable energy tech-
nology will make renewable alternatives more 
competitive and will reduce externalities. 
23. On the demand side, increased energy effi-
ciency is crucial for tackling global warming. 
A large potential for energy efficiency remains 
untapped, not least in emerging and develop-
ing countries where energy efficiency is low. 
Given their vast current and future consump-
tion levels, not least in emerging economies 
such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, 
the potential for energy-saving innovation is 
enormous. For instance, energy performance 
standards for buildings will become a central 
policy instrument. This may be combined 
with transferring good lessons from developed 
economies and from international technologi-
cal knowledge sharing.
24. Changes toward a low-carbon economy will 
necessarily involve the transformation of in-
frastructures. Electricity transmission is par-
ticularly relevant for the development and 
large-scale deployment of renewable energy 
technologies. Sources of renewable energy are 
generally concentrated in areas located far 
from areas of electricity consumption, making 
efficient infrastructural connections between 
sources and users a crucial challenge. The ab-
sence of transmission grids (and credible plans 
for their establishment) blocks investments in 
energy transformation systems. This contrib-
utes further to the uneven competition be-
tween low- and high-carbon technologies. 
25. Governments should lead infrastructure 
transformations due to the public good na-
ture and immense upfront investment costs. 
Transforming and building infrastructures are 
central to low-carbon development. Incre-
mental innovation is possible within existing 
infrastructures, while disruptive innovation 
requires significant transformation of infra-
structures. Radical innovation will require 
completely new infrastructures, not the least 
those for decentralised energy systems. 
26. It is necessary to address not only the devel-
opment of renewable energy technologies but 
also the ‘dismantling’ of systems for fossil 
energy technology. The destructive aspect of 
a green energy system transformation is just 
as important as the creative aspect. Fossil and 
renewable energy sources are in direct but un-
even and unfair competition. 
General recommendations 
27. Development policy should seek to combine 
the human development and environmental 
sustainability objectives through promotion 
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of processes of learning, innovation, and de-
velopment. Few organisations have started to 
bring innovation and low-carbon develop-
ment together in policies for system develop-
ment. This is what this review seeks to do. 
28. Some of the recommendations require a 
higher level of governance capacity in public 
organisations. To enhance governance capac-
ity may thus be a prerequisite for low-carbon 
development.  
29. Policy is about taking manageable steps in 
the right direction and to engage in policy 
learning rather than seeking to design opti-
mal policies upfront. Furthermore, unpopular 
but necessary policies for sustainability transi-
tions must be introduced in a strategic, step-
wise manner. Governments and other actors 
should continue to develop new instruments 
and adjust existing instruments to new tech-
nologies and local circumstances. 
30. Building and strengthening national local 
LICS is necessary for achieving a self-directed 
and wide-scale adaptation, dissemination, and 
use of new low-carbon technologies. Creating 
local demand for technology requires market-
formation policies, but without local LICS, 
this will not translate into a demand for new 
knowledge.
31. Linkage formation is crucial to the formation 
of local LICS. Experience shows, that while it 
has been possible to build LICS components 
(e.g. universities, research institutes, R&D reg-
ulations, etc.) in the South, it has been much 
more difficult to stimulate the interactions be-
tween components, mainly because of lacking 
demand for knowledge. New connections can 
centre on direct creation of sustainable energy 
access and on indirect creation of industrial 
and economic development. 
32. At the local level, securing energy access is 
about building new energy LICS in rural 
areas and transforming the existing urban 
ones. Building new rural energy systems re-
quires new energy routines, new institutions, 
and competence building for the application 
of new energy sources. Policies should focus 
on making new energy technology available, 
supporting market formation via microcredit 
financing and thus creating socially inclusive 
learning spaces to facilitate the shift in energy 
technology. 
33. The industrial and economic development 
dimension of low-carbon development is 
crucial to ensure the production capacity for 
dissemination as well as the economic devel-
opment of countries in the South. A central 
element of low-carbon development is that 
countries can develop green jobs and build 
their competence base. A range of jobs and 
tasks are involved in the various stages of ener-
gy provision, from component manufacturing 
to operation and maintenance. Innovation-
oriented local content requirement policy in 
combination with directed public procure-
ment schemes are key instruments that may 
help stimulate this process at the national level. 
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34. Policies for supporting local innovation ca-
pabilities are not an alternative to global dif-
fusion, but a necessary complement. Global 
diffusion and local innovation goes hand 
in hand. International ‘technology transfer’ 
tends to be ineffective without complemen-
tary investments in local capability to creative 
engagement in the absorption and further de-
velopment of knowledge and equipment from 
abroad. Countries in the South must build 
renewable energy technology-specific LICS in 
order to successfully receive new technology 
and subsequently adapt it to local conditions 
and ensure large-scale dissemination and use.
35. Low-carbon development involves build-
ing low-carbon LICS in both the North and 
the South, and stimulating their interaction. 
There is a growing consensus that interna-
tional action to harness technology for cli-
mate change mitigation and general develop-
ment in the South must go beyond a debate 
of technology transfer to focus instead on 
innovation cooperation, i.e., joint action to 
accelerate the development, adaptation, and 
deployment of suitable technologies. Inno-
vation cooperation needs to extend beyond 
the technological aspect and encompass other 
facets of the innovation system that support 
the deployment of technology and builds ca-
pabilities. A better understanding of the role 
of local innovation in developing countries 
for achieving and sustaining low-carbon de-
velopment is urgently needed.
Recommendations to donor organisations
36. Donor organisations should seek to support 
experimentation with new business models 
for decentralised energy provision, bringing 
together system actors such as energy service 
providers, financial institutions, equipment 
manufacturers, and suppliers of operation and 
maintenance services. This support may com-
bine policies for renewable energy with fund-
ing for infrastructure such as microgrids. It will 
also involve consultations that bring together 
local community government and service pro-
viders to combine service-level standards and 
social standards for democratising technology 
choices and enhancing job generation.
37. Engaging with and supporting system op-
erators with the capacity for oversight in par-
ticular technology fields are crucial to provide 
advice and connect stakeholders. System op-
erator organisation can facilitate project repli-
cation and up scaling. A key task for donors is 
to engage with local administrations to build 
the ‘meta-capabilities’ necessary for bringing 
together and orchestrating the various actors. 
Bringing experiences and capabilities to the 
system level should be a key priority area. 
38. Support mechanisms to enhance South-South 
technology transfer by organising matchmak-
ing events for buyers and suppliers of appro-
priate sustainable technologies in the global 
South. South-South collaboration is likely to 
be particularly important in this regard. The 
emerging economies of BRICS are in a strong 
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position to advance relevant and affordable 
technologies because their conditions are simi-
lar to those in poor countries. Donors should 
actively work to bring together the relevant ac-
tors in the global South and provide platforms 
for collaboration. Some Northern donors have 
started working with ‘triangular cooperation 
methods’ in low-carbon fields where the do-
nors actively facilitate technology collabora-
tion and exchange between Southern partners 
39. Support awareness raising and curriculum 
development for low-carbon and sustain-
able development. Educational systems are 
crucial elements of low-carbon LICS because 
they are central to influencing the values that 
form aspirations, consumptions choices, and 
capabilities for ‘low-carbon behaviour’ – from 
the recycling of existing products to the de-
velopment of new innovative products and 
processes. Many donors are in a strong posi-
tion to influence policies in favour of a com-
mitment to education. Donor organisations 
and policy makers leverage existing educa-
tional initiatives to develop low-carbon devel-
opment campaigns at different levels of the 
school system.
40. One key role of donors is to create new al-
liances for financing. Introduce initiatives 
that connect institutional investors in devel-
oped countries with green energy investors in 
the developing world. One particularly im-
portant task in this respect is to help set up 
channels connecting finance in the OECD 
countries with low-carbon investment needs 
in the developing world. 
41. Donor organisations may need to find ways 
of making long term commitments to low 
carbon development. It may be necessary to 
pool donor support into funds to be able to 
finance parts of the energy transformations in 
low income countries. For example, donors 
may help finance feed-in tariffs so that the 
costs is shifted away from poor consumers in 
the South to large-scale donor funds to ensure 
that transformation does not adversely affect 
existing energy consumers.
42. International organisations also have a key 
role to play in shaping perceptions and dis-
courses of low-carbon development. Efforts fo-
cused on climate change mitigation sometimes 
overlook the developing world’s energy access 
imperatives, with the result that those policies 
are often allowed to gravitate towards cheaper, 
high-carbon solutions. More comprehensive 
efforts directed at low carbon development 
sometimes overlook the crucial role of learning 
and innovation.
43. A change of values is needed in the global 
community. International policy debates are 
not yet driven by the proposed new notion of 
low-carbon development. The policy agenda is 
often driven by the more narrow notions of cli-
mate change and is heavily influenced by eco-
nomic interest. Those engaged in international 
assistance can help to spearhead this process – 
in recipient countries as well as at home. 
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1. Innovation for low-carbon development    
 Stating the problem
Among climate researchers, there is increasing 
agreement that the rise in the global mean temper-
ature is due to a human-induced atmospheric con-
centration of greenhouse gases. If climate change 
is to remain within acceptable bounds, both in 
terms of pace and magnitude, the current systems 
for producing energy-based fossil fuels must be 
changed gradually into systems based on renewable 
energy; the direct as well as the indirect consump-
tion of energy must be reduced. In this thematic 
review, we define and describe low-carbon develop-
ment as an important element of such a reduction 
in greenhouse gas emissions. 
To be effective in curbing climate change, low-
carbon development must be implemented glob-
ally, i.e., in the North as well as in the South. 
Such a dramatic change in development paths will 
probably be unfeasible without a globally negoti-
ated distribution of the burdens and benefits in 
accordance with accepted principles of fairness. 
The necessity of shifting toward low-carbon de-
velopment in international agreements is obvious 
when considering both the global character of 
climate change and the greatly unequal distribu-
tion of technical and institutional capabilities and 
living standards between the North and South. It 
becomes even more obvious when one considers 
the importance to this process of knowledge de-
velopment and knowledge destruction. 
Various kinds of technical and institutional inno-
vation are necessary in order to restructure produc-
tion and consumption toward more sustainable 
socio-economic systems. The recognition that in-
novation is interactive is essential; hence, the in-
novative path and performance of an economy – 
whether a country, region, or sector – is a result not 
only of the innovation performance of individual 
firms, but also their interaction with each other 
and with other systems, not least the financial, po-
litical, and research systems. 
Within the context of structural change toward 
sustainability, the focus of this review is on the role 
of increased reliance on renewable energy sources. 
More specifically, we explore how an internation-
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ally coordinated development of low-carbon learn-
ing, innovation, and competence building systems 
can contribute to climate change mitigation.
Learning, innovation, and competence building 
systems (LICS) are at the heart of this report. A ba-
sic assumption is that a ‘systems perspectives’ can 
contribute to the design and implementation of 
better development strategies. The notion of LICS 
implies that economic and social development 
depends on innovation. Successful innovation re-
quires multiple layers of interaction and learning 
among a wide range of individuals, organisations, 
and institutions. 
The key issues addressed in this review are, firstly, 
how the notion of LICS can help us understand the 
challenges of low-carbon development (LCD), and 
secondly, how the design of support structures for 
the building of LICS contributes to the strengthen-
ing of LCD.
Supporting low-carbon LICS rests on the devel-
opment of knowledge infrastructures, institutions, 
and learning capabilities. The building of such 
systems is usually a long process, which, given the 
nature and urgency of the climate challenge, pre-
sents a problem of its own. Therefore, it is essen-
tial to identify the key leverage points for stimu-
lating the process. 
The building of low-carbon LICS is only part of 
the restructuring toward LCD. In addition to its 
urgency, the process involves complex issues not 
only of infrastructure, industrial capacity, invest-
ments, technology, and energy efficiency, but also 
the influence of institutional/cultural factors, social 
inclusion, and energy access. Low-carbon develop-
ment will not, however, be implemented unless 
these problems are tackled. 
It is becoming increasingly clear that low-carbon 
development will not be a smooth and harmonious 
process in which countries and companies work 
together in order to achieve their common interest 
in climate change mitigation. The challenges posed 
by a number of tensions will much more likely 
lead to conflict. Tension exists between the inter-
ests of the North and the South, between a broad 
push for socially and environmentally sustainable 
development and a narrower agenda of climate 
change mitigation. Other tensions exist among es-
tablished and new technologies. The tensions will 
affect policy making, which will have to deal with 
conflicts about the distribution of income, wealth, 
and power in the sharing of costs and the benefits 
of structural change. 
This review draws on research within the Glo-
belics community in order to demonstrate key 
insights into the process of supporting LICS for 
low-carbon development. It seeks to bring together 
the development, climate change, and innovation 
agendas. This is important because, as the global 
climate change regime moves ahead, the need for 
investment in innovation related to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in poor countries and 
communities will increase. The funds available for 
the introduction of new technologies, not the least 
in Africa, are also likely to increase. Substantial op-
portunities for the funding of low-carbon innova-
tions and related systems will arise. Ensuring that 
 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    19
system-building initiatives are appropriate to local 
contexts is crucially important to national policy 
makers and donor organisations seeking to inte-
grate climate change mitigation with a develop-
ment agenda. 
1.1 Planetary boundaries and climate crisis
Climate change is only one major environmental 
problem facing humanity. Since the publication of 
Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), it has 
become increasingly clear that the consequences 
of human economic activity are challenging the 
‘carrying capacity’ of the planet.1 In the 1980s, 
the Brundtland Commission epitomized this as 
the notion of sustainable development, defined 
as development that meets the needs of the pres-
ent without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their needs (WCED, 1987). 
In order to adhere to this principle, it is neces-
sary to stay within the biophysical thresholds for 
the carrying capacity of the planet. If this is ig-
nored, future generations will be faced with dire 
consequences. In the run-up to the 2009 United 
Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenha-
gen, Rockstrom et al. (2009) identified nine plan-
etary boundaries that define a safe operating space 
for humanity. The transgression of these boundar-
ies is likely to cause unacceptable and irreversible 
environmental damage. The boundaries reflect 
nine interlinked processes: 
1. Climate change;
2. Biodiversity loss (terrestrial and marine);
3. Bio-geochemical change (interference with the 
nitrogen cycle);
4. Change in land use;
5. Global freshwater use;
6. Ocean acidification; 
7. Stratospheric ozone depletion; 
8. Chemical pollution; and 
9. Atmospheric aerosol loading.
With respect to the first three processes, we have 
already exceeded the safe boundaries while we are 
close to overstepping them for processes 4-6. With 
respect to the remaining boundaries, we are still 
within safe operating limits (land use and strato-
spheric ozone depletion), or we do not yet know 
the extent of the problem (chemical pollution and 
atmospheric aerosol loading).
The highest priority should be to address the 
problems created by the transgressions already 
made. However, although the processes can often 
be addressed individually with specific measures, 
the interdependent nature of the problems should 
be recognised. In the words of Rockstrom et al.: 
‘Because many of the boundaries are linked, ex-
ceeding one will have implications for others in 
ways that we do not as yet completely understand’ 
(2009, p. 475). However, some of the interlinking 
processes have already been mapped. For example, 
the rise in sea levels caused by climate change may 
accelerate diversity loss and change conditions for 
freshwater use through the intrusion of saltwater. 
The fact that addressing one problem may come at 
expense of others is another aspect of the interde-
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pendency. For example, concentrated solar power 
(CSP) is a promising technology that addresses cli-
mate change, but the vast quantity of freshwater 
required presents a problem; CSP systems are typ-
ically located in places with scarce water resources 
(Bucknall, 2013). Although hydropower is anoth-
er promising technology, it often has major nega-
tive consequences for the communities affected by 
construction of dams, and freshwater withdrawal 
is a serious threat (Wales, 2013).2 There are count-
less such trade-offs and unintended consequences 
effects. 
It is clear that addressing human-induced cli-
mate change in itself will not lead to environmen-
tally sustainable development. Climate change 
mitigation is a necessary, although insufficient, 
step toward this goal. Such development requires 
that all the planetary boundaries be respected. At 
present, climate change is the most urgent issue, 
but an overly narrow focus on low-carbon inno-
vation may mean not only that the other bounda-
ries receive inadequate attention, but also that 
their interdependencies are overlooked (Alten-
burg & Pegels, 2012, p. 8; Mulugetta & Urban, 
2010, p. 7549). Any solution involved in climate 
change mitigation needs to be considered in rela-
tion to the broader perspective of sustainable de-
velopment. 
Although three of the planetary boundaries have 
already been overstepped and they all pose a threat 
to human existence, the most immediate danger, 
i.e., of climate change, has become one of the most 
pressing issues of our time. There is now almost 
universal agreement that the global mean tempera-
ture is rising due to the human-induced increase in 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere.3 In 2013, for the first time in 
4.5 million years, the atmospheric level of CO2 ex-
ceeded 400 parts per million (EIA, 2013). Since 
the mid-1900s we have rapidly been moving be-
yond the planetary boundary for atmospheric car-
bon dioxide concentration, which Rockstrom et al. 
(2009) calculated at 350 ppm (see fig. 1).
As a result, the climate on earth is changing – 
on average getting warmer – with rising sea levels 
and ‘climate chaoses’ characterised by more fre-
quent and stronger weather phenomena such as 
droughts, floods, storms, and heat waves. Accord-
ing to the EIA, the goal of limiting the global long-
term average temperature rise to 2 °C above prein-
dustrial levels ‘remains technically feasible, though 
extremely challenging’ (EIA, 2013, p. 9). Without 
action, rises are more likely to be between 3.6 °C 
and 5.3 °C, with the bulk of the changes occurring 
before 2100.
Keeping within the 2°C threshold is possible 
only with very rapid ‘decarbonisation’, i.e., a reduc-
tion of carbon emissions in the energy sector and 
in the whole economy (Schmitz & Becker, 2013). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
suggested in its Fourth Assessment Report that, by 
2050, carbon emissions needed to be reduced 50 
percent from 1990 levels, starting in 2015 (IPCC, 
2007). To have a realistic chance of limiting the 
probability of a global temperature increase to less 
than 2°C during this century, GHG emissions 
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must be reduced by approximately 80 percent be-
fore 2050. 
There is widespread agreement, however, that 
this schedule for reducing carbon emissions will 
not be met: ‘The world is not on track to meet the 
target agreed by governments to limit the long-
term rise in the average global temperature to 2 
degrees Celsius’ (OECD/IEA, 2013, p. 9). A new 
climate change agreement within the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) should be in place by 2020, but ma-
jor changes are required to maintain any chance of 
reaching the 2 °C target. As emphasised below, the 
necessary changes are massive and it seems unre-
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Source: NOAA/ESRL (2013). Parts per million (yearly averages) measured at Mauna Loa, Hawaii.
Fig. 1. Accumulation of atmospheric CO2 concentration
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alistic that major changes would be implemented 
in the short run. However, problems are growing 
as we approach an environmental tipping point; 
at that point, the costs of tackling climate change 
will rise and the urgency of changing from finite 
resources will increase:
The question is thus not whether the 
global economy will adopt resource-
efficient (and particularly low-carbon) 
production or not: it will have to. The 
question is whether this transition will 
be organised before major environmen-
tal and economic crises occur or wheth-
er abatement action will be taken only 
under the pressure of acute crises and at 
a far higher cost (Altenburg & Pegels, 
2012, p. 8). 
Therefore, the world is faced with a deadline. At 
the core of the challenge is the global economic 
system’s dependence on fossil fuel-based energy 
sources. The energy sources currently being ex-
ploited emit greenhouse gases that lead to climate 
change. Since the current economic systems are 
predominantly based on fossil fuels, a drastic 
change is necessary and hinges on the creation of 
CO2 neutral systems.4
This would help to mitigate climate change by 
reducing and phasing out fossil fuels and chang-
ing the energy consumption patterns. The global 
economy will need to adopt resource-efficient 
modes of production. In the short run, the most 
efficient techniques currently available need to be 
adopted, but in the longer run entirely new tech-
niques need to be developed (to be discussed in 
the next section). Very drastic reductions in the 
degree of dependence on fossil fuels are necessary 
within a relatively short time. A rapid implemen-
tation of such drastic reductions is difficult to un-
dertake because of the magnitude of the changes 
involved. The vastness of a low-carbon transition 
is equal to earlier large-scale societal transforma-
tions such as the industrial revolution. As the 
United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs has put it, a ‘global green technolog-
ical transformation, greater in scale and achiev-
able within a much shorter time-frame than the 
first industrial revolution’ is required (UNDESA, 
2011, p. 1). 
Revolutions entail broad interlocking societal 
changes, but even single components of change 
present major challenges. For example, the elec-
tricity sector is a key component in this respect. 
Decarbonising the global electricity sector by 
2050 would require an added low-carbon capacity 
of about 32,000 terawatt hours per year, five times 
the capacity of the whole power sector in 1973 
(Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004). A total replacement 
of hydrocarbons in energy production by 2050 
would imply that the renewable energy industry 
must double its capacity every seven years for 70 
years. Conversely, after two centuries of increase in 
carbon-based energy at the magnitude of 3.5 per-
cent annually, the world must learn to reduce its 
dependence on carbon at the same rate for decades 
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ahead (Laestadius, 2013). Reducing the energy 
use and greenhouse gas emissions associated with 
growing and increasingly urban populations will 
require drastic changes in consumption patterns, 
transportation and industry systems, residential 
and building infrastructures, and water and sani-
tation systems.
History offers many examples of major envi-
ronmental crises that have severely reduced popu-
lations or forced them to move away from their 
habitats. However, the global scale of the climate 
change makes it a different challenge. Moreover, its 
causes and effects are distributed unequally across 
the globe. Climate change affects continents and 
regions very differently, with the least developed 
regions most negatively affected. These countries, 
in turn, have comparatively low per capita emis-
sion rates. Hence, those least responsible for cli-
mate change are those that are most vulnerable 
to it. The global problems of poverty and climate 
change are therefore closely interrelated. Any effort 
to tackle poverty on a global scale – to lift poor sec-
tions of societies into the middle classes – through 
the stimulation of income growth created and sus-
tained by existing energy-related technologies will 
lead to gross overstepping of the planetary bounda-
ries. The next section will elaborate on the inter-
locking nature of this complex of problems. 
1.2 Development, fairness,    
and limits to growth
From an historical perspective, economic growth 
has been concentrated in the established economic 
powers, i.e., the OECD countries, which have also 
accounted for the majority of carbon emissions. 
More recently, global economic growth has been 
fuelled by new economic powers, i.e., large devel-
oping countries such as Brazil, China, India, and 
South Africa. Critically, the energy-intensive life-
style of current advanced economies are now being 
emulated globally (Wolf, 2012). This increases the 
environmental pressure as it aggravates the prob-
lems of the unequal distribution of income be-
tween countries, which are in turn connected with 
powerful ’demonstration effects’.5 
To remedy this situation, values that induce 
more environment-friendly lifestyles and consump-
tion patterns must be developed first in wealthy 
countries, as these have been in the forefront of 
defining aspirations for the global middle classes. 
Although the concept of low-carbon development 
was championed by donor agencies (pioneered by 
DFID in the United Kingdom, in particular), the 
process does not depend primarily on mitigation 
and adaptation strategies in and for the developing 
world. The United States and Europe, which have 
led the development of consumerism that inflicted 
heavy damage on the climate, now have to take the 
lead in developing new environmental values. The 
attention of both producers and consumers must 
be directed toward conserving environmental re-
sources through a combination of regulations and 
incentives. Furthermore, a shift in values and eth-
ics is necessary. The current imperatives of ‘more is 
better’, combined with the observation that human 
needs are relative – they are defined in relation to 
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what people have, they are not absolute  – makes it 
impossible to procure enough goods and services, 
regardless of the scale of economic growth. With-
out changes in values and ethics, development will 
remain locked into growth-dominated modes with 
poor outlooks for sustainability. 
Although ‘frugal innovations’ from the develop-
ing world may show the world how to reduce ma-
terials and waste, it seems that the core changes 
in value have to come from the top of the in-
come distribution hierarchy where aspiration 
level’s tend to defined; in this sense a bottom-up 
approach starting in the developing world will 
not work. Urging the rapidly growing emerging 
economies to take their ’fair’ share of the respon-
sibility for the global environment – as seems to 
be the view of most high-income countries – does 
not convince developing countries, because it is 
unfair. Moreover, it will not increase the sustain-
ability of consumer values. The implication is not 
that the wealthy world should take responsibility 
for low-carbon development while the developing 
world should do the ‘development’ part. On the 
contrary, the implication is that low-carbon devel-
opment should be a global, albeit a globally differ-
entiated, process that promotes much more than 
just ‘green growth’. The process fosters economic 
growth while making growth processes sustainable 
(Hallegatte et al., 2012).
Green growth will not be capable of overcoming 
the long-term limits on growth (Jackson, 2009). It 
is useful to see the problem in an evolutionary per-
spective:  we understand production as energy and 
that materials are made into goods and services for 
consumption in a process directed and controlled 
by knowledge. If we expect production to grow ex-
ponentially, the production process will eventually 
meet material and energy limits because exponen-
tial decrease in the material and energy require-
ments of production is difficult to imagine. This is 
also the case when we take recycling into account. 
The total decoupling of materials and energy from 
production growth is probably unattainable. 
However, if we assume (as we often do) that the 
growth of knowledge will not meet with compa-
rable limits on materials and energy, we may post-
pone putting limits on the growth of the creation, 
distribution, and use of new knowledge. In fact, 
any serious move toward a new development path 
radically less wasteful of energy and materials has 
to rely on the development and implementation 
of new knowledge. In other words, it will hinge on 
innovation. We may call this ‘dynamic economis-
ing’ with materials and energy. This means that we 
should use not only the existing resources in the 
most efficient way within the possibilities offered 
by existing technologies, but constantly develop 
new knowledge and resources that enable us to 
economise even further. 
It is important to observe that a discussion of the 
economic growth process under the restraint of the 
material and energy side covers only one aspect of 
the problem. We may refer to this as the ‘source 
side’, where the transformation of materials and 
energy creates unwanted by-products. However, 
there is also another side, the ’sink side’ of the prob-
 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    25
lem, which concerns the storage and concentration 
of those by-products. This side is closely linked to 
the limited ‘carrying capacity’ of the earth that was 
mentioned earlier.6 Even allowing for a permeable 
boundary between sinks and sources, the planetary 
boundaries are all predominantly the result of the 
earth’s limited carrying capacity on the sink side.
1.3 Green path creation as a solution   
to carbon lock-in  
It is widely agreed that countries in the North are 
often deeply locked into fossil fuel-based energy 
systems (Smith, 2009; Unruh, 2000) and that most 
developing countries are following a similar path of 
carbon-intensive energy systems (Unruh & Carril-
lo-Hermosilla, 2006). The factors driving ‘carbon 
lock-in’ are multiple, but four factors seem essential.
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technological systems that are central to the 
functioning of society; they are not individual 
artefacts that can be changed independently. 
This feature of energy technology and the 
weight of other sectors’ dependency on energy 
make energy technological systems difficult to 
change. 
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nologies are subject to path dependency. When 
understanding technology as a socio-technical 
system consisting of interlinked artefacts, path 
dependency is created by the interaction of fac-
tors such as economies of scale, network exter-
nalities, adaptive expectations, and knowledge 
accumulation. These mechanisms are enforced 
where interindustrial dependencies are present. 
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firms encounter in reorienting their core com-
petences impede the shift to low-carbon devel-
opment. Incumbent technologies have dem-
onstrated the capacity for radical performance 
improvement when threatened by emerging 
technologies. For example, the ongoing ‘shale 
gas revolution’ indicates that fossil energy is 
fighting back rather than going green. 
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new ‘green’ actors in terms not only of financial 
and human resources, but also of political in-
fluence; these factors may amount to powerful 
resistance to change. This is further aggravated 
by the fact that many of the organisations in 
need of transformation hold powerful posi-
tions, such as public companies, ministries, 
and energy agencies with strong political influ-
ence (Walz, 2007). 
The mechanisms leading to lock-in are often sup-
ported by formal as well as informal institutions in 
terms of consumption routines, energy use, and in-
frastructure operation (Unruh, 2000). This makes 
the shift to LCD difficult in general but there are 
additional factors underlying the carbon lock-in 
that is taking place in the developing world.
Although developing countries have multiple 
opportunities to move along distinct innovation 
paths and reduce the carbon intensity of devel-
opment trajectories, strong forces are working 
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against this. A case in point is the relative immatu-
rity of most green technologies. For example, even 
though the number and scale of renewable energy 
technologies (RETs) are increasing in the South, 
most countries will remain largely fossil-dependent 
for the near future. RETs cannot yet be considered 
‘plug and play’ commodities because they tend to 
disrupt electric systems (or fuel systems) or depend 
upon costly system-level changes.
Secondly, local capacity for mastering the direc-
tion of technological development is often insuffi-
cient. Energy technologies are mainly in the hands 
of large multinational enterprises (MNEs). Due to 
the logic of capital intensity and increasing returns 
to scale in energy technology, the international 
market is oligopolistic. It favours actors that can de-
liver complete packages of capital, competence, and 
finance. MNEs specialise mainly in standardised 
fossil energy packages. For the reasons mentioned 
above, such companies cannot be expected to facili-
tate technological leapfrogging.7 
Thirdly, the expansion of renewable energy sourc-
es is costly, and most developing countries are likely 
to depend on international sources of finance. Three 
sources finance energy system investments: public, 
private, and multilateral organisations. Most devel-
oping countries depend on the international capital 
markets, whose importance in energy finance has 
increased over the last two decades, and on multi-
lateral organisations. Multilateral lending organisa-
tions are essentially banks that must respond to 
market signals and repay debts although they might 
have the influence to distort prices temporarily.8 
Fourthly, production subsidies for petroleum 
products, electricity, natural gas, and coal are sig-
nificant. In 2011, such subsidies amounted to 
USD 480 billion, equivalent to 0.7 percent of 
global GDP, or 2 percent of total government rev-
enue (IMF). Energy subsidisation of this kind is 
seen typically in the South, particularly in oil-pro-
ducing economies in the Middle East and North-
ern Africa. The subsidies mean that renewable en-
ergy is not competing on a level playing field, but 
their removal is hampered by the vested interests 
of the beneficiaries of the system.
The notion of carbon lock-in is useful for identi-
fying the barriers to a low carbon energy transfor-
mation, but it also tends to portray the challenge 
of breaking those barriers as insurmountable. Path 
dependency is not destiny. History is rich in ex-
amples of intentional path creation or shifting 
(Garud & Karnøe, 2001). Carbon lock-in is not a 
static state but a dynamic process in which coali-
tions of actors with different interests compete 
over the direction of change, often by exerting 
influence on institutional change. Lock-in and 
shifting paths can be overcome if ‘low carbon’ 
coalitions become sufficiently strong locally and 
internationally (Schmitz, 2013). Moreover, we 
observe that the carbon lock-in described above is 
increasingly being challenged: International think 
tanks, multilateral organisations, and donor agen-
cies are stressing the need for low carbon transfor-
mation. Important financial actors are responding 
to the inability of financial markets to internalise 
the long-term cost of carbon lock-in. For exam-
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ple: the European Investment Bank recently re-
stricted lending to carbon energy projects; the 
World Bank cut financing to coal; the UN Green 
Climate Fund opened in December 2013. Ad-
ditionally, the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants began to develop new accountancy 
guidelines that clarify the cost of carbon activi-
ties. A group of 70 global investors managing more 
than USD 3 trillion in assets launched the first 
coordinated effort to spur the world’s 45 top oil 
and gas, coal, and electric power companies to as-
sess the financial risks emerging from continued 
carbon lock-in.
1.4 Low-carbon development and innovation
There are broad and narrow views of low-carbon 
development. In the narrow view, low-carbon de-
velopment is the process of transforming the cur-
rent fossil fuel-based economic system, particularly 
the energy system, toward CO2 neutrality. This view 
closely resembles notions of low-carbon growth (El-
lis et al., 2009; DFID, 2009) and is confined essen-
tially to elements of the environmental dimension 
of sustainability (in particular, greenhouse gas). It 
is rooted in the goal of sustainable development 
(Mulugetta & Urban, 2010) while not necessarily 
addressing the multiple planetary boundaries, and 
especially their inter-linkages. 
The broad view differs in two respects. First, in 
contrast to growth-focused concepts (low-carbon 
growth and sustainable growth), it explicitly brings 
together two objectives: climate change mitigation 
and the sustained development of low- and middle-
income countries. It thus includes the social and 
political dimensions of sustainability. In the words 
of Urban and Nordensvärd:
Low-carbon development is a recently 
emerged concept that aims to mitigate 
emissions to avoid dangerous climate 
change, while at the same time achiev-
ing social and economic development 
in a carbon constrained world (Urban 
& Nordensvärd, 2013, p. 7).
Low-carbon development in its broadest sense 
involves more than just reduced levels of carbon 
growth as it aims to promote international de-
velopment, particularly inclusive development 
(see Box 1, next page). The low-carbon devel-
opment concept is a projection not only of the 
co-existence of climate change mitigation and 
international development. It is also inherent in 
the notion that synergies between the two can be 
developed. For example, the push to create green 
energy systems before brown energy systems take 
hold in low-income countries may help to cre-
ate energy access for the poor. However, as will 
be shown, there are many questions about syner-
gies vs. conflicts between mitigation and various 
types of development. 
The second way in which the broad view dif-
fers from the narrow is in the linkages between the 
transformation of the fossil fuel-based system and 
the planetary boundaries, i.e., between low-carbon 
development and environmental sustainability. 
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Sources: Johnson and Andersen (2012) and Section 2.5 of this report. 
Inclusive development is a process of social and 
structural change, which gives voice and power to 
the concerns and aspirations of otherwise excluded 
groups. It redistributes the income generated in 
both the formal and informal sectors in favour of 
such groups, allowing them to shape the future of 
society in interaction with other stakeholder groups. 
In the context of low-carbon development, it is 
important to focus on development as driven by 
interactive learning and innovation. Inclusive de-
velopment may then be conceptualised as a process 
that includes otherwise marginalised groups in the 
process of driving structural change and economic 
growth toward reduced dependence on fossil fuel-
based energy systems. It also gives them a fair share 
of both the substantial values connected to learning 
and the results of learning in terms of income and 
wealth. 
Because of the sheer scale and urgency of the cli-
mate change challenge, low-carbon development 
needs to be inclusive. There is a need for institu-
tions, values, and policies that are capable of includ-
ing and mobilising many companies, organisations 
and other actors. Most importantly, large segments 
of the populations must be mobilised in order to 
break the power of interests vested in fossil-based 
energy. Creative destruction is a necessary part of 
low-carbon development and, without broad inclu-
sion, powerful groups with carbon-based interests 
will be able to retard or even prevent it. 
Successful low-carbon development depends on 
inclusive institutions and values in two ways. First, 
inclusion is a way to mobilise the human and natu-
ral resources and the financial powers required to 
increase the use of renewable energy from its cur-
rent 5 percent of global energy use to nearly 100 
percent. Inclusive institutions are also instrumental 
in the structural transformation and the connected 
redistribution of income and power that will neces-
sarily accompany low-carbon development.
Secondly, inclusion has substantive intrinsic value 
in development. The broad inclusion of all groups 
in the discourse about low-carbon development as 
well as in the implementation process will stimu-
late capability building in the population as they 
are drawn into learning and innovation activities. 
It may be argued that this is the true meaning of 
development. It is also reasonable to assume that 
the instrumental and substantive values of low-
carbon development will be mutually supportive 
and strengthening. If inclusion is valued for its own 
sake, it is more likely that people will engage in 
the process of low-carbon development despite the 
costs involved.
Box 1. Climate change and inclusive development
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Low-carbon development is defined occasionally 
in ways that fall short of the notion of sustainable 
development. Under the definition provided by 
Urban and Nordensvärd above (2013, p. 7), low-
carbon development is – strictly speaking – con-
sistent with transgressing all the planetary bound-
aries except climate change. However, for the 
reasons outlined in this chapter, the interdepen-
dencies between related environmental problems 
should be acknowledged explicitly. The notion of 
low-carbon development works primarily as a fo-
cusing device, directing the attention toward what 
is probably the most immediate and serious en-
vironmental threat, but it should not replace the 
notion of sustainable development.
We define low-carbon development as structural 
change that simultaneously improves living con-
ditions in low- and middle-income countries and 
helps to mitigate climate change without adverse 
effects for other planetary boundaries (fig. 2). 
Engaging in low-carbon development means 
that innovation needs to take a new course that 
supports the shift to a ‘green techno-economic 
paradigm’ (Freeman, 1996, p. 38). It is more about 
the direction of innovation than about the rate of 
innovation. The green transformation will require 
Source: Modified from Urban and Nordensvärd (2013).
Fig. 2. Defining low-carbon development – an illustration
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major changes in production and consumption 
across a range of technological spheres, not the 
least energy, transport, and construction. It will 
be a process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 
2010 [1942]; Bergek et al., 2013) in the original 
sense of the term: existing economic systems have 
to be destructed while new and more environmen-
tally sound ones are created in their place. 
This report uses a systems perspective to the 
transformational challenges. The innovation system 
concept was developed in the late 1980s by schol-
ars in Europe (Freeman & Lundvall, 1988; Lund-
vall, 1992) and the United States (Nelson, 1993). 
These scholars agreed that in order to understand 
how learning and innovation take place, it is crucial 
to understand the interaction between organisa-
tions at the level of the national ‘system’. Since the 
1980s, our understanding of the systemic nature of 
innovation has progressed dramatically. Over the 
last ten years, the systems concept has become used 
widely in studies of learning and innovation in de-
veloping countries (Lundvall, 2009; Lundvall et al., 
2006; Malerba & Mani, 2009; Kraemer-Mbula & 
Wamae, 2010).
Since the emergence of the innovation system 
concept, research into systems has taken two dif-
ferent perspectives; the first adopted a narrow fo-
cus, linking innovation to science and technology. 
The second, and broader, perspective encompasses 
learning, innovation, and competence building 
at different levels of aggregation; it includes expe-
rience-based as well as science-based innovation. 
Narrow definitions of the innovation system are of 
limited relevance when it comes to understanding 
the problems of developing economies. In fact, nar-
row innovation system concepts may be misleading 
for innovation policies in advanced countries, too.
Competence building and innovation stem not 
only from science-based, but also from experience-
based, learning, which unfolds among many sys-
tems actors; these include business enterprises and 
intermediaries such as applied research institutes. 
Learning based on experience may complement sci-
ence-based learning through all phases of develop-
ment, but the former is very important in the early 
stages of development, where the science system is 
somewhat disconnected from the needs of the pro-
ductive economy (Arnold & Bell, 2001). 
Scholars in the Globelics network have explic-
itly sought to capture a broad systems approach 
by referring to LICS rather than solely to inno-
vation systems, but the theoretical heritage from 
innovation system research (Lundvall, 1992; Nel-
son 1993) is explicitly acknowledged.  At the core 
of the concept is the importance of tacit knowl-
edge and interactive learning for innovation and 
growth. Contrary to the view that knowledge is a 
pure public good, a range of research in the field 
of innovation studies has demonstrated that im-
portant components of knowledge are tacit and 
difficult to understand out of context (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; von Hippel, 1994; Johnson et 
al., 2002). This contextually rich knowledge may 
prove costly or even impossible to transfer through 
the use of codified supports or instruments such as 
manuals or journals. 
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Another core idea is that generating novelty 
depends on interaction among actors with related 
but different knowledge. Without this variety or 
difference there is a risk of myopia and of missing 
out on the perception of new opportunities (Noote-
boom, 2000, pp. 72-73). For firms, one way to fos-
ter the exploitation of variety in knowledge is in-
teractive learning within them, both among teams 
and between services and divisions. Another way is 
through interaction with other firms and organisa-
tions in order to draw on outside sources of related 
but different knowledge. This idea is developed in 
Lundvall’s (1985) work on the role of user-produc-
er interactions in national innovation systems.
The concept of learning, innovation, and compe-
tence building systems (LICS) is a further develop-
ment of the innovation system concept. It refers 
both to the system components (such as firms, uni-
versities, research organisations, vocational training 
institutes, and so forth) as well as to the institutions 
that influence their interactions. It is the nature and 
frequency of interactions in the systems that deter-
mine the rate and direction of learning, innovation, 
and competence building. The LICS approach to 
development research is based on the premises that 
learning, innovation, and competence building are 
interdependent processes:
t Learning may refer to attainment and deepen-
ing of skills and know-how as well as to increas-
ingly more adequate information about the 
world. Learning may take place when pursu-
ing routine economic activities or as result of 
search processes, including research.
t Innovation refers to both productive practices 
that are new to the context and to the capac-
ity to develop new technologies for the world. 
It requires a mix of experience-based learning 
and learning from research and development 
(R&D) activities. 
t Competence building is the upgrading of skills 
and capabilities through organisational learn-
ing or through investments in educations and 
training, both in firms and society as a whole.
The concept of LICS puts the mutually reinforcing 
processes of learning, innovation, and competence 
building at the heart of the development process. 
It is fundamental to the notion of LICS that local 
context matters: highly abstract systems analysis or 
policy that ignore the specificities of particular envi-
ronments can be of only limited use in understand-
ing and promoting innovation and development.
Note: See Section 2.1 for a more detailed discussion of the LICS concept. 
Box 2. What are LICS?
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Box 2 introduces the LICS concept and a more 
complete discussion is provided in the next chapter. 
The notion of LICS is built on many years of inno-
vation systems research, but it is devised for analyses 
in the context of developing countries. As Cozzens 
and Sutz emphasise, the notion of LICS ‘opened 
the road to acknowledging that definitively one size 
does not fit all in terms of an innovation systems 
approach, and the specific characteristics of innova-
tion systems in developing countries started to be 
analysed’ (Cozzens & Sutz, 2012, p. 10). 
Recently, a number of studies have tried explic-
itly to apply a learning and innovation perspective 
to the low-carbon challenge. This literature has fo-
cused mainly on the North (Kemp & Soete, 1992; 
Geels, 2002; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2004), but a 
growing body of research focuses specifically on 
developing countries (Altenburg & Pegels, 2012; 
Ockwell et al., 2008; Berkhout et al., 2010; UN-
DESA, 2011). In this report the notion of low-car-
bon LICS is defined as the system of knowledge in-
stitutions, business, policy makers, and users who 
are involved in developing, using, and evaluating 
solutions for low-carbon development.
The focus of this report is on the climate change 
mitigation aspects of low-carbon development, al-
though we acknowledge that adaptation is a neces-
sary and important element of low-carbon develop-
ment.  We also acknowledge that a ‘huge diversity 
of innovation-related adaptation issues will arise in 
poor countries’ due to climate change (Bell, 2009, 
p. 54). 
The UNFCC defines climate change adaptation 
as adjustments in ecological, social, or economic 
systems in response to actual or expected climatic 
stimuli and their effects or impacts. This implies 
that communities anticipate adverse effects and 
take action to reduce the damage caused by, e.g., 
flooding, sporadic seasonal change, storms, and 
draughts. For local communities, policies at the 
global and national levels are often less relevant 
because the effects of climate change tend to vary 
locally. Policies at the local level are more im-
portant in this respect and the efforts to support 
learning initiatives seem particularly important. 
For example, for users of agricultural land, climate 
change adaptation must be enhanced by user-
driven innovation. The climate change research 
community has often used the notion of climate 
change resilience, but this term seems to empha-
sise resistance to externally created pressures. Em-
phasis should be placed on the capacity to create 
new processes and organisational arrangements, 
rather than particular products. As is true of the 
mitigation side, the most important element at 
the adaptation side may reside in the strengthen-
ing of local innovation capabilities.
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2. LICS and low-carbon development
This chapter introduces the notion of learning, in-
novation, and competence-building systems (LICS) 
for a discussion of the requirements of low-carbon 
development. This development aims at strength-
ening LICS so that they are reoriented toward 
contributing to the goals inherent to this develop-
ment. Since low-carbon development is a process 
of radical change, it involves LICS on the regional, 
national, and global levels. Many sectors and tech-
nologies are also involved. 
We argue that economic growth and structural 
change are crucial aspects of low-carbon develop-
ment and that to grasp its possibilities and dif-
ficulties, focus has to be on knowledge creation 
and utilisation, i.e., on learning and innovation. 
We identify a number of areas in which innovation 
(technical as well as organisational and institution-
al) would be helpful for low-carbon development. 
To implement this, innovation policy has to be re-
oriented from general innovation support to direct-
ed innovation support, which should be reflected in 
any effort to build or support LICS. 
We proceed to discuss the necessity of new or 
changed values, institutions and policies in the im-
plementation of low-carbon development. A partic-
ularly important aspect is the role of social inclusion 
in such changes.
Finally, we address the critically important issue 
of connecting the necessary institutional changes 
to the process of globalisation and to the regulative 
powers of nation states. The problem is that there is 
not a functional regulatory framework. If interna-
tional cooperation and regulation are not strength-
ened and made more efficient, environmental 
destruction may continue in spite of the political 
readiness for increased environmental protection. 
2.1 Learning, innovation, and competence 
building systems
The LICS concept is an adaptation of the inno-
vation system concept to a development perspec-
tive. The notion of innovation systems (national, 
regional, local, sectoral) was first applied to high-
income countries as studies of ‘observed phenome-
34   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
na’. In this situation, innovation systems have often 
been studied in a positive rather than normative 
framework, i.e., as actually existing systems. The 
IS concept is often used as a device for focusing on 
resource creation through learning and innovation, 
rather than on the allocation of already existing, 
but scarce, resources. The concept is applied also 
to the selection and study of the entities driving 
the innovation processes (various routines, firms, 
government agencies, networks, markets, etc.). 
The perspective changes when developing coun-
tries are studied. Innovation capabilities and inno-
vation systems tend to be fragmented, with inno-
vation being an activity in specific and sometimes 
isolated parts of the economy. Innovation processes 
are typically imitative and take the form of adap-
tation rather than introducing new-to-the-world 
elements. This situation tends to shift the IS per-
spective from systems description toward systems 
building.
Innovation systems in high-income countries 
often emerge and evolve, if not entirely by them-
selves, then to some extent behind the backs of 
private and public decision makers. In low-income 
countries, however, waiting for innovation systems 
to evolve may not be feasible. We want to shape, 
build, and nurture them through many different 
kinds of policy making. Building innovation sys-
tems becomes part of a development strategy. 
In developing countries, there is a strong focus 
on the formation of innovation capabilities that 
are clearly needed at various levels (the individual, 
the firm, the government, the community, etc.) 
and in many sectors (agriculture, industry, service, 
government, etc.). Furthermore, there are many 
kinds of capabilities that are important in this 
context: technical, organisational, social, political, 
etc. It is obvious that such capability building re-
quires that learning is organised and supported on 
a broad scale, at every level in the formal education 
system as well as in firms, communities, and fami-
lies. To succeed in shifting attention toward inno-
vation capabilities, it is necessary to view substan-
tial parts of the development process as a learning 
process. We need to regard the process as broadly 
based since there are numerous sources of learn-
ing. While in high-income countries with well-
performing innovation systems it may be useful 
to focus the analysis on R&D systems and high 
tech-based innovation, this makes little sense in de-
veloping countries. There we need to use broadly 
based innovation system analysis.
In a Globelics context, the use of the LICS con-
cept signals that learning, innovation, and com-
petence building are considered core processes in 
development; additionally, building LICS may be 
a central part of a development strategy. To build 
LICS means to support the establishment of in-
frastructures, institutions, and organisations that 
stimulate learning, innovation, and competence 
building processes on different levels of aggrega-
tion. The LICS notion applies, however, not only 
to developing countries. It implies a partial rather 
than a total change of focus. Development is con-
stituted by similar processes across the globe. It is 
an ongoing process with sources in learning al-
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though the role and performance of innovation is 
different in the North and the South. The way we 
use the IS notion also has to be different.
On a global scale, the implications of low-car-
bon development are very different for individual 
countries due to their different conditions and re-
sources, e.g., in areas such as technological com-
petence, financial resources, and the presence of 
wind, biomass or hydropower. In the South, LICS 
are generally weaker in scale, scope, and invest-
ment, and system components are neither well 
connected nor coordinated, with the result that 
these countries are rarely well prepared for devel-
oping new energy technology (Sagar, Bremner & 
Grubb, 2009). Moreover, the majority of compe-
tences underpinning renewable energy technolo-
gies are concentrated in the North. Even though 
innovation competences are undergoing a global 
redistribution, further improvement of existing, 
and the development of new, renewable energy 
technologies are expected to happen mostly in the 
North. As a consequence, international technology 
transfer and collaboration in the field of renewable 
energy technology must be a central dimension of 
low-carbon development. 
For many developing countries, the key process 
for addressing energy needs can be summarised 
thus: expand affordable energy supplies and ser-
vices, improve energy efficiency, transform tra-
ditional renewable energy systems into modern 
ones, and simultaneously improve and gradu-
ally dismantle fossil energy systems.9 In contrast, 
the technology needs emerging from the en-
ergy needs are to: accelerate technology transfers, 
adapt the latter technologies to local ecological, 
cultural, and economic conditions and to unad-
dressed local needs, and, in turn, stimulate broad 
dissemination. Large competence gaps between 
local needs and local capabilities are frequent (Sa-
gar, 2013). The implications of supporting low-
carbon development are thus quite different for 
LICS in the North and in the South. However, 
this is not merely a process of diffusion and ad-
aptation initiated from the North. It is primarily 
a process of strengthening LICS in the South so 
that energy systems can gradually become more 
innovative and capable of meeting local needs 
(section 4.4). 
2.2 LICS and low-carbon development
A discussion of the specific case of low-carbon de-
velopment presupposes an analysis of the role of 
learning, innovation, and competence building. 
This involves much more than R&D, R&D-based 
innovation, and innovation in high-tech activities, 
which seem to be the most common focus areas. 
It requires a much broader approach, one that 
includes an analysis of the structure and change 
of a number of systems of learning, innovation, 
and competence building, which support, or may 
be induced to support, low-carbon development. 
Since such development must be seen as a process 
of radical change, it is clear that it involves inno-
vation systems on several levels (for example local, 
national, and even global levels) and many sectors 
and technologies. 
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Furthermore, it would be counterproductive to 
limit the discussion to technical aspects of learn-
ing, innovation, and competence building. Effec-
tive low-carbon development also needs to include 
organisational and institutional change as well as 
changes in the realms, instruments, and techniques 
of policy making. We do not yet know precisely 
which technologies need to be developed, nor do 
we know what organisational changes may be re-
quired. One country will be different from the next. 
The ways in which institutions and policy making 
need to be changed are also unclear. We do know, 
however, that some of the necessary technical, or-
ganisational, and institutional changes will be quite 
radical and that they will interact with each other. 
Unless we take into account these linkages and 
interactions, we will be unable to understand the 
requirements of low-carbon development. This is 
why we should use a systems approach to deal with 
the challenge and why we should assume that LICS 
are relevant and important to our understanding of, 
and policy making in, low-carbon development. 
Based on this background, it is clear that a dis-
cussion of low-carbon development should rest on 
a broad and flexible notion of LICS. The broad 
scope enables us to embrace many kinds of inno-
vation, minor as well as major, technical as well 
as organisational and institutional. Flexibility is re-
quired, as the innovation capabilities that need to 
be developed differ among countries. 
Providing equal opportunities, especially in edu-
cation and health care, has been crucially important 
in most recent examples of successful development 
(Johnson & Andersen, 2012). It is thus reason-
able to assume that the impact on the livelihood 
of marginalised and poor people will be important 
also to the building and performance of innovation 
systems that can support low-carbon development. 
Moreover, if large segments of the population are 
deprived of participation in the process of low-car-
bon development, and if its potentially great eco-
nomic, social, and political costs (i.e., the costs of 
structural change accompanying all development 
processes) are distributed unequally and unjustly, 
the result may be not only weak support, but also 
protests and resistance from the negatively affected 
groups. 
We conclude that a LICS approach to low-car-
bon development has to be broad, flexible, and 
inclusive.
This conclusion is strengthened further by the 
vast quantity of resources required for dismantling 
carbon-based energy systems and building new 
systems based on renewable energy; this is a ma-
jor problem on its own. It involves not only the 
costs of developing new knowledge, new organisa-
tions, and new institutions; it involves compensat-
ing people who stand to lose income and wealth 
from structural change. Massive investments of 
physical capital – equipment, materials, buildings, 
energy, transport systems, etc. – are also needed. 
We are unable to offer a realistic estimation of the 
investments required, but it takes little imagina-
tion to see that a major mobilisation of economic 
resources will be required, especially when seen in 
the short-term perspective. 
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As mentioned at the beginning of this chap-
ter, low-carbon development is concerned with 
strengthening national LICS so that they are reori-
ented toward contributing to the goals inherent in 
low-carbon development. For some countries, this 
may imply the building of low-carbon energy tech-
nology systems of innovation. For other countries, 
it implies a strengthening of dissemination and ad-
aptation capabilities for low-carbon energy and for 
LICS in general, but without engaging in the con-
struction of low-carbon energy technology systems.
With regard to energy transformations (the topic 
of Chapter 3), it may be worthwhile to focus on 
technology levels. In a given country, LICS with a 
focus on particular low-carbon technologies (e.g., 
solar photovoltaic (PV) technology) do not neces-
sarily exist. In such cases, the support of sectoral or 
technology-specific LICS are important. To do so 
we must understand LICS as social organisms that, 
as flowers in a garden, must be nurtured. 
However, the observation of practical technol-
ogy-specific LICS building often shows that these 
processes ultimately hinge on the strength and effi-
ciency of existing national LICS and industry struc-
tures. A case in point is Bangladesh, where a local 
manufacturing industry in the field of solar energy 
was successfully developed. In contrast, Kenya’s fail-
ure in this regard provided a strong demonstration 
of the influence of differences in existing compe-
tences when industry-promoting policies were en-
acted (UN, 2011, p. 141). See Box 3 for further 
details on systems competence building in Kenya. 
The box shows that although Solar PV has had con-
siderable success in Kenya, it has been concentrated 
in solar PV deployment; on the other hand, manu-
facturing has been confined to ‘experimentations’ 
and these have been adversely affected by national 
instability.            
Photovoltaic (PV) technology already gained a 
foothold in Kenya in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. It was used to power commercial and com-
munity applications such as telecommunications 
facilities and health centres. The first recorded ex-
perience with Solar Home Systems (SHS) stems 
from the mid-1980s, when an ex-Peace Corps vol-
unteer, Harold Burris, used PV technology for his 
home. In 1985, Burris teamed up with another 
Peace Corps volunteer, Mark Hankins, to install 
PV lighting in a rural Kenyan school. Following 
this installation, the headmaster and teachers 
wanted PV for their homes. From this point, Bur-
ris began to market his solar home systems locally, 
in a relatively wealthy part of Kenya. Within a few 
years, Burris and his technicians were busy install-
ing SHS, and the PV suppliers in Nairobi entered 
this growing market once they received news of the 
success enjoyed by Burris.
Hankins also began to exploit this opportunity 
but focused initially on solar training. Through his 
own company, Energy Alternatives Africa (EAA), 
Box 3. Solar home systems in Kenya
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he won project funding to support experimenta-
tion with ideas for further developing the SHS 
market. Over the next decades, EAA became an 
important player in Kenya, implementing many 
donor-funded projects. These projects included in-
stalling PV systems in community buildings, such 
as schools and hospitals, along with the training 
of local technicians. Other projects involved de-
veloping and testing various products or balance-
of-system components, such as solar lanterns or 
charge regulators. Some projects experimented 
with building local manufacturing capacity for 
solar batteries, while others tested various financ-
ing mechanisms, such as microcredit through local 
savings and credit cooperatives.
EAA can be seen as an innovation system opera-
tor in the Kenyan SHS domain. The worth of this 
market is now about USD 6 million annually and 
more than 320,000 SHS are installed in homes 
across the country (Byrne, 2011; Ondraczek, 
2013). Further advances have been observed sub-
sequently. For example, the Kenyan government 
– for many years hostile to PV (and other renew-
able energy technologies) – recently implemented 
a large project to install PV systems in schools, a 
project worth about a third of the annual SHS mar-
ket. Kenya now has a feed-in tariff for PV. A recent 
development is the start of solar module assembly 
through a Dutch-Kenyan joint venture (see http://
www.ubbink.co.ke/). Earlier, a Chinese company 
had shown an interest in manufacturing modules in 
Kenya (Disenyana, 2009) but the deal fell apart fol-
lowing the postelection violence in 2008. It is also 
worth noting that, contrary to widely disseminated 
rhetoric, development of the Kenyan SHS market 
was not led by the private sector. Instead, it depend-
ed crucially on donor interventions to create spaces 
for experimentation and learning, interventions 
that often involved private sector actors who then 
used the learning to further develop their market 
activities.
Source: Byrne and Ockwell (2013). 
The multilevel interdependency between national 
and technology-specific LICS implies that, as new 
technologies and knowledge are developed, adapt-
ed, disseminated, or used in the national LICS, 
this knowledge is itself transformed. One implica-
tion is that building technology-specific LICS (at 
lower levels of aggregation) constitutes a diversifica-
tion and transformation of the national LICS (at 
higher aggregation levels) because LICS are open 
and recursive systems. Hence, the process of build-
ing technology-specific LICS is necessarily embed-
ded in and co-evolves with the national LICS. In 
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this perspective, a low-carbon transformation of the 
energy sector (from black and brown to green) be-
comes a matter of building renewable energy LICS 
in a process where national LICS are made more 
low carbon. 
The successful development, adaptation, dissem-
ination, and use of new energy technology depend 
on a number of interrelated and interacting factors. 
In the early phases, the focus is primarily on tech-
nical aspects. Once acceptable technical solutions 
are found, the focus moves to developing a viable 
product of interest to users. They should therefore 
be involved in the product design processes. At the 
same time, companies need to change focus from 
R&D to enhancing manufacturing capacity and 
building supply chains and relevant infrastruc-
tures. Design alterations and up-scaling processes 
tend to have strong feedback mechanisms connect-
ed to the original technical configuration. Hence, 
these steps would ideally happen partly in parallel 
rather than sequentially. Various forms of finance 
are necessary in the process – venture and seed cap-
ital for initial search and debt financing for up scal-
ing. Any kind of expansion of production capacity 
rests on a demand for the product. Typically, there 
is a need for public authorities to engage in mar-
ket formation by establishing technical standards, 
public procurement, financial incentives, and/or 
use required by law. Such initiatives help reduce 
user uncertainty and secure initial demand, which 
can facilitate learning by doing and the effect on 
economies of scale. Such a process of technology 
development/adaptation depends additionally on 
a number of factors. Are there clear financial in-
centives for companies to enter this particular low-
carbon industry?  Are the technical competences in 
place, and are they sufficiently entrepreneurial to 
face the risks involved? Governments are often re-
quired to incentivise companies by creating ‘green 
rents’, e.g., by protecting and encouraging them 
(Altenburg, 2012); they also invest in collective 
complementary assets such as technology-specific 
knowledge development (education, training, and 
research) and infrastructures. All the elements are 
systemically interrelated. Hence, developing, im-
porting and adapting, disseminating and using 
low-carbon technology is essentially about build-
ing low-carbon LICS. 
Due to the differences in competence and knowl-
edge between North and South, and the role of ab-
sorptive capacity in technology transfer activities, 
countries in the South must build renewable energy 
technology-specific LICS. This will enable them to 
receive new technology and successfully adapt it to 
local conditions, ensuring large-scale dissemination 
and use. Low-carbon development thus involves 
building low-carbon LICS in both the North and 
the South and stimulating their interaction. 
2.3 Knowledge, growth, and change
Inventions and innovations enabling more in-
tensive and extensive uses of both renewable and 
nonrenewable natural resources have been prereq-
uisites for population growth and for the unsus-
tainability of the present world economy. Still, if 
technical change has the power to increase negative 
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environmental impacts, it may also have the power 
to do the opposite. In any case, a radical change of 
direction toward low-carbon development is im-
possible without developing and widely utilising 
new knowledge and innovation.
In a LICS perspective, low-carbon development 
is seen generally as an interactive process involv-
ing institutional and technical change. In many 
respects, it must also encompass and utilise eco-
nomic growth in the traditional sense of increased 
production of goods and services. In many regions 
of the world, economic growth is still exceedingly 
important as a means to a better life, even if growth 
must be combined with the allocation of resources 
to reduce illiteracy, illness, malnutrition, and other 
deprivations. In fact, as experienced by Japan, Chi-
na, Korea, Singapore, and many other countries, 
economic growth and structural change were fos-
tered by early public support for the education and 
health of the people. 
Growth is also necessary as a means of building 
new infrastructures, technologies, constructions, 
houses, and machineries on which low-carbon de-
velopment depends. As has already been empha-
sised, low-carbon development requires a massive 
investment of resources not only in the form of 
manual and intellectual work but also of physical 
capital and natural resources. Without economic 
growth, the required massive investments cannot 
be realised. At the same time, however, the aim of 
economic growth must undergo a radical change 
and be directed toward the requirements of low-
carbon development. While economic growth has 
always been accompanied by structural change, 
this coupling becomes more than usually impor-
tant to low-carbon development. 
In summary: Low-carbon development is a pro-
cess of structural change and economic growth 
driven by the interaction between technical and in-
stitutional change. The process depends on several 
kinds of learning and knowledge creation. How-
ever, the low-carbon development discourse has 
thus far focused on technical aspects rather than 
on institutional aspects of the challenge. This is not 
surprising since it is quite obvious that radical tech-
nical change is necessary, but perhaps not equally 
obvious that institutions also need to change in 
radical ways. It is also easier to visualise the various 
technical possibilities than to pinpoint the institu-
tional changes (in property rights, social inclusion, 
incentives, education, financing, etc.) that need to 
accompany them. 
2.4 Innovation for low-carbon development
It should not be difficult to identify a number 
of areas in which innovation, technical as well 
as organisational and institutional, would sup-
port low-carbon development. Energy production 
and consumption need to move away from fos-
sil fuels; final demand should consist increasingly 
of goods and services with low climate impact; 
and technological and organisational knowledge 
should be directed systematically toward the same 
goal. Progress in any of the following, partly over-
lapping dimensions, would be moves in the right 
direction: 
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and new forms of agglomerations; and (i.e., 
city planning and development that reduce re-
source transport and heating). 
Referring to these types of changes, we may think 
of ways in which innovation can contribute to low-
carbon development. Innovation should, however, 
not be viewed as a panacea for any problem con-
nected with climate change. Significant parts of 
current innovation efforts work to undermine sus-
tainability; for example, some consumer product 
innovations are designed only to stimulate con-
sumers’ appetite for a new product model. Another 
example is process innovations that increase the use 
of resources per unit of value produced. In a mar-
ket economy, process innovations that reduce the 
price of resource-intensive products will move the 
production structure in the wrong direction. It is 
therefore necessary to redefine innovation policy 
from general innovation support toward directed 
innovation support, and this should also be reflect-
ed in efforts to build or support LICS. Because of 
the aforementioned differences between LICS in 
the South and the North, this may also imply dif-
ferent policies in each region.
A detailed direction of learning and innovation 
processes is unfeasible. However, history gives 
many examples of how such processes can be 
guided by governments, in order to lead eventually 
to a new technological trajectory in the economy. 
Market forces are obviously incapable of solving 
the problem without guidance, nor can the state 
take on the role of entrepreneur. The so-called ef-
fective demand of future generations is currently 
zero, which indicates a need for strong interven-
tion by forces outside the marketplace. This does 
not exclude the use of market mechanisms; neither 
does it imply central planning and total loss of au-
tonomy for agents in the private sector. Rather, it 
calls for intelligent management of the interaction 
between government interventions, market forces, 
and other actors. The need for creativity and entre-
preneurship in individuals as well as in organisa-
tions may actually be stronger than ever. 
The discussed guidance may take many forms: 
taxation, subsidies, public research, public pro-
duction and procurement, standardisation, and 
regulation. Such policy tools can be selected and 
designed according to their effect on innovation 
and learning. Measures that make procedures 
inflexible should be avoided. They should give 
freedom in the choice of method as long as the 
desired outcome of specific low-carbon objectives 
is reached. 
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The implementation of this kind of guided capi-
talist development will doubtlessly meet with fun-
damental institutional obstacles. One of the most 
severe problems is that nation-states dominate 
political governance while climate change is pre-
eminently a global phenomenon. However, pos-
itive responses to this problem are possible, one of 
which is to point to a green competitiveness strate-
gy. Another is to point to the need for international 
or even global agreements. 
Were it possible to convince policy makers that 
taking the lead in low-carbon development would 
give them an advantage in international competi-
tion, we might expect governments to do so. This 
has taken place at a modest scale, for example, with 
windmills in Denmark, electric cars in California, 
and wind and solar power in China.
However, for various reasons, this argument has 
met with resistance. One is that a low-carbon strat-
egy will be unfavourable to some industries with 
a long historical legacy and with strong political 
power. Organisations that represent the enterprise 
sector as well as the financial-industrial complex 
tend to oppose government intervention if some 
of their members will be affected negatively. Gov-
ernments therefore need to establish alliances with 
those parts of the enterprise sector that have a di-
rect interest in a low-carbon strategy. 
Another factor reducing national efforts in the 
North is the general resistance in the establish-
ment, often fed by mainstream macroeconomists, 
to selective policies that give the state a steering 
role. It is a widespread assumption that the market 
can and should do the job of allocating resources, 
and that governments should become involved 
only when there are obvious cases of market fail-
ure. This market dogmatism in the North may be 
contrasted with the extreme degree of pragmatism 
that characterises the Chinese leadership; it seems 
that as long as a policy works, their leaders have 
no problem with any kind of mixing of markets, 
management, and planning. A change toward a 
low-carbon innovation strategy will require a battle 
with market dogmatism. 
Without international coordination, some of the 
necessary initiatives may be difficult to implement 
at the national level. If industries are footloose, 
new burdens may result in outsourcing to other 
countries, which may have a net negative impact 
on global warming (Wang & Watson, 2007). This 
could be the case if activities are moved to a country 
without green ambitions. The need to design global 
cooperation in parallel with national efforts is thus 
evident, and we can safely say that radical changes 
in economic systems should be anticipated.
With these general reflections in mind, we now 
return briefly to the different areas in which inno-
vation is important. 
2.4.1 Substituting nonrenewable with renewable 
energy and resources 
The process of substitution will involve the pro-
duction, distribution, and use of energy. While 
major technical progress has been observed in the 
production of renewable energy, some of the most 
serious bottlenecks concern storage, distribution 
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nets (grids), and the linking of production to distri-
bution nets. Where, for instance, electric vehicles 
are concerned, both battery technology and insuf-
ficient infrastructure have proved to be obstacles. 
The general picture seems to show a clear agen-
da for research, development, and experimenta-
tion. But a mobilisation of resources is needed to 
tackle the existing problems and create incentives 
for a rapid diffusion of feasible solutions. Polices 
will need to combine market creations such as 
feed-in tariffs with polices for technological ex-
perimentation. (See Box 4 for the case of solar PV 
policies in China.) 
Major problem-based collaborative projects, 
whether national or transnational, need to be es-
tablished in order to overcome bottlenecks. The lo-
In 2011, the share of installed capacity of solar PV 
in China increased to almost 5 percent of world 
solar capacity. This was an increase from only 1 
percent of world capacity in 2008 (REN21, 2011). 
This increase had much to do with the change in 
national policy that focused primarily on promot-
ing the domestic market (Liu & Goldstein, 2012). 
The policies introduced were The Rooftop Subsidy 
Program and Golden Sun Demonstration Program.
The Rooftop Subsidy Program was formulated by 
the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Rural Development of China in March 
2009. This provided subsidies for rooftop systems 
(upfront RMB 15/W) and for BIPV systems (up-
front RMB 20/W) and subsidised 50 percent of 
the cost of supplying critical components for on-
grid PV systems. The Golden Sun Demonstration 
Program was formulated by the Ministry of Science 
and Technology and National Energy Administra-
tion in July 2009. This program supported the large 
(more than 500Mw) solar PV projects over a period 
of 2-3 years. 
Both programs are ongoing. In addition to the 
above, two rounds of public tender for solar pow-
ered projects were implemented in 2009. In 2011, 
to encourage development further, a National Feed 
in Tariff (FIT) scheme was announced by the Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC). In 2012, the National Energy Adminis-
tration (NEA) issued the twelfth Five-Year Plan for 
Renewable Energy Development, demonstrating 
clearly their plan to invest in renewable energy. This 
includes especially the use of solar energy in estab-
lishing the grid system and mobilising local govern-
ment, consumers, and other important actors.
Box 4. Solar PV policies in China
Sources: Iizuka (2013); Zhang and He (2013). 
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cation of strategic missing links is one of the tasks 
facing an intelligent innovation strategy. While 
many cases with great potential for the interlinking 
of knowledge fields present themselves, there is no 
existing mechanism to couple the fields. 
2.4.2 More energy-efficient processes
One of the reasons for the growing labour produc-
tivity over past centuries is the constant increase in 
the cost of labour. We would argue that a similar 
effect on energy and resource productivity could re-
sult from an ongoing increase in green taxes. While 
a steep increase would have the strongest immedi-
ate impact on behaviour, it would need to be com-
bined with a long-term incremental increase in or-
der to shape a new trajectory where focus is moved 
from labour to energy and resource productivity. 
However, because of the need for improved energy 
access in large segments of the population in many 
low-income countries, lower green taxes may have 
to be implemented in these countries.
The development of new capital goods for less 
energy-intensive production will require a combi-
nation of innovation efforts. An important part of 
the strategy will be to locate and offer special at-
tention and support to lead users. Learning to pro-
duce and use low-energy equipment will require 
major effort. In many developing countries, there 
is a large scope for developing more energy efficient 
production, not just for environmental reasons but 
also to reduce production costs. Energy efficiency 
technologies may be promoted earmarked low in-
terest loans to producers but larger systemic issues 
will also need to be addressed. Box 5 discusses this 
for the cases of  Energy Efficiency technologies in 
cassava processing in Nigeria and maize processing 
in Kenya. 
2.4.3 New longer-lasting and recyclable consumer 
products
A challenge for public policy lies in interventions 
that can realise the objective of introducing more 
sustainable consumer products. Superficial forms 
of intervention could aim at sales efforts for the 
stimulation of consumers’ demand for the most re-
cent model of a particular consumer product. An 
alternative would be to establish collaboration be-
tween the enterprise sector and regulatory authori-
ties, in which the producer is recognised as a green 
standard setter.
A third possible avenue of action would involve 
consumers. Consumer organisations may be given 
a clearer mandate to rank products according to 
their energy requirements and environmental im-
pact; governments may likewise set a threshold for 
acceptable minimum standards and exclude non-
acceptable models from the national market. 
These innovation processes will require re-
search and development as well as stronger inter-
action with users. In some fields, users may actu-
ally already be engaged in the innovation process, 
through either user panels or membership in con-
sumer organisations. Where recycling and durabil-
ity are concerned, upgrading consumers’ skills and 
insights through training and information may go 
hand in hand with producer certification. 
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Source: Ndichu et al. (2013)
Box 5. Energy efficiency in cassava and maize processing, Nigeria and Kenya
A recent scoping study examines the status of en-
ergy efficiency technology in Nigeria and Kenya. 
The study has focus on adoption of energy effi-
ciency technologies in micro, small and medium-
sized enterprises in two agro-industry subsectors: 
cassava processing in Nigeria and maize process-
ing in Kenya. 
The evidence from this study also shows the no-
tion that energy efficiency technologies are rela-
tively underdeveloped and government poli¬cies 
are important since they create an enabling en-
vironment for the diffusion of green technolo-
gies. This is so especially through mobilisation 
of critical resources, encouragement/incentive for 
private sector involvement, and facilitation of de-
velopment cooperation activities. Some of the key 
specific findings of the study include: 
t ɨFNPTUJOìVFOUJBMESJWFSTPGFOFSHZFïDJFODZ
technology adoption were similar in both coun-
tries. Key drivers and facilitating factors for 
adoption of energy efficiency measures by cas-
sava and maize processors were in-house knowl-
edge about energy man¬agement, availability of 
technical expertise, and the desire and need to 
save costs. 
t &OFSHZDPTUTBSFB TJHOJëDBOUDPTU JUFNGPS
many agro-industrial sectors but few compa-
nies have adopted sophisticated energy efficien-
cy measures. The main reason for this is that 
the system of innovation for energy efficiency is 
weakly developed. 
t )JHIJOJUJBMTFUVQDPTUTBOEIJHIDPTUPGëOBODF
are the most important barriers to the adoption 
of energy efficiency measures among the cassava 
processors and maize millers. 
t ɨFGPSFJHODPNQPOFOUTPGCPUISFOFXBCMFFOFS-
gy and energy efficiency technologies are mainly 
from China, and to a lesser extent from India. 
There is a need for foreign technology to be more 
adaptable to African contexts and a need to up-
grade African technology. Technical cooperation 
should be based on this insight 
The study establishes that there is a great interest 
among companies to engage in technical coopera-
tion with foreign companies and research institutes. 
Such cooperation can take various forms such as 
schol-arships for African students and training of 
workers, joint research programmes and exchange 
programmes, technological transfer based on Afri-
can solutions which are upgraded and non-African 
technologies which are adapted to the African con-
text. Technical cooperation should however go be-
yond the transfer of technology and include issues 
of creating an enabling environment for techno-
logical acquisition, finance, education and training.
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2.4.4 A change toward less energy    
intensive production
It is unclear whether a low-carbon innovation 
strategy would impede change, including structur-
al change. Some forms of innovations will need to 
be slowed down, e.g., innovations that exploit con-
sumers’ urge for the new or that lead to growth in 
energy- and resource-intensive production. How-
ever, at the same time, other types of innovation 
will need to be stimulated. We would expect the 
restructuring of the overall economy to be acceler-
ated in the process of low-carbon development – or 
at least until a low-carbon development path has 
become firmly established. 
This has implications for the financing of innova-
tion and investment. To channel finance into low-
carbon energy systems and low-carbon production 
and consumption, ‘low-carbon development banks’ 
must be established. Government will play an im-
portant role in determining the direction of invest-
ment, not to select specific projects, but to promote 
specific new industries in order to build low-carbon 
LICS. 
The fundamental enabling mechanism behind 
economic growth – structural change – needs to be 
strengthened rather than weakened. The restruc-
turing will be reflected in shifts in the demand for 
labour. There will be sectors where specific jobs dis-
appear while new jobs in other sectors are created. 
Many existing jobs will require new skills and new 
perspectives. There will be a need for new kinds of 
education and for the retraining of engineers, de-
signers, skilled workers, and managers. 
2.4.5 Transport-reducing location of   
economic activities
As great resources are required for the transport of 
resources from one part of the world to another, 
green movements have made proposals aiming at 
the co-localization of production and consump-
tion. The conventional economic wisdom is that 
any trade that actually takes place is rational be-
cause the specialisation that it reflects contributes 
to higher efficiency. 
The efficiency of the current pattern of global 
trade and the resulting volume of transport of 
people and goods is difficult to judge because the 
transnational corporations that undertake it man-
age a substantial part of the trade. Much company 
trade, particularly intracompany trade is guided by 
a financial, rather than resource, logic. A useful tool 
for reducing ‘excessive trade’ lies in levying taxes on 
international transport and trade in proportion to 
their energy consumption or, more generally, their 
impact on the environment. 
Ongoing innovation processes aiming at more 
efficient methods of transport are taking place in 
areas where a combination of national and global 
problem-based projects could result in major break-
throughs. The high degree of concentration in the 
sector may require that third parties, for instance at 
the United Nations level, help the major business 
groups join forces in order to develop more sustain-
able modes of transport. 
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2.4.6 Low-carbon principles for construction,  
housing and urban planning
For various reasons the construction sector is 
among the most conservative in terms of innova-
tion and organisational change. This is to some de-
gree a reflection of a special division of labour, in 
which project design is separated from implemen-
tation. Another factor that slows innovation is that 
construction teams working on a new building are 
put together ad hoc so that cumulative learning is 
limited. 
When it comes to the construction of green 
buildings, some of the weaknesses of the innova-
tion process will need to be overcome. New com-
binations of technologies and disciplines may like-
wise help develop new forms of housing that are 
comfortable and aesthetic as well as sustainable. 
Governments are already setting new standards 
to ensure that more ambitious plans are prepared 
in collaboration with experts and citizens. Rather 
than being prescriptive, standards should aid a 
goal-oriented approach while leaving room for 
creativity. 
Urbanisation and city growth are major pro-
cesses of economic change, both in the South 
and the North. With regard to urban planning 
and development, there are large untapped pos-
sibilities for saving energy by improving hous-
ing, transport, and waste management and, more 
generally, the improvement of urban infrastruc-
ture and urban order. Urbanisation can become 
a major road to energy saving in which city-based 
LICS may have a crucial role to play. Conversely, 
Bangladesh is one of the least developed economies 
of the world. Under normal circumstances, the 
country holds little attraction for waste manage-
ment projects. The Waste Concern Group, a Bang-
ladeshi social business enterprise, has established a 
successful partnership with World Wide Recycling 
(WWR) BV of the Netherlands, a subsidiary of a 
medium-sized integrated firm with diverse waste 
management expertise. The partners run their ac-
tivities under two joint ventures operating waste 
recycling and waste-to-energy projects.
WWR and Waste Concern Group became pio-
neers by registering the first Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) project focusing on organic 
waste composting. The CDM project has resulted 
in an organic waste handling practice based on 
composting. The compost plant obtains organic 
waste from the population of Dhaka through direct 
collection from vegetable markets. The resulting 
higher-yield, lower-cost compost is sold to farm-
ers, and the carbon credits obtained are sold on the 
international market. The fact that city authorities 
bear no costs is a critical aspect of this model. Waste 
collection is done free of cost; processing takes place 
on land owned by Waste Concern Group.
Box 6. International cooperation on   
sustainable waste management   
in Dhaka
Sources: Waste Concern Group (2004); Doranova (2013).
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under-investment in low-carbon solutions in the 
development of new (mega) cities will come at a 
high cost, both financially and in terms of envi-
ronment and climate change. As described in Box 
6, there are international collaboration projects in 
this field under the auspices of the clean develop-
ment mechanism (CDM).     
This brief discussion of the potential role of 
various kinds of innovation in low-carbon devel-
opment has indicated the need for new kinds of 
LICS. Stronger attention should be given to the 
ways in which innovation affect the amount and 
type of energy used. Performance indicators for 
measuring progress would have to be changed, 
and consumers would have to find new ways to 
satisfy their need for stimulation and newness. 
We see few technical barriers for moving the 
innovation system in this direction; however, the 
political and institutional barriers are huge. Vested 
interests, nationalism, finance capital interests, 
economic market dogmatism, and political short-
termism constitute key barriers for the needed 
change. 
2.5 Values, institutions, and policies
We have described low-carbon development as a 
process of interaction between institutional and 
technical change. However, the few examples al-
ready mentioned indicate that the notion of insti-
tutions must be broadened for use in this context. 
In fact, values and policies also have to be included 
in any discussion of nontechnical barriers to low-
carbon development.
The implementation of environmental protec-
tion policies is aided by the presence of a popular 
feeling of commitment to the environment and 
its protection. This will facilitate the shaping of 
more energy-saving consumer habits and increase 
the acceptance of rising costs in connection with 
introducing low-carbon energy systems. Malleable 
values and expectations about the future may work 
for change in more modest expectations of future 
increases in material living standards. 
The question is from where such values will 
come. Values are shaped in complex processes over 
time and there is no guarantee that new ‘good val-
ues’ will automatically emerge to protect the social 
fabric when needed. Environmental destruction 
will not necessarily lead to support for environ-
mental protection as soon as people realise that 
serious threats are looming. It is true that the in-
creasing focus of public debate on the environment 
and growing scientific knowledge of the character 
of the threats have resulted in broadened environ-
mental awareness. The Euro Barometer question-
naires document that people tend to place environ-
mental problems as some of the most important 
questions for the future.
Lately, however, broad environment problems 
have lost some of their urgency in people’s minds, 
for example where climate change is concerned. 
The financial crisis seems to retard the develop-
ment of stronger environmental values. The cur-
rent tendency toward strongly individualist sen-
timent in Western cultures and a dissemination 
of such values among rapidly growing developing 
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countries are also working against a ‘green’ shift in 
values. Concern for the environment is essentially 
a concern for humankind. This does not sit well 
with the current surge in individualism although 
a contrary cultural and consumer trend can be ob-
served in trends in ecology, fair trade, and sustain-
ably produced products. 
We should not expect any major impact from 
isolated moral campaigns in favour of green be-
haviour on the part of consumers, workers, farm-
ers, managers, and capitalists. The global ecological 
crisis is faced with the problem that, as individual 
actors, we tend to see our own share of responsi-
bility marginal: even those of us who accept that 
the problem is important are reluctant to change 
our behaviour. However, substantial changes in 
the most widely accepted norms are still possible. 
Such changes will be based more upon new in-
stitutional frameworks and regulations than upon 
moral preaching. 
New values need to go beyond ‘green’ shopping 
and practicing low-energy lifestyles because the 
changes required for low-carbon transition must, 
to some extent, be initiated top-down by a strong 
(entrepreneurial) state. This will in turn require 
democratic legitimacy in populations – on a glob-
al scale – that acknowledge the importance and 
implications of the climate crisis and consciously 
vote for the low-carbon path, even if, or when, it 
decreases their material standard of living. This is 
an extremely serious and complex challenge. The 
legitimacy of low-carbon policies is nevertheless a 
premise for achieving anything of significance on 
the supply side; otherwise, manoeuvring space for 
policy changes is very limited.
Thorough ongoing change in economic behav-
iour (i.e., changes in the ways research organisations 
prioritise among different tracks to pursue, the 
ways firms develop and choose product and pro-
cess technologies, how consumers distribute their 
purchases, and how politicians gain power) requires 
a fundamental change in institutional frameworks. 
The decisive institutions are the ones connected to 
the learning society, and special attention should 
be given to policy learning and the institutions 
that support it. New policy instruments and new 
ways of using them must be increased in terms of 
low-carbon development. Deeper environmental 
awareness and new visions about the relationships 
between environment and society, foresight, data 
collection, theory development, new environ-
mental bureaucracies, new forms of cooperation 
between the research system and the political sys-
tem, new legal and regulatory frameworks – these 
are only some of the factors that must be developed. 
It is impossible to describe in detail the depth and 
breadth of the necessary changes. They will depend 
on the context, which shows great variation from 
one country to the other. The development of insti-
tutions and policies should be mutually supportive, 
partly by design and partly by evolution. Because of 
the magnitude of the challenge, inclusive political 
and economic institutions are necessary (Acemoglu 
& Robinson, 2012). By definition, inclusive insti-
tutions distribute power and economic influence 
widely, establish legally binding restraints on the 
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people in power (the rule of law), secure property 
rights and create incentives for large parts of the 
population to invest in learning. These institutions 
also secure the population’s participation, not only 
in production, but also in the management of it. If 
institutions are not sufficiently inclusive, they will 
obstruct the creative destruction of vested interests, 
which typically block necessary new policies. The 
structural change needed for sustainable growth 
and development will be too slow. 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the impor-
tance of social inclusion by institutions and policy-
making processes for the successful implementa-
tion of low-carbon development. To move the 
development and implementation of technologies 
in directions that can significantly reduce the pre-
sent accumulation of environmental problems and 
the dependence on fossil fuels may require devel-
opment, not only of a wide range of new institu-
tions, but also of institutions that include broad 
majorities of the population in political and eco-
nomic decision making. This may be called deep 
institutional change. 
Social inclusion is an important aspect of the 
‘Nordic model’. The Nordic countries are small, 
have high taxes, strong trade unions and generous 
unemployment support. While some economists 
would highlight these elements as being detrimen-
tal to economic performance, the Nordic countries 
are among the most successful economies world-
wide, both in terms of GNP and in terms of well-
being and happiness indexes. Much of their success 
can be explained by the investment of social capi-
tal. This is reflected in the high level of trust that 
makes business transactions as well as interactive 
learning across organisational borders more effec-
tive than in comparable societies. At the level of 
the national political systems, cooperation among 
classes has historically played a fundamental role 
in the way the countries have responded to criti-
cal crises. Lastly, such cooperation is reflected in 
wider active participation in organisational change 
processes and learning in the workplace. The im-
portance of inclusive institutions is not confined 
to high-income countries. Their development has 
been crucial throughout the history of civiliza-
tion and they should therefore not be regarded as 
a high-income luxury that countries in the South 
cannot afford now.
A critically important issue is how many neces-
sary institutional changes are connected to the pro-
cess of globalisation and to the regulative powers of 
nation-states. In a situation where nation-states are 
in mutual political and economic competition, they 
are unlikely to pioneer policies and institutional 
changes that risk damaging their competitiveness. 
If international cooperation and regulation cannot 
be established, environmental destruction will con-
tinue in spite of the political will to prioritise envi-
ronmental protection. Nation-states in Europe and 
elsewhere have historically served as frameworks for 
uniquely high rates of economic growth, rates that 
have enabled the establishment of welfare states 
and the creation of class compromise. The current 
global governance system is strongly rooted in this 
history and new emerging economies such as China 
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and India have started to use national political in-
stitutions to foster rapid economic growth. There 
is a strong connection between the nation-state 
as an institution and current economic growth 
trajectories. 
This becomes especially clear when governments 
focus on increasing international competitiveness. 
Welfare, employment, and growth require that 
domestic firms and experts enjoy conditions that 
are at least as attractive as those found in other 
countries. In its crudest form, competitiveness is 
reduced to the level of wages or wage costs per unit 
of production. Business lobbyists are particularly 
active when it comes to using the argument for 
competition to promote self-interest, e.g., in call-
ing for lower wages and lower taxes. Government 
efforts to respond to ecological challenges by taxes 
on pollution, resource use, and energy have come 
under attack increasingly at the national level be-
cause they undermine the competitiveness of do-
mestic firms or make it less attractive for foreign 
investment. The focus on national competitiveness 
may have a negative impact on the use of resources. 
It slows down the increase in energy and resource 
productivity. Polluting industries with energy and 
resource intensive activities are sheltered in order 
to avoid job loss. 
One way to overcome the trap of competition 
is to enter into global or multilateral agreements 
on environmental regulation. Many years of dis-
cussion about how to improve international envi-
ronmental regulation have produced only meagre 
results.   However, the ability to engage effectively 
in such transnational agreements will be of decisive 
importance for moving toward sustainable develop-
ment. This requires a major change in perspective. 
Today, the nation-state remains a ‘natural’ arena for 
discourse and action, but the solutions need to be 
global. 
This chapter has attempted to clarify the role of 
innovations in low-carbon development and dis-
cuss how this process may be affected by changes in 
institutions, values, and policies. In the next chap-
ter we turn to the support of the development of 
low-carbon LICS. 
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3. Building low-carbon energy LICS
This chapter considers more specifically the trans-
formation of energy systems involved in low-car-
bon development. The key message is that the core 
of any national policy for low-carbon development 
must be the building of LICS; this process must 
be coordinated with international activities. The 
chapter explores the issues involved at the national 
level focusing on energy sector transformations. 
Energy sectors are based on a number of different 
energy technologies. The low-carbon perspective 
seeks to change the mix of energy technologies so 
that overall, the sector becomes ‘lower carbon’. We 
thus apply the notion of technology-specific LICS 
(see Chapter 2). At the sector level, this challenge 
presupposes the creation of LICS for low-carbon 
energy technology, typically renewable energy tech-
nologies, and the phasing out of high-carbon en-
ergy technologies. At the national level, the latter 
is equivalent to changing national LICS into more 
low-carbon LICS.
To structure this analytical task, the issues are pre-
sented separately as important dimensions of low-
carbon development that will be linked together 
in the process. Global low-carbon development 
involves innovation policy measures along at least 
four broad lines:
i the energy supply side and energy access;
ii energy demand, efficiency, and social legiti-
macy;
iii development and dissemination of low-carbon 
infrastructures to facilitate changes on the sup-
ply and demand sides of energy;
iv dismantling high-carbon energy systems. 
These are interdependent dimensions of building 
successful low-carbon LICS. The policy issues are 
addressed primarily in Chapter 5.
3.1 Energy production 
The transformation of energy systems toward low-
carbon development entails innovation along at 
least four dimensions. The first concerns significant 
improvements of existing energy technologies. The 
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second concerns simultaneous improvement and 
large-scale diffusion of renewable energy technolo-
gies to replace fossil energy and satisfy the growing 
global energy demand. Thirdly, we discuss the de-
velopment of radically new sources of energy (for 
the longer term). This translates into investments 
in a range of diverse and experimental paths of re-
search to increase the likelihood of radical techno-
logical energy innovations. Fourth, we discuss im-
provements in energy access in the South.
3.1.1 More efficient fossil energy technologies 
Despite the current strong emphasis on renewable 
energy technologies, fossil energy made up 78.2 
percent of Global Final Energy Consumption in 
2011 (RE 21, 2013). The International Energy 
Outlook 2013 (EIA, 2013a) estimates that global 
energy consumption will increase by 56 percent 
between 2010 and 2040. The report further pro-
jects that the global use of petroleum10 will rise from 
87 million barrels per day (MBD) in 2010, to 97 
MBD in 2020, to 115 MBD in 2040. The growth 
will be concentrated in the transport sector and in 
the South, particularly China and India, while it 
will decrease in the North. The world’s use of coal 
is projected to grow at an annual average rate of 1.3 
percent between 2010 and 2040, to peak in 2025. 
Consumption will be dominated by China (47 per-
cent), the United States (14 percent), and India (9 
percent). Consumption of natural gas is expected 
to increase by 64 percent in the period 2010-2040. 
Gas is an attractive option for many countries as it 
is less capital-intensive than most energy sources 
and has a much lower carbon intensity than oil and 
coal, which makes it more compatible with low-
carbon policies (EIA, 2013a). The implication of 
the likely continued presence and economic im-
portance of fossil energy in the coming decades is 
that strategies for low-carbon development need to 
include initiatives to limit their CO2 emissions (see 
Section 1.4). Ignoring this would undermine con-
structive low-carbon strategies. Three areas of fossil 
energy where innovation can contribute to a low-
carbon development are: the efficiency of coal-fired 
power plants, carbon capture and storage technol-
ogy, and the development of shale gas. 
In 2009, coal-fired power generation alone con-
tributed 30 percent of total global CO2 emissions. 
The efficiency of plants varies enormously due to 
differences in their age, steam conditions, local 
climatic conditions, coal quality, operating and 
maintenance skills, and adopted technology. Even 
though high-efficiency, low-emission technologies 
for coal plants are becoming more widespread (50 
percent of new plants in 2011), approximately 75 
percent of all operating plants used low-efficiency 
technology in 2011 (OECD/IEA, 2012). From 
a global perspective, efficiency improvement is 
therefore one of the most cost-effective and short-
est lead-time strategies for reducing emissions from 
energy production. This is especially true for coun-
tries in the South, where plant efficiency is gener-
ally lower and coal use for electricity generation is 
increasing (World Coal Institute, 2012). In China, 
coal is used for an estimated 77 percent of total 
electricity generation in 2010 (in the United States, 
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it is 44 percent), which represented 40 percent of 
total world coal-fired electric generating capacity. 
Although China has been closing its older, ineffi-
cient coal-fired power plants, the country contin-
ues its rapid increase in coal-fired generating ca-
pacity (OECD/IEA, 2013). Further improvement 
and dissemination of highly efficient low-emission 
technology can be part of a global low-carbon de-
velopment strategy in which innovation plays a key 
role (OECD/IEA, 2012).
Carbon capture and storage technology removes 
CO2 from fossil energy in power plants or indus-
trial use and stores the carbon underground. Car-
bon capture and storage have so far only few, small-
scale applications and is struggling to improve. The 
reasons for this are:
t ɨFBCTFODFPGBEPNJOBOUUFDIOPMPHJDBMEFTJHO
t $POUJOVFEVODFSUBJOUJFTBCPVUUIFMJBCJMJUJFTPG
long-term underground storage;
t 6ODFSUBJOUZBCPVUTVïDJFOUQPTTJCJMJUZPGJN-
proving carbon capture and storage and devel-
oping the vast supply chains for carbon capture 
and storage within the required time, i.e., the 
next two or three decades;
t 6ODFSUBJOUZBCPVUUIFëOBODJBMWJBCJMJUZPGEF-
veloping large-scale CCS systems and supply 
chains; and
t 4USPOHQVCMJDSFTJTUBODFEVFUP/*.#:JTN11, 
fear of crowding out renewable energy technolo-
gies, fear of rebound effects and of legitimising 
continued fossil-energy use (Markusson et al., 
2012).
Carbon capture and storage is thus largely un-
proven on the scale required for a serious impact. 
However, assuming that fossil energy retains its role 
in the world’s energy matrix for the medium term, 
the technology has the potential to form part of a 
lower-carbon process. Carbon capture and storage 
is thus an immature low-carbon technology, pro-
moted mostly in oil and coal producing nations 
such as Norway, Canada, China, and the United 
States. In principle, however, it would have greater 
potential in the South if improved and diffused 
through LICS-building processes. 
The rapid growth of shale gas production in the 
United States has led to a decline in CO2 emissions 
and increased competitiveness of natural gas versus 
coal. Estimates of shale gas resources outside the 
United States are relatively uncertain, and estimates 
will continue to change as exploration continues. In 
the short run, however, major production is expect-
ed in the United States, China, and Canada, while 
Mexico, Chile, and the Middle East (OECD/IEA, 
2013) are expected to join the list. Even though the 
size of life-cycle emission from shale gas remains 
disputed, the fuel is significantly more low-carbon 
than both coal and oil. Hence, if gas replaces coal 
and oil, the further improvement and diffusion 
of the technological competences underlying the 
North American shale revolution could be a strong 
contributor to ‘low-carbon development’ in a nar-
row sense, but due to other environmentally nega-
tive consequences, it may strain other planetary 
boundaries. 
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Innovation in these fossil energy technologies can 
contribute to low-carbon development. The latter 
implies improving and disseminating energy tech-
nology LICS. Improvement involves strengthening 
existing LICS by mobilising resources and support-
ing new learning spaces. Diffusion requires LICS-
building via the support of learning spaces to adapt 
and disseminate technology from abroad. A key 
point in this is to overcome the potential tensions 
between fossil and renewable energy technologies 
in terms of competition for resources. The guiding 
principle must be to lower carbon use and foster 
development. This may lead to a process where fos-
sil energy technology needs to be improved at the 
same time as it is phased out.
3.1.2 Diffusion of renewable energy technologies
By 2011 renewable energy sources accounted for 
19 percent of global final energy consumption (up 
from 16.7 percent in 2010); nuclear energy sup-
plied 2.8 percent and fossil energy 78.2 percent. 
Among renewable energy sources, traditional bio-
mass (wood, charcoal, etc.) made up 9.3 percent 
of energy consumption, with modern renewables 
at 9.7 percent. The latter consists of hydropower 
(3.7 percent), biofuels (0.8 percent), biomass/so-
lar geothermal heat and hot water (4.1 percent), 
and wind/solar/biomass/geothermal power gen-
eration (1.1 percent) (RE 21, 2013). 
Hence, 6 percent of world energy consumption 
currently comes from modern renewable energy 
technologies (minus hydro). Even though overall 
capacity is still fairly low, the global capacity to 
produce renewable energy is growing quickly (RE 
21, 2012). This growth is concentrated in the wind 
energy and solar PV sectors, with India, Brazil and, 
in particular, China as strong participants. China is 
the world leader in wind and solar thermal energy 
(RE 21, 2007, 2011). In 2008, Brazil generated 
2 percent of global renewable electricity (includ-
ing hydropower), China 2.8 percent, India 0.7 
percent, while Germany generated 0.5 percent and 
the United States, 2.1 
The picture is significantly different for Africa, 
where investment in renewable energy remains low 
compared to other regions. The renewable energy 
markets are underdeveloped and energy demand is 
satisfied mainly by traditional biomass and fossil 
energy (RE 21, 2013). The continent, sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular, is facing extraordinary chal-
lenges due to its predominantly rural population, 
large parts of which are without access to electric-
ity. In consequence, biomass and organic waste 
combustion are the main energy sources (cover-
ing 95-99 percent) in residential energy use. The 
unsustainable ways that local biomass and organic 
waste sources are often used create environmen-
tal and health problems. Despite the bleak overall 
picture, there are notable exceptions, with large-
scale hydropower plants (Mozambique, Zambia, 
Namibia, Kenya, Ghana, and Cameroon) and geo-
thermal and solar PV in Kenya (Belward et al., 
2011; Byrne & Ockwell, 2013). 
Despite the growing use of renewable energy 
technologies, it is far from reaching the scale re-
quired (cf. Chapter 1). The inadequate dissemi-
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Plant Type
Minimum Average Maximum
Conventional coal 89.5 100.1 118.3
Advanced coal 112.6 123.0 137.9
Advanced coal with carbon capture and storage 123.9 135.5 152.7
Natural gas fired
- Conventional combined cycle 62.5 67.1 78.2
- Advanced combined cycle 60.0 65.6 76.1
- Advanced CC with carbon capture and storage 87.4 93.4 107.5
- Conventional combustion turbine 104.0 130.3 149.8
- Advanced combustion turbine 90.3 104.6 119.0
Advanced nuclear 104.4 108.4 115.3
Wind 73.5 86.6 99.8
Wind — offshore 183.0 221.5 294.7
Solar PV 112.5 144.3 224.4
Solar thermal 190.2 261.5 417.6
Geothermal 81.4 89.6 100.3
Biomass 98.0 111.0 130.8
Hydro 58.4 90.3 149.2
Source: EIA (2013b). Note: the table shows the total system levelised cost (2011 USD/MWh) for plants entering service in 2018.
Table 1. Estimated cost of electricity according to source in 2018
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nation appears in a context where the dangers of 
climate change are becoming physically visible, 
where policies exist to stimulate dissemination, and 
where a range of renewable energy technologies are 
in place. This apparent paradox finds an explana-
tion in innovation studies. New technologies are 
typically economically inferior to established tech-
nologies and therefore face two serious obstacles. 
First, in spite of their vast potential, the new tech-
nologies may be inferior in terms of performance 
characteristics and cost. The technological potential 
is normally released only after a series of post in-
troduction improvements (learning curves) have 
taken place. Secondly, due to the systemic nature 
of technology, their new forms are relatively disad-
vantaged vis-à-vis established technologies that have 
established infrastructures, institutions, and enjoy 
broad social and cultural acceptance. For these rea-
sons there are no clear or strong market signals for 
the delivery of new technologies to the world even 
though they have the potential to afford large bene-
fits to the public (Sagar, Bremner & Grubb, 2009). 
Accordingly the challenge of dissemination should 
be seen as a process of building LICS specifically 
adapted to renewable energy technologies, in which 
systemic barriers are gradually removed (Jacobsson 
& Bergek, 2004). 
The establishment of a clear cost hierarchy for re-
newable energy technologies is complicated by the 
great variability among countries, and even regions, 
of technology- and location-specific supply chains, 
cost structures, and resource availability (IRENA, 
2012). As discussed, there are nevertheless signifi-
cant cost differences between fossil and renewable 
energy technologies, as well as among different 
forms of renewable energy technologies. It appears 
from table 1 that for renewable energy technologies 
to be able to compete with fossil energy, produc-
tivity-enhancing innovation needs to take place. 
This must happen at the same time it is established. 
Such a simultaneous innovation and dissemination 
process is an obstacle, because a technology under 
rapid improvement tends to stall the implementa-
tion process. 
The diffusion challenge can be clarified further 
when seen as involving three different types of in-
novation. Smith (2009) distinguishes between in-
cremental innovation, disruptive innovation, and 
radical innovation.12 Incremental innovation con-
cerns improvements in and the diffusion of rela-
tively mature and established technologies such as 
heat pumping technologies for cooling/heating in 
buildings, and hydropower. Disruptive innovation 
involves technologies with significant unexploited 
technological potential, such as geothermal en-
ergy, solar panels, and wind energy (particularly 
offshore). Radical innovation concerns relatively 
immature technologies such as fusion power, hy-
drogen, ocean energy, advanced fuel cells, space-
based solar power, and similarly advanced energy 
storage technologies, e.g., batteries, capacitors, 
and compressed gas storage. These distinctions al-
low us to see the need for different types of learn-
ing spaces ranging from basic science to market 
creation. Incremental innovation and dissemina-
tion possibly may be achieved with market-based 
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instruments such as carbon taxes and renewable 
energy quotas. Disruptive innovations and their 
dissemination require technology-specific poli-
cies, further market formation, and public pro-
curement to stimulate competence building. Fur-
thermore, nascent markets are needed to support 
learning spaces in which performance characteris-
tics can be improved. 
Access to finance and further market creation will 
be crucial. Relevant policies include technology-
specific feed-in tariffs and low-carbon financing. 
More radical forms of low-carbon energy innova-
tion are necessary for the longer term, thus call-
ing for basic research. Here learning spaces have a 
stronger orientation toward such research, R&D, 
and experimentation. The investments needed are 
not only highly uncertain, but also large-scale and 
capital-intensive, and must be expected to take a 
long time; coordination problems are also foreseea-
ble. These features are augmented as we move from 
incremental through disruptive to radical innova-
tions; it is therefore to be expected that private ac-
tors will play a rather minor role (Ghosh & Nanda, 
2010; Mazzucato, 2013), and that internationally 
coordinated and government-driven mission-ori-
ented programmes will be necessary. 
Although such a process may be expected to be 
coordinated from the North, countries in the South 
must participate in order to develop critical absorp-
tive LICS for further dissemination. All three types 
of innovation and dissemination are necessary, and 
must be coordinated across technologies (including 
fossil energy), time, and space to further low-car-
bon development. Each type will demand different 
policy instruments. 
Another aspect of the dissemination challenge in 
low-carbon development is to create the necessary 
production capacity for the large-scale production 
of renewable energy technologies. The building of 
technology-specific LICS is a necessary but insuf-
ficient step toward establishing a supplier industry 
for renewable energy technologies. The industrial 
dimension of low-carbon development is crucial 
to ensure not only the production capacity for dis-
semination, but also for the economic development 
of countries in the South. It is often posited as a 
central element of low-carbon development that 
countries can develop green jobs, build competenc-
es, and export capital goods. Experience tells us that 
building a rudimentary industrial supply capacity 
for a single new technology takes at least a couple 
of decades. Further decades are required for mov-
ing along learning curves and reaching sufficient 
scale for export demand (Jacobsson, Bergek, Fi-
non & Lauber, 2009). Whether a global effort can 
speed up the process of establishing such industries 
remains to be seen. However, it is clear that most 
countries in the South do not presently have the 
required LICS capacity, and it must therefore be a 
longer-term goal to initiate the industrialization of 
renewable energy technologies. In the short term, 
the goal will be to import, adapt, disseminate, and 
use low-carbon technologies. 
Industrial capacity may follow suit but in any 
case, this issue should be considered from the be-
ginning. The knowledge gap between North and 
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South may mean that global inequality is repro-
duced in low-carbon development: countries in 
the South might continue their neoperipheral 
insertion into the global economy with depend-
ence on innovation from abroad (Arocena & Sutz, 
2010). This would undermine the development 
dimension of low-carbon development. To avoid 
this, the planning of local LICS-building should 
start immediately. Some form of international 
division of labour is, however, to be expected al-
though this may change over time. Hence, the 
processes of innovation, diffusion, and building 
production capacity in the South and in the North 
must interact and take place in parallel, rather than 
in sequence. An innovation-oriented local content 
requirement policy is one of the instruments that 
might help stimulate this process at the national 
level (Johnson, 2013).
One interesting renewable energy technology 
is modern biomass. Modern biomass can be de-
fined as biomass produced in a sustainable way, 
which excludes the traditional use of biomass as 
fuel wood and includes electricity generation and 
heat production, as well as transportation fuels 
(Goldemberg and Coelho, 2004)13 Modern bio-
mass supposes that biomass can be produced and 
consumed in a sustainable way. However, presently 
this kind of biomass is mainly produced and used 
in developed countries, although Brazil is a leader 
in this technology in the developing world, par-
ticularly in Bioethanol (see Box 7). Raw materials 
for modern biomass can be all sort of agricultural 
and forest crops or residues, animal residues and 
urban solid waste. The main advantage of biomass 
products alongside being renewable and low car-
bon emission is that they can be provided as solid, 
liquid or gas fuels. Thus, they can be easily stored 
and compete with fossil fuels in several niche mar-
kets, like in transportation technologies. The main 
uses for bioenergy are heat, electricity and biofuels. 
Solar thermal technologies are also important 
RE technologies, particularly for residential water 
heating. The main technologies for domestic wa-
ter heating are unglazed and glazed water collector 
and evacuated tube collector. Technology domi-
nance is not at the hands of a few manufactures, 
on the opposite, there are plenty of manufacturers 
and product suppliers worldwide. 
The leading use of evacuated tube collector is 
mainly due to the Chinese market which has in-
stalled 152,180 MWth (Mauthner & Weiss, 2013). 
China provides a unique experience since its ac-
celerated solar water heater industry development 
and high market growth rate occurred without any 
incentive policy at national level, no fiscal, taxa-
tion, regular subsidy and financing policies for the 
market and manufacturers. Only a combination 
of long-term R&D and innovation which led to 
low-cost products and high performance-cost ratio 
and a few demand pull initiatives (provincial and 
municipal mandatory installation in new buildings 
and an appliance program for rural areas).
3.1.3 Energy access
Access to modern energy sources is considered 
an integral part of development. Access to lower 
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carbon energy is crucial. A state of energy poverty 
refers to the unavailability of cooking facilities with 
modern fuels and the absence of electrical lighting 
for reading or other household and productive ac-
tivities after sunset. As of 2009, 1.4 billion people 
lacked access to electricity, 85 percent of them in 
rural areas. Almost 2.7 billion people rely on woody 
biomass fuels for cooking. Across the South, the 
energy-poor are faced with the perverse situation 
that even though they consume less energy than 
the majority of the world’s population, they pay the 
highest price per unit of energy. The poorest in the 
developing countries, typically in rural areas, thus 
spend a higher share of their resources (income and 
time) on providing energy to the household than 
the prevailingly urban higher-income groups (Sova-
Brazil has demonstrated strong capacity to increase 
bioenergy supply and demand. Brazil was for a 
long time the world leader in liquid biofuels with 
its ethanol program. However since the middle of 
last decade, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol lagged be-
hind the American corn ethanol. In 2011, United 
States and Brazil accounted for 63 percent and 24 
percent of the world bioethanol production. In the 
other kinds of biomass, developed countries are 
still the world leaders, for instance in biomass for 
power markets, where European Union and United 
States are the world leaders. Biomass responds for 
28 percent of Brazil total energy demand, but un-
like many others developing countries the greatest 
share (20 percent) is modern biomass that is deeply 
inserted into the agro-industrial production system. 
Brazil is the second in the world ranking of electric-
ity biomass generation only after United States, and 
almost 4.6 percent of all domestic electricity supply 
Box 7. Modern biomass in Brazil
Source: Furtado (2013); Ren 21 (2013)
is generated by biomass conversion, mostly of sug-
arcane bagasse.
Ethanol and biodiesel are already important 
biofuels substitutes for gasoline and diesel oil in 
some countries. They can be consumed mixed or 
pure with the adaptation of the engines. Bioetha-
nol is produced from food crops, as corn or sug-
arcane, and biodiesel is obtained from palm, soya, 
or any vegetable oil. In the case of first generation 
biofuels where the bioenergy raw material is not 
a crop residue, energy use can compete with food 
production or with other important agriculture 
raw materials. Second generation technologies 
like hydrolysis, pyrolysis, and even gasification, 
can use agricultural cellulose rich residues in the 
production of ethanol and other fuels, like diesel, 
kerosene, and synthetic gas. Second generation 
technologies are expected to reduce the challenge 
energy-food competition.
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Only 10 percent of the population in the district 
of Kasese, Uganda, have access to the power grid. 
People are restricted to the use of kerosene or ta-
dooba, a paraffin product, in order to enjoy after-
sunset lighting in their homes. Providing access to 
safer and cleaner energy sources is thus a priority, 
but alternatives must be affordable so they do not 
exceed current energy expenses, which correspond 
to roughly one dollar per day.
The Access2Innovation initiative gathers in-
terested stakeholders from various backgrounds 
(companies, public authorities, universities, etc.) 
to develop a solution that addresses energy needs 
in Kasese. The framework discussed for this solu-
tion is the creation of energy hubs, which would be 
centrally located close to schools and commerce, 
offering the recharge of batteries that need to be 
light enough for a child to carry home for use at 
night. Local energy consumption is low. The level 
of energy consumption needs to provide domestic 
lighting, mobile phone and radio charging. The 
generation of energy in the hubs will rely on the 
abundant sunlight photovoltaic panels. The poten-
Box 8. Energy hubs in Kasese, Uganda
Source: Remmen (2013). 
tial of this opportunity relies on the partnerships 
and funding possibilities offered by the facilitators.
Access2Innovation offers access to locally based 
NGOs with a deep understanding of the local 
com munity, its needs, and culture. The project 
enjoys government support. In addition to access 
to energy, the hub format will help raise school at-
tendance, since the children’s trip to school would 
also provide for the daily energy supply. The po-
tentials of the project include the opportunity to 
inspire similar projects elsewhere in Uganda itself 
and Africa.
Another possible result of the project relates to 
the provision of energy to small businesses, which 
can foster entrepreneurship and economic activity 
in the region. Some of the challenges facing this 
case concern the transport of the material for the 
construction and installation of the energy hub, as 
well as recruiting and training people for its main-
tenance. Further challenges include protection 
from theft, pricing limitations, developing cash-
free payment systems to avoid corruption, and the 
provision and safe discard of used batteries.
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cool, 2012). Because of their modest contribution 
to global pollution, energy-poor people are over-
looked by climate change policies (Sagar, 2005). 
Energy poverty is associated with a number of 
other deprivations that hit women in particular. 
The hours needed to collect traditional fuels in the 
form of wood, charcoal, agricultural residues, or 
dung comprise a large part of the day. This work is 
often done by women. Moreover, there are health 
issues in relation to the use of energy sources such 
as the burning of fuels for cooking, heating, and 
reading (kerosene). The domestic roles of women 
and girls expose them to extremely dangerous in-
door contamination, so that the latter are more 
often sick than boys are. The socialisation of girls 
further means that their schooling is likely to suf-
fer. Moreover, the energy efficiency of energy-poor 
households is very low. Their high-carbon energy 
use is prone to lead to deforestation, desertifica-
tion, and land degradation that in turn exacerbate 
the problems of paying for and spending the time 
needed for collection. Due to their low absolute 
level, scant attention is given to these routines (So-
vacool, 2012). 
Most research on providing access to energy 
has found that ‘technological fixes’ are insufficient 
for the transformation of rural energy systems. 
Cultural patterns, lack of finance/credit, low user 
competence, low awareness, market regulations, 
and high prices are some of the factors that mili-
tate against local energy transformation (Sovacool, 
2012). Transforming traditional rural energy sys-
tems thus requires new energy routines, new insti-
tutions, and competence building for the applica-
tion of new sources energy. Policies should focus 
on making new energy technology available, sup-
porting market formation via microcredit financ-
ing and thus creating socially inclusive learning 
spaces to facilitate the shift in energy technology. 
At the local level, securing energy access involves 
building new energy LICS in rural areas and re-
placing the existing urban ones.
The challenges for energy access depend on the 
specific characteristics of energy systems and their 
context, but there are trade-offs related to the de-
sign of the energy system and access. A contentious 
issue concerns off-grid versus on-grid energy ac-
cess, the former often referring to small-scale, de-
centralized energy production, and the latter to a 
large-scale centralized production, typically with a 
costly transmission infrastructure. Where the main 
goal is to satisfy the low-level energy needs of poor 
households, access to off-grid solutions, even if 
unstable, may suffice. As an example, see Box 8 
on solar energy hubs in Kasese, Uganda. However, 
such solutions may not work in all settings. If pow-
er is needed for energy-intensive natural resource-
based industries, the stability and backup power of 
the grid is probably necessary. 
The question of energy access for low-carbon de-
velopment strategies thus involves a multitemporal 
perspective. Off-grid energy access is a reasonable 
short-term goal while on-grid development could 
be a longer-term goal, as energy consumption will 
grow with the economic development in the South. 
On the other hand, if energy storage technologies 
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improve significantly, off-grid low-carbon develop-
ment may as well become feasible over time. In ad-
dition to local energy transformation, innovation 
in storage technology should be a political prior-
ity. Despite the rhetoric about the need to increase 
access to energy – for a number of developing 
countries it would make most sense via decen-
tralized options – investment and activity are still 
skewed toward centralized options (Mallett, 2013). 
3.2 Demand side
The demand side of low-carbon transformation of 
energy systems refers to efficiency in energy use, 
the importance of users, social legitimacy for build-
ing LICS, and the importance of market creation 
for the dissemination of low-carbon technology.
3.2.1 Energy use efficiency
Increases are expected in the world’s demand for 
energy, in particular for electricity as transport and 
heating become increasingly electrified (in the 
North). Despite expected energy efficiency efforts, 
demand is thus expected to rise from 3250 TWh/
yr to 4900 TWh/yr in 2050 (for EU27 and Nor-
way and Switzerland) (EC, 2010). Globally, energy 
efficiency has been improving, particularly in the 
South, although the 2000s have seen an abatement 
in this development, partly due to increased eco-
nomic activity in the South (RE 21, 2013). Still, 
a large untapped potential for energy efficiency 
remains, especially in emerging and developing 
countries (UNIDO, 2011). Box 9 outlines some 
of the key barriers for industrial energy efficiency 
in developing  countries and sets options for their 
adoption.  
In general terms, increasing energy efficiency re-
quires improvements in existing LICS rather than 
building new ones. According to Walz (2013), the 
energy efficiency in the industrial sector of develop-
ing countries is on average 2-4 times lower but the 
picture is rather diverse; given their vast consump-
tion levels, the BRICS-countries with very low en-
ergy efficiency have enormous potential for energy 
saving innovation. These countries’ aggressive pur-
suit of development in renewable energy technol-
ogy is paradoxical, given their failure to emphasise 
the low hanging fruits of energy efficiency.
Although the situation must be addressed by all 
countries, the large emerging economies in the 
South in particular could reap large benefits. This 
is an important element of global energy trans-
formation because their demand exercises a strain 
on energy resources. Energy performance stand-
ards for the building sector and others should be 
a central policy instrument, as an estimated 60 
percent of potential global savings in emissions 
can be gained in that sector (OECD/IEA, 2013). 
Such standards could serve to reorient the direc-
tion of innovation and stimulate dissemination 
and uptake in existing LICS. Where such policies 
exist, they should to be strengthened; where they 
are absent, they should to be implemented. It is 
important to avoid rebound effects, which may 
be mitigated in the South where, in all fairness, 
room for growth in per capita energy use should 
be allowed.
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Source: Sorrell, Mallett, and Nye (2011); Mallett, Sorrell, and Nye (2011).
Box 9. Industrial energy efficiency in developing countries: barriers and options
Barriers to develop and use energy efficient tech-
nologies are pronounced in the developing world. 
These barriers include energy subsidies creating 
an artificially low price for energy, a lack of infor-
mation and skills, difficulty in accessing capital, 
and concern regarding production disruption. Ad-
dressing energy use in industry as a means to realise 
low-carbon transitions is important, as industry is 
a key contributor to carbon emissions, especially 
in emerging economies. Research regarding the ex-
periences of policies aimed at increasing industrial 
energy efficiency in developing countries yielded 
the following policy implications: 
1 The need for a systematic / sector-wide yet tar-
geted approach; 
2 The need for a long-term time horizon and clar-
ity on roles and responsibilities; 
3 The need to tailor policies to specific needs of a 
country and sector; and 
4 International energy efficiency programs do 
make a difference. 
Industrial energy efficiency policies were more ef-
fective when they focused on sectors (e.g., govern-
ment, industry associations, firms, academia) versus 
individual firms and through a series of policy in-
struments (e.g., informational instruments coupled 
with incentives and / or regulations) versus one 
policy tool. One example comes from the cement 
industry where in the 1980s the sector consolidated 
at a global scale offering opportunities for firms to 
learn. While important to focus on the sector as a 
whole, it was crucial to target policies appropriately 
to increase effectiveness – for instance, to distin-
guish policy levers between small and medium-
sized enterprises and large-scale firms. Furthermore, 
and juxtaposed against the urgency that addressing 
climate change requires, was the need for long-term 
time horizons (in contrast to the common structure 
of development programs with 3-5 year cycles) and 
clarity on roles and responsibilities to elicit success. 
This rationale is in line with how decisions on capi-
tal investment and infrastructure are made in addi-
tion to timelines where behaviour changes / para-
digm shifts happen systematically. Having a long 
timeline for a project is distinct from unsuccessful 
projects whose lifecycles were ‘long’ but laid dor-
mant for much of the project life. For example, a 
project by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
on efficiency boilers with China was plagued by de-
lays, and thus had subsequent changes in personnel 
and responsible agencies. Here, a key cause of delay 
occurred when potential suppliers were reluctant 
to provide technology licences due to Intellectual 
Property (IP) concerns.
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3.2.2 Social legitimacy and inclusion
The issues of social legitimacy and inclusion were 
mentioned in the previous chapter. The impact of 
such factors for building learning spaces and LICS 
is discussed briefly here. As was seen in Section 2.5, 
not only the price, but also users’ energy consump-
tion routines, have strong implications for the dis-
semination of new energy technology. 
Many low-carbon development initiatives take 
the form of rapidly implemented, centralized, large-
scale energy solutions that require grid connections. 
This may lead to conflict between the priorities of 
policy makers and communities (Ockwell & Mal-
lett, 2013, p. 122). In the context of strong techno-
logical competences, the engagement of local stake-
holders is critical to adoption and dissemination. 
In many cases, the barriers to uptake of low-carbon 
technology are not finance or access to technology, 
but rather an absence of proactive local users and 
actors. One successful and documented form of lo-
cal engagement is cross-sector and multistakeholder 
partnerships (Ockwell & Mallett, 2013). Hence, if 
LICS-building is to ensure the dissemination and 
use of low-carbon technology, the process must be 
socially inclusive, involve users, and give them voice 
and ownership. Inclusion and user learning are thus 
central aspects of low-carbon development at the 
local level. 
As argued in the previous chapter, low-carbon 
development necessarily involves a vast redistribu-
tion of resources, power, and competences, some-
thing that the potential, probably powerful, losers 
are likely to resist. The distribution of green rents 
must therefore be socially acceptable (Jacobsson & 
Bergek, 2011), and those who stand to lose in the 
process must be compensated. These issues concern 
the entire legitimacy of low-carbon development, 
which, under non-dictatorship rule, effectively de-
cides on the arena for policy manoeuvring on the 
supply side. Hence, at the national level, the process 
of low-carbon development needs to be inclusive 
and enjoy broad social legitimacy to overcome bar-
riers. Moreover, social inclusion on a global level is 
also needed to enable low-carbon development and 
mitigate its inherent tensions. It is necessary for the 
strong to include the weak, for example, through 
new forms of international collaboration.
In sum, it seems that low-carbon development 
is predicated on the creation of inclusive institu-
tions at local, national, and global levels.14 
3.2.3 Market formation and demand for knowledge
It is a unique characteristic of climate actions that 
their realisation will benefit mostly future genera-
tions.15 As the market demand of future unborn or 
infant generations is currently zero, forces outside 
the marketplace need to intervene. A central goal 
of policy is thus to construct markets for low-car-
bon technologies by creating and managing green 
rents (Altenburg, 2012).
Private investors tend to be hesitant because, un-
der current circumstances, most renewable energy 
technologies are not price-competitive. Distortion 
of prices arises partly from externalities. In general, 
the market price mechanism does not automatical-
ly internalise the cost of the environmental damage 
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caused by the use of fossil energy, nor does it inter-
nalise the benefits of the use of renewable energy. 
Attempts have been made to address this type of 
market failure with technology-neutral market-
based instruments, e.g., carbon taxes and cap-and-
trade. These instruments tend to increase the price 
of energy, at least initially, which is unfortunate 
for developing countries; higher energy prices may 
harm economic growth in energy-importing coun-
tries (UN, 2011). The latter is another issue of low-
carbon development that must be addressed.
Private investors are deterred further because, as 
markets are politically driven, it is very difficult 
to know how the future market and demand will 
act in the absence of international binding agree-
ments. Governments may have a sudden change 
of heart. This creates uncertainty, which implies 
that governments must engage in large-scale mo-
bilisation of resources to finance investments in 
and stimulate demand for low-carbon technolo-
gies.16 Public procurement may be a relevant pol-
icy to aid market formation by supplying crucial 
early demand and reducing consumer uncertainty 
with demonstration projects. Market formation 
also involves reducing uncertainty by establishing 
technical and quality standards. Early niche mar-
kets will in turn create a demand for new com-
petences in the labour market and education and 
training systems. In sum, for learning spaces to 
emerge around low-carbon technologies, govern-
ments must create ‘green’ rents to stimulate pri-
vate company investment. Microfinance may be 
another appropriate instrument for supporting 
demand the demand of the rural poor for low-
carbon technologies.
Nevertheless, the creation of domestic demand 
for low-carbon technology does not guarantee that 
this demand translates into an effective domestic 
call for new low-carbon competences and knowl-
edge. Experience shows that, while it has been pos-
sible to build LICS components (e.g., universities, 
research institutes, R&D regulations, etc.) in the 
South, it has been much more difficult to stimu-
late the interactions between components, mainly 
because the demand for knowledge is lacking (Aro-
cena & Sutz, 2000; Cimoli, Ferraz & Primi, 2009; 
Rodrik, 2007). In some countries in Latin America, 
the demand for knowledge has weakened because 
of the economic transformation in recent decades. 
Some causes are the replacement of local capital 
goods for imports, the weakening of in-house en-
gineering firms, the post-privatization dismantling 
of R&D capabilities in public enterprises, and re-
duced incentives for regional R&D investments 
stemming from the dominance of multinational 
enterprises. Weak interaction between knowledge 
producers and potential users generates a type of 
insertion into the global economy which may be 
labelled as neoperipheral, this is characteristic of 
countries that are dependent on innovation from 
abroad (Arocena & Sutz, 2002, 2010). 
Weak demand for knowledge has also been at-
tributed to institutional factors such as a ‘passive 
learning culture’ (Juma, Fang, Honca, & Huete-
Perez, 2001; Viotti, 2002) world leaders adopted 
the United Nations Millennium Declaration in 
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which they pledged to halve, by 2015, the pro-
portion of the world’s people earning less than a 
dollar a day, suffering from hunger and unable to 
obtain safe drinking water. This paper argues that 
meeting these targets will entail concerted efforts 
to raise economic productivity in the developing 
world and to redirect industrialized countries to 
address research and development (R&D. Tech-
nology imports by passive learners typically lead to 
few technically demanding alterations. Only the 
most essential capabilities of technology use in the 
production system are acquired, i.e., those neces-
sary to solve basic production problems. Active 
learners, on the other hand, intentionally pursue 
mastery of the imported technology, usually lead-
ing to improvements. Such learning is a necessary, 
although insufficient, precondition for the devel-
opment of LICS. 
Local LICS are necessary for achieving a self-
directed and wide-scale adaptation, dissemination, 
and use of new low-carbon technologies. Accord-
ing to this perspective, creating local demand for 
technology requires market-formation policies, but 
without local LICS, this will not translate into a 
demand for new knowledge. Developing countries 
will likely become dependent on low-carbon in-
novation from abroad. Avoiding this requires the 
encouragement of active learning cultures; the 
problems and concerns of local stakeholders must 
be represented in the process. In other words, with-
out local, socially inclusive learning spaces, little 
can be achieved. The fact that inclusion and local 
market formation are inseparable issues means that 
policy must thus address both market demand and 
knowledge demand.
3.3 Low-carbon infrastructures   
 Transmission
Infrastructures are central to the functioning of 
our high-carbon economies (Jonsson, 2000), and 
any change toward a low-carbon economy in-
volves their transformation.17 The infrastructure 
of the electrical system is particularly relevant for 
the development and large-scale deployment of re-
newable energy technologies. Sources of renewable 
energy are widely dispersed across countries but are 
found generally in areas far from the core areas of 
electricity consumption. The intermittency of re-
newable energy generation implies that renewable 
energy sources must be connected (and their power 
eventually stored) across very large territories to 
constitute a reliable source of energy (Boyle, 2012; 
Tawney, Bell & Ziegle, 2011)18 (Ideally, the sun is 
shining and the wind blowing somewhere in the 
system at all times.) In this situation, the absence 
of transmission grids (and credible plans for their 
establishment) can block investments in a trans-
formation of energy systems. Moreover, the cost of 
installing renewable energy technologies is affected 
adversely since the cost of grid connections is born 
by operators. This contributes further to the un-
even competition between low- and high-carbon 
technologies. According to Tawney et al. (2011), 
the International Energy Agency estimates that 
a global replacement of fossil energy with renew-
able energy in the period 2010 to 2050, in order 
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to halve the energy-related CO2 emissions, would 
require transmission investments of USD 4.2 tril-
lion, equivalent to USD 100 billion per year. 
To put these figures into perspective, the United 
States invested USD 9 billion in transmission in-
frastructure in 2009. There is reason to believe that 
resource mobilisation is lacking. According to the 
American Wind Energy Association, the key issue 
in grid developments is that ‘transmission develop-
ers are hesitant to build transmission in a region 
without certainty that a power plant will be built 
to use the line, just as wind and solar developers are 
hesitant to build a power plant without certainty 
that a transmission line will be built’ (Tawney et 
al., 2011, p. 8). Contemplating the necessary co-
evolution of renewable energy dissemination and 
transmission expansion, whether in the short or 
long run, one is reminded of the chicken and egg 
problem. 
It has often been argued that infrastructure is a 
crucial element, which influences the ‘direction’ of 
innovation. Infrastructure is a key element within 
the selection environment pertaining to techno-
logical choices. New technologies and technologi-
cal systems (notably ‘radical’ and ‘disruptive’ ones) 
require specific infrastructures for their emergence 
and dissemination (Freeman, 2001).  In the case of 
low-carbon development, it is necessary, therefore, 
to change infrastructures in significant ways. Incre-
mental innovations can thrive within existing in-
frastructures, while disruptive innovation requires 
significant transformation of infrastructures. Radi-
cal innovation, in turn, is likely to require com-
pletely new infrastructures. We must thus move 
from a static to a dynamic understanding of infra-
structures. 
On the one hand, some of the techno-economic 
properties that characterise infrastructures lend 
them an aura of permanence. Those properties are 
their scale, indivisibility, capital-intensity, external-
ities, asset durability, and ‘systemness’ (Markard, 
2011). Moreover, the centrality of infrastructure 
to the functioning of society means that its sta-
bility is often a goal in itself. The implication of 
the above-mentioned properties is that, when and 
if infrastructure change takes place, it is mostly in-
cremental. The ability of governments to mobi-
lise large resources and absorb the risks involved 
leads to the expectation that they will undertake 
the needed infrastructure transformations (Maz-
zucato, 2013; Smith, 2005).19 However, any true 
understanding of infrastructural change rests on 
the fact that infrastructures are socio-technical 
systems that are continuously maintained, repro-
duced, and transformed. While in the short run 
infrastructures may be conceived as static systems, 
the long-run view must see them as dynamic sys-
tems. This constitutes the essential duality in the 
infrastructure term. 
In consequence, innovation policy should address 
both specific low-carbon technologies and the in-
frastructures within which they are deployed. There 
is no necessary connection between changes in 
these domains, technologically or temporally. They 
are nevertheless interacting factors, and private-
sector innovation decisions may be closely linked 
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to public sector infrastructure strategies (Andersen 
& Wicken, 2013). In conclusion, developing and 
disseminating renewable energy technologies may 
prove ineffective, and even impossible, for energy 
sector transformation unless it is complemented by 
appropriate infrastructure transformation. Coun-
tries in both the North and the South thus need to 
develop LICS that can simultaneously enable the 
building of low-carbon infrastructure and the tech-
nological mastery of renewable energy technologies. 
3.4 Dismantling high-carbon LICS
The comparatively low price of fossil energy, which 
due partly to state subsidies, means that green leap-
frogging in the South will not be a straightforward 
process, and that high-carbon energy is likely to 
remain part of the world’s energy matrix for some 
time. Because these energy sources are in direct but 
uneven competition, we must address not only the 
development of renewable energy technologies but 
also the dismantling of LICS for fossil energy tech-
nology. This destructive aspect of a green energy 
system transformation is just as important as the 
creative aspect. 
The dismantling of high-carbon LICS is further 
complicated by the enormous value to the stock 
market of fossil fuels in the ground. According to 
Carbon Tracker (2013), to avoid global warming 
above 2 °C in comparison to preindustrial levels, 
the world can tolerate only the burning of approx-
imately 20 percent of known fossil energy reserves 
(totalling 2,860 GtCO2). This creates a number of 
challenges for low-carbon development. The 200 
largest fossil fuel companies globally (listed on 
stock exchanges) have a combined value of USD 4 
trillion and debts worth USD 1.5 trillion. Equity 
valuations may have to be reduced by 40-60 per-
cent to correspond to the 2-degree scenario. This 
would lead to credit rating downgrades for these 
companies, with potential debt servicing problems, 
in turn creating carbon vulnerability in global mar-
kets.20 This is problematic as current evaluations of 
companies are based on the full exploitation of 
proven reserves at a consistent production rate and 
price. If climate goals are to be met, it is not a mat-
ter of if but when these fossil fuel assets are frozen. 
With the downgrading of fossil energy company 
bonds, debt default could lead to an international 
financial crisis.
This report urges policy makers to initiate re-
forms that can deal with such systemic uncertainty 
rather than assuming that everything will conform 
to the models of the past. Meanwhile, companies 
are still rewarded for finding and developing new 
fossil energy reserves, and market risks are accessed 
as if global warming were not an issue (Carbon 
Tracker, 2013). This situation is a symptom of 
carbon lock-in where markets, despite compelling 
evidence, are not convinced that governments are 
serious about climate change policy. These views 
are gaining wider acceptance (recently the carbon 
budget notion was embraced by the IPCC). How-
ever, proven reserves are rising quickly as the global 
fossil energy industry is highly active in parts of 
the South such as South America, East Africa, and 
Eurasia, with the OPEC countries still controlling 
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two-thirds of known oil reserves (BP, 2013; Mitch-
ell, Marcel & Mitchell, 2012). Developing coun-
tries that have recently discovered fossil fuel energy 
reserves see them as a means for development by 
serving as a source of state income; these reserves 
supply domestic industry with cheap energy, and 
local policies are directed toward building new fos-
sil energy-related industries. In these regions, ten-
sions between low-carbon targets and economic 
development are obvious. 
From a global perspective, interactions between 
brown and green energy are becoming increasingly 
complex. The data indicate that it may be naïve to 
believe that fossil energy can be totally discarded 
in the short run. Still, the process of moving away 
from fossil energy needs to start now. Each country 
should make strategic roadmaps with milestones 
for short-, medium-, and long-term goals for the 
total decarbonisation of energy production with a 
gradually decreasing share of fossil energy whose 
efficiency is simultaneously improved. Still, it is 
unclear whether and how these dynamic trade-offs 
can be managed at both national and international 
levels. Research has hitherto mainly focused on the 
creation of new low-carbon technology and poli-
cies rather than studying ‘the governance of termi-
nation’ (Stegmaier & Kuhlmann, 2013), ‘policy 
dismantling’ (Jordan, Bauer & Green-Pedersen, 
2013), or ‘regime destabilization’ (Turnheim & 
Geels, 2012). It is clear, however, that such pro-
cesses would involve policies of delegitimising 
high-carbon technology, of immobilising associ-
ated resources (keeping them in the ground), and of 
‘unlearning’ or destruction of competences and in-
stitutions for supporting the existing energy regime. 
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4. Managing the tensions
New technologies and innovations will play a 
vital role in achieving low-carbon development. 
However, given the large differences in financial 
and technological capacity across countries, un-
resolved questions of roles and responsibilities 
remain. Major tensions are already slowing in-
ternational negotiations in various arenas, e.g., 
climate and trade, and impeding the low-carbon 
transition. This chapter reviews key areas of ten-
sion concerning low-carbon innovation policy 
and strategy at the global level. We concentrate on 
four major tensions impeding the transformation 
to a low-carbon world: 
  
1 Climate versus development? Climate change 
presents a major challenge to humanity. How-
ever, there are other challenges, the solutions 
to which depend on furthering economic and 
social development, most importantly within 
poor, developing countries. The real and per-
ceived trade-off between these different pri-
orities has tended to stifle progress in policy 
making, but recent discourse has emphasised 
the creation of ‘co-benefits’. Such benefits are 
most likely to materialize within coherent low-
carbon innovation systems.
2 Advanced versus developing economies? Which 
countries are responsible for the low-carbon 
transition, how is it done, and within what 
timeframe? These issues relate to not only the 
financing of the transformation process; the 
development of enabling technologies, as well 
as capacity-building for the adoption of such 
technologies worldwide, are becoming increas-
ingly important in global policy deliberations, 
especially for developing countries with weaker 
capabilities. 
3 Incumbents versus newcomers? The world of 
technology has witnessed a constant competi-
tion between incumbents and newcomers. But 
where climate change transformation is con-
cerned, this competition takes place against the 
backdrop of an emerging climate regime and 
a potential global power shift. Thus, we see a 
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competition between incumbent and newcom-
er players at multiple levels: technology, corpo-
rate, and national. 
4 Technology transfer versus innovation coop-
eration? The low-carbon development agenda 
raises important issues about global technology 
collaboration. The urgency of rapid diffusion 
often leads to policies for deployment of low-
carbon technology through technology transfer. 
However, the relatively slow process of raising 
capability levels and establishing collaborative 
relationships between LICS (as opposed to tech-
nology transfer) is likely to lead to more sustain-
able outcomes. 
In the next section, we present and analyse these 
tensions in order to uncover the underlying issues, 
the understanding of which is essential for a dis-
cussion of possible pathways to circumvent the 
tensions in low-carbon development policies. 
4.1 Climate versus development
As emphasised in Chapter 1, the notion of low-
carbon development brings together the climate 
change and development policy agendas, but they 
are often discussed separately. Table 2 shows a num-
ber of challenges that connect directly or indirectly 
to climate change mitigation and adaptive action. 
For universal energy access to be realised by 2030, 
an investment of approximately USD 1 trillion will 
be required, mostly in developing countries (IEA, 
2012). Yet, these numbers – and the scale of activ-
ity required to ensure success – pale in comparison 
to the efforts and resources that will be required for 
addressing the climate problem. However, resourc-
es for both of these activities remain limited and far 
below what are needed. 
Policy makers in developing countries must ad-
dress poverty alleviation, industrialization, job 
creation, and S&T capacity building. Given the 
precarious energy availability in several develop-
ing countries, energy security objectives are also 
a concern. 
The challenges of reducing poverty and expand-
ing access to energy services combined with stimu-
lating low-carbon development are particularly 
thorny issues for developing countries. The focus 
on increased energy access competes with other 
poverty reduction goals for financial and institu-
tional support from policy makers, donors, and 
multilateral agencies operating in developing coun-
tries. The challenges are increased by the need to en-
sure that energy is affordable for poor populations; 
expensive low-carbon technologies are unattractive 
from a (short-term) cost perspective. 
In a world of finite resources many such trade-
offs pose real dilemmas.21 Accompanying the ten-
sions in low-carbon development, the climate 
change question also has a strong bearing on other 
development goals.
As noted in Chapter 1, very large segments of the 
population in developing countries depend on ag-
riculture for sustenance; a large portion are minor 
landholders for whom climate-induced weather 
shifts could lead to significant setbacks. The de-
velopment of large communities across the globe 
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could also be jeopardised by the impact of climate 
change. Although the goals of development and 
low-carbon growth are perceived as conflicting, 
they are in reality closely interrelated. 
Co-benefits are the additional benefits of policies 
implemented to mitigate climate change. Most pol-
icies designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
or to adapt to climate change entail important ad-
ditional benefits for human development. The case 
of rural electrification is a clear example of a con-
tingent initiative, but also one that requires innova-
tion and capacity building at multiple levels, from 
viable business models, to training local operation 
and maintenance staff in problem solving. 
4.2 Advanced versus developing countries
The tension between advanced and developing 
countries with regard to the development of ena-
bling technologies and capacity building for their 
global diffusion is particularly challenging. Dis-
cussion of this question is part of much broader 
issues in the climate change policy debate. The 
discussion of emission reductions and associated 
technology initiatives at the global level has been 
paralysed for more than a decade. Since the es-
tablishment of the UNFCCC in 1992, many de-
veloped countries have instituted programmes to 
reduce their GHG emissions, although a political 
consensus for adequate action on low-carbon tech-
nology development and deployment is still lack-
ing.22 While developing countries have also started 
taking tentative steps to manage their GHG emis-
sions, they continue to rise, especially given the 
economic growth of these countries in recent 
years.23 Consequently, as highlighted in Chapter 
1, we are far from the mitigating action needed 
to avoid dangerous climate change (Kartha & Er-
ickson, 2011; UNEP, 2010). Tackling the climate 
Indicator Number (millions)
People without access to electricity 1,300
People without access to clean cooking facilities 2,600
Undernourished people 870
People without access to safe drinking water 783
People without access to basic sanitation 2,500
Sources: WEO (2012); SOFI (2012); JMP (2012); WWDR (2012).
Table 2. Global developmental challenges
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problem will require a significant reorientation of 
human and economic activities. Transforming the 
present energy system and technology paradigms 
will incur enormous costs. According to IEA esti-
mates, achieving the 2 °C scenario would require 
a further investment of USD 36 trillion between 
2012 and 2050 as compared to a business-as-usual 
scenario (see IEA ETP, 2012). 
Table 3 highlights the enormous disparity be-
tween developed and developing countries in terms 
of per capita emissions and access to electricity (as 
indicated by per capita electricity generation). Not 
only are the developing countries much poorer, 
their per capita emissions are substantially lower 
than those of developed countries.24 
Notwithstanding the recent rise of BRICS coun-
tries as major emitters, the resistance of advanced 
economies to technology transfer derives from 
concerns over competitiveness. This sentiment is 
compounded by the growth in BRIC countries’ 
rising technology competence (albeit still lagging 
far behind) and investments in their own R&D. 
Increasing the capacity for the development of 
low-carbon infrastructure and technology in de-
veloping countries is an important part of climate 
change mitigation. The current expansion of infra-
structure in developing countries is a process that is 
likely to continue in the coming decades. Because 
of the desirability of minimising high-carbon in-
frastructure, the building up of such capacity is 
an urgent matter. However, real efforts have been 
meagre despite the urgency of the climate problem, 
the limited capacity of developing countries, and 
the presence of capital and technology capacity in 
the developed world. The delay will increase the 
overall cost of future efforts to achieve the needed 
mitigation. 
The current economic crisis has further aggra-
vated the existing tensions concerning the respon-
sibility to support the needed low-carbon transfor-
mation. Tight capital availability, growing account 
deficits, and increased focus on national competi-
tiveness have had at least two effects. The first is 
a slowing of developed countries’ investment in 
low-carbon technology development (though in-
vestments by risk capital have increased during this 
period) (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 
2013). The second effect is the stimulation of co-
operation toward capacity building within develop-
ing countries, several of which are now perceived as 
competitors. 
At the national level, a number of countries are 
engaged in supporting and developing low-car-
bon sectors in very different ways, as they attempt 
to manage the tensions of national competitive-
ness, energy security, and climate change. The de-
veloped countries, with their current technology 
leadership and much higher R&D investments, 
seek to further their innovation lead in low-car-
bon technology over developing countries. At the 
same time, countries such as China, Brazil, South 
Africa, and India seek to become players by look-
ing toward their large emerging markets for low-
carbon technologies coupled with their low-cost 
manufacturing and perhaps frugal innovation 
capabilities.25 
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Countries Per capita emissions 
(a)
Carbon-intensity of 
the economy (b)
Per capita electricity 
generation (c)
Total  emissions (d)
United States 17.31 0.41 14.04 5,415.00
Germany 9.32 0.26 7.61 769.98
Japan 8.97 0.25 8.72 1,168.49
United Kingdom 7.78 0,21 6.08 493.21
South Africa 6.94 1.20 5.13 441.28
France 5.52 0.16 8.7 360.89
China 5.40 1.79 3.13 7,711.38
Brazil 1.99 0.35 2.65 398.19
Gabon 1.80 0.27 0.13 2.70
Indonesia 1.71 1.09 0.71 400.91
India 1.39 1.30 0.82 1,665.38
Sudan 0.33 0.35 0.14 14.40
Nigeria 0.30 0.30 0.97 47.50
Notes : The table shows 2010 data on:
(a) CO2 emission s per capita (tonnes CO2/capita)
(b) CO2 emissions/GDP (kg CO2/US dollar (2005 prices) 
(c) Generation  in KWh, thousands 
(d) CO2 emissions in million tonnes of CO2: reference approach.
Sources: a, b, d: CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (2012 Edition), IEA, Paris; c: World Bank 
Development Indicators dataset for Per Capita GNI (market exchange rate) (2012).
Table 3. Key indicators in selected developed and developing countries 
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Currently, the car industry relies on fossil fuel-
based internal combustion engines (ICEs) and is 
one of the major contributors to global greenhouse 
gas emissions. Driven by policy action and indica-
tions toward future action, the sector is witness-
ing efforts toward low-carbon innovation, with 
several more sustainable alternative approaches 
for the replacement of the present ICE ecosystem. 
Meanwhile, as developing countries see increased 
industrialisation through a burgeoning automobile 
industry, the sector remains an industrial keystone 
of several major developed economies. 
Against this backdrop, we observe two evolu-
tionary trends within the global industry. First, 
firms from developing countries (primarily China 
and India), having established themselves in their 
domestic market, have begun strategising for the 
global markets. Secondly, we see an increasing 
proliferation of efforts at decarbonisation within 
the car industry, primarily through the adoption 
of electric propulsion systems rather than exist-
ing ICE systems. Thus, overall, within the auto-
mobile sector the tension between the incumbents 
and newcomers is being played out at three levels: 
countries, firms, and technologies. Of course, the 
approaches to decarbonisation are different across 
firms. While Toyota has taken a hybrid electric 
Box 10. Technological trajectories in the car industry
Source: Chaudhary (2012).
route, Nissan and others have chosen a pure elec-
trical vehicle route. Others are hedging their bets 
with investments in a range of hybrid and pure EV 
solutions (e.g., GM, Ford, Daimler, etc.). Concur-
rently, the incumbent ICE technologies are also 
improving their efficiency, thereby posing a serious 
challenge to the emerging technology paradigm.
At the same time, emerging firms in developing 
countries are hoping to use this transition within 
the global car industry to catch up with their estab-
lished peers in the developed countries. National 
champions in China and (to some extent) India are 
investing in the overall innovation chain for elec-
tric mobility, hoping to leverage these technologies 
to catapult them into the global markets. At the 
country level, the transformation toward low-car-
bon mobility is supported through various policies 
with the aim of gaining (in developing countries) 
or preserving (in developed countries) industrial 
competitiveness in the automobile sector. Other 
motivations are energy security and climate change 
mitigation. Interestingly, these efforts, while posi-
tioned as investments toward climate change miti-
gation, are being created by nations, both devel-
oping and developed, to support the domestic car 
industry in transitioning toward the new technol-
ogy landscape.
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Low-carbon technologies are strategically impor-
tant as the cornerstone of future industrialization 
in developing countries. However, these technolo-
gies are also an instrument for furthering the com-
petitive edge in developed countries. This leads to a 
strong interest in supporting domestic low-carbon 
technology-related industries in both developed 
and developing countries. 
This conflict between the need for global climate 
change mitigation and the respective national 
imperatives of competitiveness and job creation is 
threatening the global trade in low-carbon technol-
ogies and associated products. A framework to ad-
dress such tensions is currently lacking. Without a 
directed effort to move toward responsible liberali-
sation of such trade, efforts toward climate change 
mitigation could easily devolve into new trade 
wars. A recent example of this tension is within the 
solar power sector. The tensions lead to protection-
ist rhetoric and policies in China, the European 
Union, and the United States. The result has been 
market uncertainty within the still-nascent renew-
able technology sectors.
From a low-carbon development perspective, 
while developing countries require access to low-
carbon technologies, assistance in their contextu-
alization, and financing for their deployment, the 
imperatives discussed above necessitate a multiple-
objectives policy approach. In summary, although 
competitiveness is a pressing issue for both devel-
oped and developing countries, the two groups dif-
fer on the starting point and the urgency of action. 
The resulting tension is a major impediment to 
global low-carbon development. 
4.3 Incumbents versus newcomers
At the company level, examples of responses to a 
changed business environment include the emer-
gence of new firms and the transformation of exist-
ing ones, as players jostle to gain the competitive 
advantage (and mitigate risk) in a shifting land-
scape. For instance, the present fossil fuel-powered 
global economy consists of greatly different types 
of players: from fossil fuel producers (mining, oil 
companies, etc.), to operators that convert fossil 
fuels into usable forms of energy (power plants, 
engine manufacturers, etc.) to end users. Different 
low-carbon technology paradigms will necessarily 
disrupt existing value chains, affording opportuni-
ties for new players to emerge and take their place. 
As low-carbon technologies are adopted globally, 
firms with strong capabilities in such technologies 
are poised to gain a large market in developed as 
well as developing countries. The uncertainty of 
the situation is illustrated by the nascent nature 
of low-carbon technologies; disruptive changes to 
existing models and the emergence of new mod-
els toward low-carbon development are likely to 
continue. However, different technologies present 
dissimilar deployment propositions depending on 
the complexity of technology, the extent of impact 
on the incumbent system, and the cost of deploy-
ment. For instance, it is easier to deploy nondis-
ruptive low-cost and low-complexity measures to 
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improve energy efficiency by boosting component 
performance than to use complex, disruptive, and 
expensive technologies such as electric vehicles. 
A significant portion of the global innovation 
capability is vested in transnational companies 
(TNCs). Innovation for low-carbon development 
is no exception. As a recent UNCTAD report 
contends: 
Although international climate-change 
negotiations are proceeding slowly, the 
main issues of concern for developing 
countries – finance and technology – 
can be addressed partly through better 
harnessing of TNC resources (2010). 
Through their global networks and experimental 
expertise, TNCs have access to knowledge, capital, 
and deployment expertise, which are in their inter-
est to deploy as they secure their own place in the 
future low-carbon economy through technology 
leadership. Further, the slow pace of international 
climate change negotiations means that these firms 
are actively looking for policy-driven deployment 
markets for their technologies (which, for socio-
economic reasons, are not ready for the market). 
This initial deployment is critical, both to secure 
expertise of the market and technology as well as 
to build a scale that lowers the cost of low-carbon 
technologies. 
The sectors of developing countries that are 
likely to require low-carbon technologies, such as 
transport, power, and industry, are generally late-
comers to the global scene. The result is a lag in the 
technology capability and expertise of such firms 
compared to global cutting-edge firms. Further-
more, the weak capabilities of the national innova-
tion systems in which these firms are embedded 
are a major challenge to rapid improvement. While 
countries such as Brazil, China, and India have 
made significant progress in recent years, they con-
tinue to lag well behind industrialised countries in 
indicators of technological/innovation capabilities 
and performance.26
From a low-carbon transformation perspective, the 
firms, in their respective sectors, seek to leverage 
any deployment of technology within their home 
markets to build capacity for future exports to for-
eign markets. At the same time, in some sectors 
such as electromobility, low-carbon technologies 
offer an opportunity for developing country firms 
to take a major leap toward becoming global lead-
ers in the emerging low-carbon ecosystem (Box 10). 
To compensate for their relatively low technology 
competence, these firms have started to leverage 
their local linkages and build international knowl-
edge linkages while at the same time lobbying their 
policy makers for local industry support mecha-
nisms, both regulatory and incentive driven.27
4.4 Technology transfer versus   
innovation cooperation 
As highlighted in the previous sections, the broad 
development, dissemination, and deployment of 
a variety of less GHG-intensive technologies are 
key prerequisites for global low-carbon develop-
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The Climate Innovation Centres (CICs) and Cli-
mate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) 
seek to encourage cross-border technology flows, 
foster interfirm linkages, and strengthen the 
absorptive capacity of the developing countries. 
While these measures to support capability-build-
ing and deployment are essential, such institutional 
linkages should be synergetic with national policy 
frameworks in order to efficiently and effectively 
further low-carbon development in the developing 
countries.
From an implementation standpoint, the 2010 
Cancun meeting of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
agreed to create a new technology mechanism to 
facilitate the transfer of climate-friendly technol-
ogies in the broader sense, i.e., a mechanism that 
emphasises the development of endogenous capa-
bilities in absorption, adaptation, and innovation. 
The creation of a technology executive committee 
(TEC) and a climate technology centre and net-
work (CTCN) to implement the technology trans-
fer provisions of the UNFCCC indicates a move 
from traditional technology transfer to technology 
cooperation between the advanced and developing 
countries. The aim is to enhance the efficacy and 
scale of climate-friendly technology deployment. 
This new technology mechanism spans all the key 
stages of the technology cycle from information ac-
Box 11. Climate technology and innovation centres
Sources: Sager, A.D., Bremmer, C., and Grubb, M. (2009); Sampath and Roffe (2012); UNEP RISØ (2013) 
quisition to assimilation, adaptation, and local con-
textualization of technological aspects. Further, in 
a departure from the past, cooperation among the 
advanced and the developing countries is envisaged 
to tackle the complexities of this issue. 
While the CTCN is expected to become opera-
tional by late 2013, a CIC is already operative in 
Nairobi, Kenya (with other CICs in Ethiopia, Vi-
etnam, South Africa, India, Morocco, Ghana, and 
the Caribbean about to become operational soon). 
The Kenya CIC, launched in September 2012 with 
World Bank’s support (as part of the infoDev’s Cli-
mate Technology Program) and aid support from 
Danida and UKaid, was expected to support over 
70 sustainability-oriented ventures within the first 
five years, generating 4,600 jobs directly and 24,000 
jobs in total within the next 10 years. To tailor the 
design of the CIC specifically to Kenya’s needs, an 
extensive stakeholder process involving over 100 
private, government, academic, and NGOs was 
conducted to chart the specific CIC offerings. 
As of December 2013, the Kenya CIC has al-
ready supported 70 new clean technology ventures 
in areas of water, agribusinesses and renewable 
energy by providing matchmaking (between the 
technology requirement of the solution and the 
technologies available for transfer), incubation, ca-
pacity-building, market development, and financ-
ing support services.
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ment. However, mechanisms for technology trans-
fer must be built into low-carbon development 
paradigms, because technology ownership and its 
development capacity are still skewed toward the 
advanced economies. The deployment of such 
technologies in developing countries is crucial to 
mitigating dangerous climate change.28 
Debates about technology transfer and ways to 
achieve it have traditionally considered the prob-
lem as one of simply providing access to hardware 
technologies, with no regard for the facilitation 
of knowledge exchange and development of local 
technological capabilities (Lema & Lema, 2012). 
This paradigm characterised trade and IPR-related 
discussions for several decades of the twentieth cen-
tury; the aim was to increase international com-
mitments to technology transfer rather than to 
structure institutional arrangements that fit local 
circumstances in order to ensure the absorption, 
contextualization, and deployment of technology 
(Sampatha & Roffe, 2012; Lema & Lema, 2012). 
Notwithstanding the limited economic and human 
development benefits achieved through technology 
transfer in conventional sectors, the initial struc-
turing of discussions within the UNFCCC took a 
traditional, limited viewpoint of technology trans-
fer. This led to efforts to stimulate climate-friendly 
technology transfer limited to hardware and financ-
ing assistance, a strategy widely deemed unsuccess-
ful (Ockwell & Mallett, 2013). However, there has 
been an evolution in this approach:  recognition 
of the centrality of GHG-reduction technology 
deployment in developing countries addresses the 
public good in terms of climate change challenge, 
along with the recognition of the limitations of the 
traditional position on technology transfer. 
There is a growing consensus that international 
action to harness technology for climate change 
mitigation and general development in the South 
must go beyond a debate of technology transfer to 
focus instead on innovation cooperation, i.e., joint 
action to accelerate the development, adaptation, 
and deployment of suitable technologies (Sagar, 
Bremner & Grubb, 2009). This innovation cum 
cooperation needs to extend beyond the techno-
logical aspect to encompass other facets of the in-
novation system that support the deployment of 
technology. A better understanding of the role of 
local innovation in developing countries to achieve 
and sustain low-carbon development is also needed 
(Ockwell et al., 2009). 
Despite progress in the approach and institu-
tional framework for technology transfer, several 
issues remain. The issue of technology transfer is 
deeply integrated with the trade- and IPR-related 
issues discussed earlier in this chapter, and a suc-
cessful technology transfer mechanism would need 
to consider these complex issues as well. While new 
technology mechanisms such as the Technology 
Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Tech-
nology Centre and Network (CTCN) have been 
established, any evaluation of results will have to 
await their implementation (Box 11). 
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5. Moving forward: Policy dimensions 
Low-carbon development is only one among many 
objectives pursued by governments and donor or-
ganisations in the developing world. Nevertheless, 
the low-carbon imperative has become an integral 
element of the development agenda. A large num-
ber of development organisations have included 
low-carbon development in their policies and port-
folios of programmes and projects. While many of 
these organisations have begun to implement in-
novation programmes, few have started to bring 
innovation and low-carbon development together 
in a systemic perspective. This is what the current 
report has sought to do. This implies that develop-
ment policy should seek to combine the objectives 
of human development and environmental sustain-
ability through the promotion of processes of learn-
ing, innovation, and development. This concluding 
chapter discusses policy implications.
5.1 Actors
The transformation of innovation systems toward 
low-carbon development will reflect the outcome of 
decisions made by public and private actors at dif-
ferent levels. At one extreme, the global agreements 
made in international organisations such as the 
United Nations will change the incentive structure 
for public and private actors at the international, 
national, and local levels. International cooperation 
on standards and regulations at the regional level, 
for example, the European Union, may set more 
ambitious goals and develop more effective tools to 
reach them than what can be agreed upon at the 
global level.
At the other extreme, changes in the everyday 
behaviour of individuals and households would 
have a major impact upon the transformation to-
ward low-carbon societies. If people demand and 
consume fewer energy-intensive products and sup-
port (for example, as voters) policies for low-carbon 
development, climate change mitigation would be 
easier. 
Between those two levels there are other impor-
tant actors. In particular, local municipalities are 
becoming more influential. There are several rea-
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sons for this. One is that it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that cities will be the main vehicles for 
growth and development in the future. The greater 
part of the world’s economic activity and more 
than 50 percent of its population are concentrated 
in urban areas; virtually all population growth over 
the next 30 years is projected to be concentrated in 
these areas. Consequently, cities have far-reaching 
effects upon the world’s economies: they will play 
a vital role in the realisation of sustainable develop-
ment (UN-HABITAT, 2011). 
Cities constitute environments for interactive 
learning and innovation. Cities have always been 
locations for the main producers of new knowl-
edge and vehicles for economic growth and de-
velopment. They are engines of innovation: they 
make people connect and interact, and knowledge 
is best produced by people who are close to each 
other. The hallmarks of city life – density, diversity, 
and interaction – feed innovation (Botero, 1988; 
Jacobs, 1969; Hall, 1998; Glaeser, 2011). 
There are several ways in which cities may help 
economic growth to become cleaner. Large groups 
of people living and working close together put 
strains on natural resources and energy and create 
different kinds of pollution. But in creative peri-
ods and environments, city development has also 
been characterised by sharp recognition of such 
problems and by the mobilisation of efforts to solve 
them. Cities contribute to a more sustainable de-
velopment by, on the one hand detecting and expe-
riencing problems that need to be solved and, on 
the other, by providing creative environments for 
the solution to these problems. Additionally, dense 
populations use far less energy and materials per 
capita for living, heating, and transport than more 
dispersed populations. Increased and improved 
public transport has, especially in cities, great po-
tential to reduce carbon emission. Furthermore, 
waste management and waste treatment are much 
more efficient in cities than in less urbanised areas; 
many cities in developing countries have made 
substantial progress in this area. (See Box 12)  In 
the past few decades, many cities have gone from 
net emission to net reduction of greenhouse gases 
in waste management mainly as result of enhanced 
energy and material recovery. Waste prevention 
systems may add to the benefits already achieved 
(Johnson et al., 2011). 
Globally, several cities have recognised their spe-
cific role in experiencing and solving environmen-
tal problems and have been pioneers in advance 
and independently of the national political agenda 
and government. In some areas they have also par-
ticipated in development of international networks, 
helping each other to solve environmental prob-
lems. This is exemplified by waste management, 
where politicians, civil servants, consultants, and 
researchers meet each other at international confer-
ences organised by waste management societies. 
Even if cities are becoming more important, na-
tional governments are still expected to be the main 
actors that move between global and individual ac-
tion. However, in many less developed countries, 
the effectiveness of government is low and in such 
cases, donor organisations may become important 
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actors and engage in attempts to increase the effec-
tiveness of government action. Public-private part-
nerships may be seen as another attempt to make 
public policy more effective. 
There are many actors at several levels in the pol-
icy arena for low-carbon development, but in what 
follows we point to national public policies that 
need to be implemented in order to move develop-
ing countries toward low-carbon development. We 
refer also to the role of donor organisations and of 
public-private partnerships. We recognise that the 
implementation of some of the recommendations 
requires a higher level of governance capacity in 
public organisations than the ones actually at work. 
To enhance governance capacity may thus be a pre-
requisite for low-carbon development.  
5.2 Policies for low-carbon LICS formation 
There is now a growing body of knowledge of how 
to create LICS in developing countries (e.g., Lun-
dvall et al., 2010). However, little advice is availa-
ble when it comes to policies for the formation of 
low-carbon LICS.29 They aim at increasing pros-
perity and welfare while ensuring climate change 
alleviation. Due to considerations of the public 
good concerning low-carbon LICS, governments 
and international development agencies play a key 
role in creating such systems. Government policies 
are important for any LICS, but they are impera-
tive for low-carbon LICS because of the serious-
ness and urgency of the climate change problems; 
other factors include the many market and system 
failures inhibiting low-carbon transitions. 
The appropriate policy measures will depend on 
context, particularly the level of existing innova-
tion capabilities and system attributes. In the fol-
lowing sections, we summarise some key policy 
challenges for countries seeking to leverage innova-
tion systems for low-carbon development. 
5.2.1 Energy and industrial policy
Public policies have a particularly important role 
to play in the development of low-carbon LICS. 
We must consider the high external and social 
costs arising from carbon emissions and other 
unsustainable outcomes of economic activities in 
the ‘business as usual’ scenario. Different kinds of 
economic policies, particularly industrial policies, 
are needed in order to encourage the processes 
described in Section 2.5; these include substitut-
ing nonrenewable with renewable energy and re-
sources, introducing new environment-friendly 
processes of production, etc. 
Policies for the development and, in particu-
lar, the diffusion of green technologies has been 
implemented across a wide range of developed 
countries with considerable success. A number of 
policy instruments have worked, and governments 
and other actors should continue to develop new 
instruments and adjust existing ones to new tech-
nologies and local circumstances. From this per-
spective, policy is about taking steps in the right 
direction rather than designing optimal policies. 
Furthermore, unpopular but necessary policies for 
sustainability transitions must be introduced in a 
strategic, step-by-step way.
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As argued in Chapter 3, market formation to en-
sure demand is an important policy requirement. 
In terms of key policy options, instruments such 
as feed-in tariffs, public procurement policies, and 
subsidies can be used. Feed-in tariffs have been in-
troduced in many countries to guarantee return on 
investments in green technologies. Tariffs have been 
instrumental for the success of electricity genera-
tion from renewable energy such as wind, solar, and 
hydropower in China, India, and South Africa, and 
other large developing countries. However, in the 
majority of developing countries, such tariffs can-
not stand alone. 
A systemic perspective is required as tariffs in 
themselves are unlikely to promote access to energy 
in poor countries because only a small fraction of 
the households are connected to the national grid. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion is typically 
less than 25 percent. Therefore, subsidies should 
not be linked only to renewable energy generation, 
but also aim at supporting new infrastructures, such 
as minigrids. Decentralized models of energy provi-
sion are likely to be economically viable in many 
developing countries where long distances between 
population centres make connections to central-
ized grids very costly. Most importantly, donors are 
needed to fund experiments toward developing grid 
technology solutions as well as business models for 
feed-in tariffs and service provision in decentralized 
energy models.30
While measures such as feed-in tariffs and low 
interest finance for the promotion of carbon reduc-
tion technologies are essential, they are also expen-
sive. The tariff structures in developing countries 
may need to differ from those in wealthier coun-
tries. Funding from donors and centralized na-
tional funds may thus have to compensate for costs 
that normally would be transferred to consumers. 
As households and businesses are likely to spend a 
larger share of their income on energy, prohibitive 
increases should be avoided. Donor funds may sim-
ilarly support public procurement initiatives such 
as hybrid and electric public transport by bringing 
together consortia including government agencies, 
finance, and technology providers. 
In combination with market creation initiatives 
and business model designs, a number of measures 
supported the technological capabilities of domes-
tic green technology firms, including government 
support for R&D. More broadly, domestic indus-
tries in countries such as China and India have been 
treated as strategic. The Chinese government has 
used policy measures, e.g., import duties on certain 
components, local content requirements and pref-
erential financing (Lema et al., 2011, 2013) while 
in India similar measures have been taken to sup-
port its national solar mission (Sahoo, 2013). 31
Standards are also an important part of the policy 
mix.32 The use of standards to induce low-carbon 
development is spreading in developing countries. 
China has introduced fuel standards to reduce lo-
cal and atmospheric pollution and stimulate higher 
fuel efficiency in transportation,33 and Malaysia has 
introduced process standards in waste management 
(Box 12). Standards are applicable to a wide num-
ber of areas, including construction, water, energy 
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Source: Mohamad and Keng (2013). 
Box 12. Waste management policy in Malaysia
Waste management goals differ among countries. 
Human health protection is of the utmost impor-
tance in developing countries, whereas in most 
developed countries the conservation of resources 
and the environment is the main concern. How-
ever, with increasing internal and external pressure 
for environmental protection, developing econo-
mies are facing a dual challenge of tackling both 
the basic goal of human health protection (high 
collection rates and the control of illegal dumping) 
and environmental conservation (high recycling 
rate, reduced reliance on landfills, and low-carbon 
footprint). With the increasing severity of global 
climate change, it is inevitable that the second goal 
of energy and resource conservation for waste man-
agement is addressed, thus forcing newly industri-
alising countries to develop more sustainable low-
carbon waste management systems. 
In order to achieve these multiple goals, the Ma-
laysian government introduced the Solid Waste 
and Public Cleansing Management Act 2007 to 
strengthen the institutionalisation of waste man-
agement by centralising and standardising regula-
tions at the federal level. Prior to the Act, local 
authorities had defined and practiced waste col-
lection and disposal in very different ways, and 
more than 90 percent of municipal solid waste was 
disposed at open sites. The federal intervention en-
sured the safe closure of 120 open dumpsites and 
the introduction of ten sanitary landfills. The de-
velopment and introduction of the act also led to 
a number of socio-technical experiments to fulfill 
its dual objectives. 
The goals of the Act are firstly to establish a solid 
waste management system which is holistic, inte-
grated, cost effective, sustainable, and acceptable to 
the community. The system emphasises the con-
servation of the environment, selection of afford-
able technology, and works to ensure public health. 
Secondly, the Act mandates the implementation of 
solid waste management based on the waste hier-
archy that emphasises waste minimisation through 
3R (recycle, reduce and reuse) intermediate treat-
ment, and final disposal.
The transition from conventional, unsustainable 
land filling practices to an integrated system with 
waste minimisation, recycling and treatment as in-
tegrated priorities requires interaction and network-
ing by multiple stakeholders. The transition also 
has to continue for at least 20-30 years, and thus 
exceeds the traditional perspective of short-term 
elected government. Instead it must subscribe to a 
governance structure enabling the incorporation of 
bottom-up stakeholders as front runners in transi-
tion innovation. As in most developing economies, 
this remains an institutional challenge in Malaysia 
and requires more creativity in governance and 
public policy reforms.
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generation, and waste management. It is a major 
challenge for donors and policy makers to combine 
such technical standards with social standards for 
democratizing technology choices and enhancing 
employment generation.
5.2.2 International technology collaboration and 
knowledge sharing 
Global interactive learning plays an important role 
in low-carbon development. It can take place with-
in both the public and the private sectors. Collabo-
ration between government agencies, universities, 
standard-setting institutions, etc., should be a key 
goal of technology transfer policy. Governments 
and donor agencies may support the creation of 
platforms for interactive learning, for instance, 
through arrangements for secondment in relevant 
institutions abroad to exchange experiences and 
inspiration. 34
In the private sector, equipment imports and 
licensing are key vehicles for the international 
dissemination of knowledge. These international 
connections tend to provide the focus in discus-
sions of technology transfer in the climate change 
debate. However, scholars within the field of inno-
vation have amply demonstrated that such vehi-
cles tend to be ineffective without complementary 
investments in local capability building for the 
creative engagement in, and absorption and fur-
ther development of, knowledge and equipment 
from abroad (Fu, Petriobelli & Soete, 2010; Lema 
& Lema, 2012). Relevant capabilities are found 
not only in R&D labs, but also among those con-
cerned with design, engineering, and organisa-
tional processes, often obtained by ‘doing using 
and interacting’ modes of learning (Lundvall et 
al., 2007).35
The key challenge to policy is to identify ways 
to leverage global linkages for more sustainable 
and inclusive processes. This may hinge much less 
on importing low-carbon equipment than on the 
identification of business and organisational ar-
rangements for the advancement of appropriate 
solutions. These solutions depend less on the tech-
nology or the hardware than on deployment, main-
tenance, and consumption, i.e., on their use. The 
processes and models for cooperation should be the 
key foci of technology transfer. Ensuring that the 
most adequate technologies are selected and that 
they are disseminated and used in a way that im-
proves living conditions should be the key objec-
tives for global technology arrangements. 
South-South collaboration is likely to be particu-
larly important in this regard. Actors originating 
from the BRICS countries may have the potential 
to provide particularly relevant low-carbon technol-
ogies that benefit the poor in LDCs. The emerging 
economies of BRICS are in a strong position to ad-
vance relevant and affordable technologies because 
their conditions are similar to those in poor coun-
tries. Donors should actively work to bring together 
the relevant actors in the global South and provide 
platforms for collaboration. Some Northern donors 
have started working with ‘triangular cooperation 
methods’ in low-carbon fields where these actively 
engage in facilitating technology collaboration and 
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exchange between Southern partners (Nishimoto 
& Nuttall, 2013).36     
5.2.3 Educational and labour market policy 
Building the innovation capacities required for 
low-carbon development depends on learning 
processes in formal settings as well as on organi-
sational learning in the economy. Educational 
systems are crucial elements of low-carbon LICS 
because they are central to influencing the values 
that form aspirations, consumption choices, and 
capabilities for ‘low-carbon behaviour’. These 
range from the recycling of existing products to 
the development of new innovative products and 
processes. Many donors are in a strong position to 
influence price policy in favour of a commitment 
to education. Donor organisations and policy 
makers may exploit the experience gained from 
the relatively successful HIV/AIDS campaigns to 
develop new low-carbon campaigns at different 
levels of the school system.
The key tasks for policy makers and internation-
al agencies is thus to position sustainability in the 
mainstream of the national curricula. However, at 
the same time they should help to develop sector-
specific vocational training that promotes green 
solutions in energy, transport, resource extraction, 
etc. The vocational and higher education sectors 
should also play a key role in low-carbon develop-
ment as they can help build the links to relevant 
productive and service sectors. In Bangladesh and 
China, the presence of a skilled workforce gained 
through vocational training was key to the devel-
opment of extensive solar PV industries (UNDE-
SA, 2011, p. 146). 
We thus see an opportunity to connect human 
resource development to low-carbon innovation 
priority areas, for example, in rural electrification 
missions that depend on extensive training for op-
eration and maintenance. In China, the extensive 
wind power industry is significantly constrained by 
shortages in operation and maintenance personnel 
(Lema, 2013). 
The transformation from high-carbon systems 
is associated with a reorientation of educational 
systems, as the labour force needs to be upgraded 
and reskilled. This task calls for policy cooperation 
among the educational sector, the enterprise sector, 
and the labour market. Ultimately, workers will 
need transitional support in the process of sector 
labour mobility as unemployment may rise in, for 
example, fossil fuel provision. Retraining is key to 
the success of the process. 
5.2.4 Access to finance
This report has focused mainly on the innovation 
aspects of low-carbon development. It has not dealt 
at length with financing, which is a major issue 
in climate change, not the least in the context of 
poor countries with limited economic resources for 
financing investment in green innovation capabili-
ties. However, the mobilisation of finance for in-
novation in and through appropriate programmes 
is a prerequisite for a transformation toward low-
carbon LICS. The funds commanded by govern-
ments in developing countries and donor organisa-
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tions are very limited compared to the investment 
required for green transformation. Therefore, while 
direct financial contributions may be important, 
the indirect role played by these organisations is 
most important. This is true particularly for the role 
of convenor when seeking to match funds from the 
private sector or development banks with national 
initiatives and programmes. 
There are a range of private financial sources, 
such as venture capital and green funds, but due to 
the uncertainty involved, their actual investments 
in developing countries have been modest (UND-
SESA, p. 154). There is a need for public-private 
partnership initiatives for co-financing. This might 
encompass the involvement of pension funds in the 
wealthy world and the establishment of dedicated 
funds, such as the rural renewable energy funds in 
Tanzania, Senegal, and Mali, among other places. 
It is not only a question of making funds more ac-
cessible. The weak and fragmented financial sys-
tems in Africa must be upgraded through capacity 
building and the creation of new institutions.  
One key role of donors is, thus, to create alliances 
for financing. One particularly important task in 
this respect is to help set up channels connecting 
finance in the OECD countries with low-carbon 
investment needs in the developing world. Inspira-
tion may be found in Denmark, where a national 
consortium of pension funds has recently helped to 
secure a rapid expansion of offshore wind energy 
generation. Donors could work to create such ini-
tiatives, which connect institutional investors with 
green energy investments at the international level. 
This may be a promising avenue, because the to-
tal amount of funding required to address climate 
change in the developing world is enormous when 
compared to the capacity of ODA finance.
5.2.5 Making the connections
In the preceding sections, we have discussed a num-
ber of policy options for the individual components 
of low-carbon LICS. Each of these is important in 
its own right, but at this juncture the most press-
ing policy task is to create linkages between subsys-
tems and actors. The innovation process hinges on 
interactive learning across the system components 
to enable coordination and information exchange 
among users, service providers, finance, education, 
research, etc. As the fragmentation of innovation 
systems is a key impediment to progress, it is im-
portant to combine support for innovation system 
components (actors and subsystems) with support 
for system building. This should become the top 
priority for aid policy.
5.3 Strategies for development aid 
Assuming that innovation – green innovation is no 
exception – is a systemic and interactive learning 
process, development organisations may be in-
spired to pursue new strategies. This final section 
seeks to give a brief overview of key suggestions for 
the design of donor strategies. Initially, it should be 
recognised that the scale of action required is im-
mense, the uncertainties many and serious, and the 
process costly and demanding. Few donor organi-
sations have the mandate to engage in processes 
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with these characteristics. Political backers in home 
countries are risk averse and have little tolerance 
for uncertainty and failure. Due to vested interests 
and alternative priorities, low-carbon development 
is moreover a contentious issue in many recipient 
countries. The construction of policies and strate-
gies in this field therefore needs to combine bold-
ness of vision with careful alignment of priorities.
5.3.1 Supporting learning and capability-building
Low-carbon development pathways should be 
based on locally nested capabilities for devising 
appropriate and sustainable solutions and systems. 
The capabilities should not be limited strictly to 
the development and shaping of technologies, but 
should be relevant also to the end users of sustain-
able products and services. The specific nature and 
type of the required capabilities will depend on the 
specific settings, existing transport systems, energy 
infrastructures, recycling practices, etc. They will 
also depend on the availability of local resources, 
human as well as natural. In an ideal world, con-
text-specific capability building for low-carbon in-
t $PNCJOFQPMJDJFTGPSSFOFXBCMFFOFSHZXJUI
funding for appropriate supporting infrastruc-
ture such as microgrids.
t 4VQQPSUBXBSFOFTTSBJTJOHBOEDVSSJDVMVNEF-
velopment for low-carbon and sustainable de-
velopment.
t 'BDJMJUBUFDPOTVMUBUJPOUIBUCSJOHTUPHFUIFSMPDBM
community government and service providers 
to combine service-level standards with social 
standards for democratising technology choices 
and enhancing job generation.
t 4VQQPSUFYQFSJNFOUBUJPOXJUICVTJOFTTNPE-
els for decentralised energy provision, bringing 
together system actors such as energy service 
providers, financial institutions, equipment 
manufacturers, and suppliers of operation and 
maintenance services.
t 1PPMEPOPSTVQQPSUJOUPGVOETGPSëOBODJOH
feed-in tariffs that do not adversely affect exist-
ing energy consumers.
t 4VQQPSU JOUFSOBUJPOBM FYQFSJFODF FYDIBOHF
through international secondment of personnel 
in government agencies, public advisory organi-
sations, standard-setting institutions, etc.
t 4VQQPSUNFDIBOJTNTUPFOIBODF4PVUI4PVUI
technology transfer by organising matchmak-
ing events for buyers and suppliers of appropri-
ate sustainable technologies in the global South.
t 4VQQPSUWPDBUJPOBMUSBJOJOHGPSMPXDBSCPOJO-
novation priority areas.
t *OUSPEVDFJOJUJBUJWFTUIBUDPOOFDUJOTUJUVUJPOBM
investors in developed countries with green en-
ergy investors in the developing world.
Box 13. Building low-carbon LICS        
  What can donor organisations do? 
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novation would be the overriding objective of the 
international community. 
The combination of context sensitivity and the 
learning perspective implies the critical need for 
policy learning and dynamic goal setting. It also 
implies a need for developing local capacity for an-
ticipating risks, learning about barriers, formulat-
ing policies to address these barriers, and revising 
policies in the light of experience. The internation-
al community should strengthen local capabilities 
for determining what kinds of strategies and poli-
cies are feasible in the specific setting. In developed 
and developing countries alike, this capability is 
underemphasised.
International donor organisations are in an ad-
vantageous position to work with national policy 
makers in two broad areas. The first is strategic 
intelligence on the available kinds of innovation 
capacity and capability in the given setting. The 
second is how to make appropriate choices about 
the types of projects to be funded. As every technol-
ogy actor will argue from self-interest, conflicting 
claims often make this process difficult; sometimes, 
advanced technology projects tend to be more suc-
cessful than projects based on more basic technolo-
gies. In principle, a learning approach would lead to 
more successful programme creation as the involve-
ment of stakeholders should in itself lead to more 
appropriate and dynamically guided processes.
5.3.2 Supporting systems
Low-carbon innovation is a deeply systemic pro-
cess that involves a range of interconnected actors 
such as consumers, service providers, and technol-
ogy suppliers as well as advisory, research, and gov-
ernment organisations. The nature and direction 
of innovation is susceptible to influence from sev-
eral interfaces. Policies that provide direction for 
concerted efforts are particularly important, as are 
policies for supporting actors who take responsi-
bility for coordinating systematically interrelated 
activities.  
 Development aid was directed traditionally at 
individual projects rather than system building, 
particularly before the 1990s. Since then, the ap-
proach has been increasingly ‘programmatic’ and 
focused on institutional change through budget 
support and sector-wide programs.37 However, 
the main point of the new direction proposed in 
this report is that local stakeholders are supported 
through links established with a broader set of sys-
temic capabilities; these would not necessarily have 
been developed in individual and unconnected pro-
jects or through general sectoral strengthening. This 
can happen only when attention is given to ‘systems 
integration’ and to initiatives that bring together ac-
tors and competences in ways that can be replicated 
in new projects and on a larger scale. 
 Major donor-funded development projects exist 
alongside small NGO-run projects. Bringing expe-
riences and capabilities to the system level should 
be a key priority. This process will typically have to 
be organised according to the specific field of tech-
nology concerned. Engaging with system operators 
who can oversee individual fields is crucial to es-
tablish them in the role of ‘spiders in the web’ so 
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they may provide advice and connect stakeholders. 
This type of organisation would facilitate project 
replication and upscaling. A key task for donors is 
thus to engage with local administrations to build 
the ‘meta-capabilities’ necessary for coordination.
5.3.2 Shaping perceptions and discourses
Inspiration for new strategies in development 
such as those outlined here ultimately depends 
on a change in perceptions about low-carbon in-
novation. Partners and stakeholders need to be 
In the Indian case, one of the major success stories 
in climate change mitigation has been the experi-
ence within the energy efficiency sector. To a large 
extent, this has been driven by the Bureau of Ener-
gy Efficiency (BEE). It takes a strategic approach to 
identifying areas and designing policy interventions 
that incorporate learning from global experiences 
but also considers the local economic, political, and 
institutional context. 
In its role as the ‘system operator’ for the energy 
efficiency sector, BEE helped to identify and pri-
oritise high-potential areas within the energy effi-
ciency umbrella, identify the innovation gaps that 
exist, and help design programs to address them. Of 
course, fulfillment of this role requires a sophisti-
cated understanding of local needs, the market and 
institutional context, and the suite of available rele-
vant technologies’ performance and cost envelopes. 
Moreover, since a system operator cannot hope to 
be the fulfilling agency for the actions within an in-
tervention area, it also requires consultation with a 
range of stakeholders to ensure that a broad group 
of actors buy into the process. These actors eventu-
ally become key players in the innovation process. 
In the case of developing countries, as evidenced 
by the BEE experience in India, there might be im-
portant gaps in the innovation chain marked by the 
absence of existing actors. In such cases, the system 
operator needs to support the formation of new ac-
tors to fill these gaps. Furthermore, given the very 
different innovation needs of different geographies 
and for different technologies, the system operator 
needs to take a bird’s-eye view of the full innova-
tion process and existing activities; in this way, pro-
grams, policies, and partnerships can be structured 
to most effectively bridge the innovation gaps. In-
terestingly, while the BEE case highlights the role of 
system operators who are focused on specific areas 
within specific geographies, models such as the Cli-
mate Innovation Centres are suggestive of system 
operators that span multiple areas and multiple ge-
ographies.
Box 14. The Bureau of Energy Efficiency, India  
Source: Sagar (2013)
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convinced that innovation is a comprehensive and 
interactive process. It is not only, or even primarily, 
about breakthrough ‘high tech’ equipment emerg-
ing from R&D labs. Innovation is centred on 
stepwise improvement and depends on changes in 
values, policies, institutional frameworks, cultures, 
and economies. 
International organisations also have a key role to 
play in shaping perceptions and discourses about 
low-carbon development. Low-carbon technologies 
can act as catalysts for the improvement of welfare 
and broader economic development.  Moreover, it 
cannot be assumed that there is a comprehensive 
view of the diverse objectives of development. For 
example, efforts focused on low-carbon develop-
ment tend to overlook the developing world’s en-
ergy access imperatives, with the result that those 
policies are often allowed to gravitate toward cheap-
er, high-carbon solutions.
International policy debates are not yet driven by 
the proposed new notion of low-carbon develop-
ment. Climate change mitigation tends to be the 
driver in the policy agenda and is heavily influenced 
by economic interest. True change will ultimately 
depend on real compromises and a change in val-
ues. A change in values is needed in the global com-
munity. Those engaged in international assistance 
will need to engage in and spearhead this process, in 
recipient countries and at home.
 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    95
Appendix: Low-carbon development in Globelics
Papers on low carbon from    
Globelics Conferences
The following presents an analysis of papers pre-
sented at the Globelics Conferences in 2010-2013:
t ɨFth Globelics Conference in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia 2010
t ɨFth Globelics Conference in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 2011
t ɨF th Globelics Conference in Hangzhou, 
China 2012
t ɨFth Globelics Conference in Ankara, Tur-
key 2013
Papers from these conferences were examined for 
themes relevant to low-carbon development, such 
as sustainable development, green transformation, 
green growth, climate change, eco-innovation, en-
ergy, environmental innovation, etc. The examina-
tion and analysis are based on information from 
titles, keywords, and abstracts. 
Fig. 3. Approaches used in low-carbon  
papers at Globelics conferences
Innovation system
27%
Other
22%
Eco -innovation
15%
Policy analysis
11%
Diffusion of innovation
7%
Evolutionary economics
5%
Not 
specified
5%
Sustainability transitions
5%
Inclusive innovation
3%
96   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
A total of 873 papers were presented at Globelics 
conferences for the period 2010-2013. Of these, 59 
papers are on low-carbon issues. This is equal to 7 
percent of all papers presented at the four confer-
ences.
Figure 3 shows the concepts and approaches in 
low-carbon papers. Innovation systems approaches 
amount to 27 percent. This category includes:
t *OOPWBUJPOTZTUFN
t 5FDIOPMPHJDBMJOOPWBUJPOTZTUFN
t /BUJPOBMJOOPWBUJPOTZTUFN
t 3FHJPOBMJOOPWBUJPOTZTUFN
t 4FDUPSJBMJOOPWBUJPOTZTUFN
t 4VTUBJOBCJMJUZPSJFOUFEJOOPWBUJPOTZTUFN
The category ‘other’ amounts to 22 percent and 
includes:
t #BTFPGQZSBNJEJOOPWBUJPOT
t $PDPOTUSVDUJPOPGUFDIOPMPHJFT
t (MPCBMJOOPWBUJPOOFUXPSLT
t (MPCBMWBMVFDIBJOT
t (PWFSOBODFPGJOOPWBUJPO
t *OOPWBUJWFBOEQSPEVDUJWFTZTUFNT
t *OUFSOBUJPOBMUFDIOPMPHZDPMMBCPSBUJPO
t -FBENBSLFUT
t .BOBHFNFOUPGHSFFOSFOUT
t 4PDJPUFDIOJDBMSFHJNFT
t 4VTUBJOBCMFMJWFMJIPPET
t 4ZTUFNEZOBNJDTCBTFENPEFMMJOH
t 5FDIOPMPHZMJGFDZDMF
Figure 4 shows the sectors studied in the 59 low-
carbon papers. Energy sectors amount to 43 per-
cent while 16 percent are cross-sectorial papers. 
Nine percent of the papers are in the category ‘oth-
ers’, which includes agriculture, biodiversity, con-
struction, and infrastructure. The energy sectors 
can be subdivided into wind energy (35 percent), 
general (28 percent), renewables (17 percent), so-
lar (17 percent) and carbon capture and storage (3 
percent).
Fig. 4. Sectors analysed in low-carbon  
papers at Globelics conferences
Energy
43%
Cross -sectoral
16%
Other
9%
Manufacturing
7%
Biofuel
6%
Forestry
5%
Transportation
4%
Water
4%
Automotive
3%
Waste
3%
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The complete list of papers is listed below in alphabetical order      
Absar, M. (2010). The impact of climate change on the glaciers, water resources and livelihood of Pakistan. 
Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Aguayo, F. (2011). Watching the blades go round: Adoption of wind energy technology in Mexico. Paper 
presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Aladesanmi, O., Oladipo, O. G., & Siyanbola, W. O. (2011): Environmental policy as a drive for environ-
mental innovation in Nigeria. Paper presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Almeida, M. F. de L., & Melo, M. A. (2012). Sustainability-oriented innovations in energy sector. Paper 
presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Altenburg, T. & Engelmeier, T. (2012). Rent management and policy learning in green technology develop-
ment: The case of solar energy in India. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, 
China.
Andersen, A. D. (2013). The role of infrastructure in innovation-system building and transformation in the 
context of a pending low-carbon transition. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, 
Turkey.
Andersen, M. M. (2010). Eco-innovation in the globalizing learning economy: The greening of national in-
novation systems. Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Baark, E., Kemp, R., & Turkeli, S. (2012). The political economy of eco-innovation governance in China 
and Europe: A comparative perspective. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, 
China.
Bastos, V., Maia, G., & Conti, B. (2012). Global trends in cleaner technologies and challenges to the Brazil-
ian sugarcane system of innovation. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Berkhout, F., Verbong, G., Wieczorek, A., & Raven, R. (2010). Sustainability experiments in Asia: Green 
innovations shaping alternative development pathways? Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Binz, C., Truffer, B., & Coenen, L. (2012). Systemic anchoring of global knowledge dynamics and the loca-
tion of clean-tech industry: The formation of on-site water recycling in China. Paper presented at 10th 
Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Cabezas, S.R., Laría, P.I., & Rama, V. (2011). Wind energy in Río Negro - A new industrial district at Patago-
nia (Argentina). Paper presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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Carvalho, F. (2013). A portrait of eco-innovative activities in Brazilian firms: Their main determinants, pro-
cesses and results. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
Carvalho, F., Arruda, C., Ferreira, G. G., & Dutra, H. (2012). What triggers eco-innovations in Brazilian 
firms? Evidence from the Brazilian Innovation Survey.  Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, 
Hangzhou, China.
Ching, S. C. Y. (2010). Leveraging social and environmental responsibility through the changing role of 
government: The relational state perspective. Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Cozzens, S., Cortes, R., Soumonni, O., & Woodson, T. (2011). Nanotechnology and the millennium de-
velopment goals: Water, energy, and agri-food. Paper presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos 
Aires, Argentina.
Babalola, F. D., Borokini T. I., Onefeli, A. O., Muchie, M. (2012). Innovative responses to climate change 
mitigation: Exploring the contributions of indigenous trees in urban areas of southwest Nigeria. Paper 
presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Delaportas, K. (2012). The time varying nature of diffusion determinants: Empirical evidence from the wind 
industry. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Demirel, P. (2013). Environmental protection and innovation in developing countries: Evidence from Tur-
key. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
Djezou, W. B. (2010). What fiscal policy for a sustainable management of forest resource in Côte d’Ivoire? 
Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 2010.
Djezou, W.B. (2011). Agriculture and deforestation: What optimal conversion of forest land to agriculture in 
Côte d’Ivoire? Paper presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Erden, Y. (2013). Can renewable energy solve the problem? Preliminary remarks on basic problems in Turk-
ish energy sector and suggestions for solution. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, 
Turkey.
Freire, C. (2013). Is there a path to inclusive and low carbon growth? Paper presented at the 11th Globelics 
Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
Freitas, I.B, Dantas, E., & Iizuka, M. (2013). Catching up in using and producing renewable energy tech-
nologies in the BRICS. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
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 Freitas, I.B, Dantas, E., & Iizuka, M. (2010). The global institutional frameworks and the diffusion of re-
newable energy technologies in the BRICS countries. Paper presented at 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Furtado, A. (2013). Low carbon energy innovations systems in natural resource rich developing countries: 
The case of Brazil.  Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
Garrido, S., & Lalouf, A. (2011). Before the law: The process of co-construction of technologies, regulations 
and local development in the WCO biodiesel production (Southern Buenos Aires, 2001-2010). Paper 
presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Kabiraj, S. (2012). Innovating the green way: Natural considerations for sustainable consumption. Paper 
presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Lazaric, N., Douai, A., Jin, J., & Ayerbe, C. (2012). Bandwagons or snobbish effects: Two paths for develop-
ing eco-innovations in France and China. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, 
China.
Lema, R., & Lema, A. (2010). Whither technology transfer? The rise of China and India in green technology 
sectors. Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.  
Lema, R., Berger, A., Schmitz, H., & Song, H. (2011). Competition and cooperation between Europe and 
China in the wind power sector. Paper presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Lema, R. (2012). The decomposition of innovation and China’s catch-up in wind power technology. Paper 
presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Li, C. (2012). Industrial policy and supply chain of the new energy vehicle industry in China. Paper pre-
sented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Matos, M.G. de P., Paiva, B., & de Nogueira, J. (2011). Innovation, preservation and sustainability in cul-
tural activities: An exploratory analysis based on the local innovative and productive systems framework. 
Paper presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Mohamad, Z.F., & Idris, N. (2011). Role of religious communities in enhancing transition experiments: A 
localised strategy for sustainable solid waste management in Malaysia. Paper at the 9th Globelics Confer-
ence, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Nurse, K. (2011). Innovation governance for sustainability and social inclusion in the Caribbean. Paper pre-
sented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
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Nyamwena-Mukonza, C. (2012). A conceptual framework for implementing sustainable livelihoods and 
innovation in biofuel production among smallholder farmers in Zimbabwe. Paper presented at the 10th 
Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Perrot, R. (2011). Technology life cycle and firm innovation strategies. Paper presented at the 9th Globelics 
Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Perrot, R. (2012). The dynamics of renewable energy transition in developing countries. The case of South 
Africa and India. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Platonova, I. (2011). International development partnerships and diffusion of renewable energy technolo-
gies in off-grid communities in developing countries: Exploratory study in Talamanca, Costa Rica. Paper 
presented at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Podcameni, M.G., Queiroz, J., Cassiolato, J.E., & Soares, M.C. (2011). Innovation systems, development 
and sustainability: A new productive paradigm? Evidences from Brazil. Paper presented at the 9th Globe-
lics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Queiroz, J., Podcameni, M.G., & Fontes, J. (2012). Determinants of environmental innovation: An evolu-
tionary approach. Paper presented at the 10Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Quitzow, R. (2012). Toward a strategic framework for promoting environmental innovations. Paper pre-
sented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Rennkamp, B. (2013). Feito no Brasil? Made in South Africa? Boosting technological development through 
local content requirements in the wind energy industry. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, 
Ankara, Turkey.
Roy, P. C., Cjakraborty, N., & Bardhan, S. (2010). Rural sustainability issues in developing economies: A case 
study of Sagar Island, India. Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Ruiz, F., & Catalan, P. (2012). Analysis of the functional dynamics of the technological innovation system in 
Chile for the capacity to develop wind energy. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hang-
zhou, China.
Sampath, P. G. (2012). Can the climate technology mechanism promote innovation capacity in developing 
countries? Some issues and considerations. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, 
China.
Soumonni, O. (2010). Distributed generation: An alternative paradigm for electrification in West Africa. 
Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
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Stubrin, L. (2013). Are we using NRs for the development of technological capabilities? The case of bio-fuels 
in Argentina. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
Urban, Frauke et al. (2012). A comparative analysis of the political economy of sustainability-oriented inno-
vation systems in China, India and Europe:  The case of wind energy and electric vehicles. Paper presented 
at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Walz, R. (2012). Mapping global eco-innovation capabilities and competitiveness with indicators. Paper 
presented at the 10th Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Walz, R. (2013). How do LCD innovation differ: Specificities of low carbon technologies and energy sys-
tems. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
Walz, R. (2013). Lead market for membrane bio-reactor (MBR) technology. China second-mover strategy 
for the development and exploitation of its lead market potential. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics 
Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
Walz, R., & Delgado, J.N. (2010). Innovation in sustainability technologies in newly industrializing coun-
tries: Results from a case study on wind energy. Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia.
Walz, R., & Krail, M. (2012). Toward modeling innovation driven export potentials for OECD and newly 
industrializing countries: An explanatory study for wind turbines. Paper presented at the 10th Globelics 
Conference, Hangzhou, China.
Wieczorek, A.J., Hekkert, M., & Smits, R. (2010). Systemic policy instruments and their role in addressing 
sustainability challenges. Paper presented at the 8th Globelics Conference, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Wolfer, S., Sander, H., & Gogoll, F. (2011). Reverse logistics network design for waste electrical and electron-
ic equipment (WEEE) in China: A Shanghai case study on eco-innovation in industry. Paper presented 
at the 9th Globelics Conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Xavier, G. (2013). Emerging innovation system and environmental innovation: The case of mitigation tech-
niques and CCS. Paper presented at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey.
Zhou, J., & Liu, X. (2012). Diffusion of solar thermal in China’s BoP market. Paper presented at the 10th 
Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China. 
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Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development
A seminar entitled Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development was organized by the Globelics Sec-
retariat and held in Copenhagen on 4-5 April 2013. The purpose of the seminar was to gather insights from 
the Globelics network on the topic of low-carbon development. Twenty-six noted academics participated.
The following papers were presented38
Altenburg, T. (2013, April). Sustainability-oriented innovation systems (SOIS): Managing the green trans-
formation. Paper presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Develop-
ment, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Bartels, F. (2013, April), Low carbon development: The challenges of ‘green’ innovation. Paper presented at 
the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Bertelsen, C. (2013, April). Low carbon innovation and development: A perspective from Danida.  Paper 
presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenha-
gen, Denmark.
Byrne, R. (2013, April). Low carbon development, poverty reduction and innovation system building. Paper 
presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenha-
gen, Denmark.
Doranova, A. (2013, April). EU-South cooperation perspectives in eco-innovation. Paper presented at the 
Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Furtado, A. (2013, April). Low carbon energy innovations systems in resource rich developing countries: 
The case of Brazil. Paper presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon 
Development, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Iizuka, M. (2013, April). Diverse and uneven pathways toward low carbon society in emerging economies. 
Paper presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Co-
penhagen, Denmark.
Lema, R., & Andersen, A. D. (2013, April). Learning and low carbon development: Key questions. Paper 
presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenha-
gen, Denmark.
Maharajh, R. (2013, April). The political economy of low carbon innovation. Paper presented at the Globe-
lics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenhagen, Denmark.
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the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Sampath, P.G. (2013, April). Promoting international and regional incentives for low carbon development 
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Special session at Globelics 11th Annual Conference
At the 11th Globelics Conference in Ankara, Turkey, 11-13 September 2013, the Globelics Secretariat or-
ganized a special session featuring a round table discussion on innovation, learning, and low-carbon devel-
opment. This session was designed to give additional input to the report. Rainer Walz chaired the session.
The following presentations were given
Erbaş, B.C. (2013, September). Round table discussion on innovation, learning and low carbon develop-
ment, Globelics 13. Invited presentation at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey. 
Kemp, R. (2013, September). Low-carbon development as a challenge for government. Invited presentation 
at the 11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey. 
Lema, R. (2013). Innovation systems and strategies for low carbon development. Invited presentation at the 
11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey. 
Maharajh, R. (2013). Innovation, learning and low carbon development session.  Invited presentation at the 
11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey. 
Sampath, P.G. (2013). Innovation, learning and renewable energy technologies. Invited presentation at the 
11th Globelics Conference, Ankara, Turkey. 
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Notes
1 This book was a flagship publication of the 
‘environmental decade’ of the 1960s and early 
1970s, based on seminal works such as Bould-
ing’s The Economics of the Coming Spaceship 
Earth (1966) and Ehrlich’s The population 
bomb (1968). Both of these books addressed 
the threshold level of humans on earth that the 
environment can sustain in the long run (i.e. 
the ‘carrying capacity’). 
2 Large hydropower dams often have serious eco-
logical and social consequences (Singh, 2009; 
Linaweaver, 2003).
3 Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important 
greenhouse gas and biggest contributor to cli-
mate change. However, there are a range of 
GHGs, including CO2, methane (CH4), and 
ozone (O3). These gases are emitted during the 
combustion of carbon-based fuels, mainly coal, 
oil, natural gas, and wood, which takes place 
in connection with conventional energy pro-
duction, industrial production, transport, and 
household consumption. 
4 While CO2 neutral energy systems are the key 
immediate goal, the longer-term and more am-
bitious goal should be to reduce atmospheric 
carbon dioxide concentrations to preindustrial 
levels. 
5 The notion of ‘demonstration effects’ refers to 
effects on the behavior of individuals caused by 
observation of the actions of others and their 
consequences, typically the idea that people ex-
pect or want to buy or have things because they 
see that other people are able to have them. 
6 The increased general awareness of environ-
mental problems (in the West) started on the 
sink side, mainly as a result of the 1962 pub-
lication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. This 
book documented the serious detrimental ef-
fects of pesticides on wildlife, particularly birds. 
Since then, discussion of environmental prob-
lems has focused predominantly on the sink 
rather than the source side.
7 The concept of leapfrogging is based on the 
work of Schumpeter (2010/1942). The hy-
106   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
pothesis proposes that companies holding in-
cumbent technologies have less incentive to in-
novate than potential rivals. When innovations 
by newcomers eventually become the techno-
logical paradigm, the newcomer companies 
leapfrog ahead of former leading firms. In the 
context of sustainable development, leapfrog-
ging may accelerate the process by skipping pol-
luting technologies.
8 This implies that their policies incorporate the 
climate myopia of financial markets and lean 
toward fossil energy projects. This high-carbon 
distortion is intensified by domestic policies in 
developing countries where financial policies 
tend to pursue a similar logic. The fear of power 
shortages that would be critical for industry, 
and risks associated with ‘unproven’ renewable 
energy, contribute to make fossil energy systems 
appear as a low-risk and cost-efficient path to 
create wealth (Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 
2006, pp. 1188-89).
9  As indicated by Smith (2002), a strong policy 
case can be made for energy access expansion 
among the world’s poor with fossil fuel energy, 
considering the disproportionately small emis-
sion impact of such an expansion.
10 Including other liquid fuels as crude oil and 
lease condensate, natural gas plant liquids, bitu-
men, extra-heavy oil, and refinery gains. Other 
liquids include gas-to-liquids, coal-to-liquids, 
kerogen, and biofuels.
11 NIMBY stands for ‘Not-In-My-Back-Yard’.
12 Incremental innovation means gradual changes 
within established trajectories in the high-
carbon paradigm. Disruptive innovation is the 
establishing of new trajectories within a high-
carbon paradigm without dismantling it. Ex-
amples are the change from manual to electri-
cal typewriters to personal computers with text 
software. This often involves creative destruc-
tion and the emergence of new industries (mod-
elled in the industry life cycle thinking), but this 
can take place perfectly well within the carbon-
intensive paradigm. Arguably, the diffusion of 
renewables can take place to some extent as part 
of the carbon-intensive paradigm. Radical in-
novation refers to a change of techno-economic 
paradigm by the introduction of energy sources 
that are able to completely replace carbon en-
ergy; it also refers to the use of the most unsus-
tainable renewable energy sources. Historically, 
this type of innovation has been realised only 
after decades of intensive state support.
13 Biomass is already the most important renew-
able source of energy, 91% of total renewables 
in 2011 and 10% world energy demand (IEA, 
2013). The most important share of biomass en-
ergy consumption is concentrated in traditional 
biomass (57% of bioenergy in 2011) and in the 
developing countries building sector. Much of 
this production leads to deforestation, and the 
use of biomass for cooking and heating is done 
in inefficient equipment making traditional 
biomass a major source of indoor pollution.
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14 As argued in last year’s thematic report, innova-
tion system foresight may be one instrument 
for setting in motion inclusive, medium- to 
long-term vision-building processes aimed 
at present-day decisions. Innovation system 
foresight may also work to ensure joint action 
in order to build and strengthen LICS with the 
ultimate goal of promoting global low-carbon 
development (Johnson & Andersen, 2012).
15 Although as the costs of, e.g., storms and in-
undations increase realisation of benefits from 
actions aimed at reducing climate change, the 
results will also benefit the current generation.
16 Investment funds, venture capital, long-term 
institutional investors, and foreign direct invest-
ment can function as channels of finance for 
production of RET. 
17 We use the term infrastructure to refer tangible/
physical systems such as transport and logistics 
(including air and space), telecommunication, 
water provision and water management, hous-
ing, waste management, and recycling.
18 The need for a new era of transmission technol-
ogy and planning is recognised also by promot-
ers of decentralized energy solutions (Scheer, 
2012).
19 This may be in stark contrast to recent decades 
of deregulation and liberalization of power mar-
kets (Battaglini, A., Lilliestam, J., Haas, A., & 
Patt, A., 2009; Hammons, 2008). 
20 Fossil fuel trade is concentrated in, e.g., the New 
York, Moscow, London, and combined Chinese 
exchanges.
21 The tradeoffs among mitigation objectives and 
development objectives is a key shaping force 
within the political economy of low-carbon 
sectors in developing countries, not the least 
renewables. For the case of India, see Dubash 
(2012).
22 Under the UNFCCC convention of 1992, the 
parties aimed at ‘the stabilization of greenhouse 
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level 
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’ in accord-
ance with ‘their common but differentiated re-
sponsibility and respective capabilities. Accord-
ingly, developed countries should take the lead 
in combating climate change and the adverse 
effects thereof ’. Further, the developed coun-
tries were tasked with taking the lead on the 
development of appropriate technologies and 
cooperating in the improvement of the endog-
enous capacities and capabilities of the develop-
ing countries to participate in the efforts.
23 In the context of UNFCCC, the advanced 
economies are considered under the annex-1 
countries category, i.e., the industrialised coun-
tries that were members of the OECD in 1992, 
in addition to countries with economies in tran-
sition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian 
Federation, the Baltic States, and several Cen-
tral and Eastern European States. (See: http://
unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.
php)
24 Moreover, for export-oriented developing coun-
tries such as China, a large fraction of GHG 
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emissions are incurred in order to satisfy the 
final demand of consumers in other countries. 
These considerations add another layer of com-
plexity to the responsibility debate concerning 
end use outside the producer countries (where 
emissions occur). See Ackerman, F. (2009). 
Carbon embedded in China’s trade. Unpub-
lished draft report. Stockholm: Stockholm En-
vironment Institute.
25 See Wooldridge (2010) for a discussion of fru-
gal innovation; see also the story of the Boy 
Who Harnessed the Wind in Malawi (Kamk-
wamba & Mealer, 2009) for an example from 
a low-carbon area.  
26 See www.globalinnovationindex.org/content.
aspx?page=GII-Home 
27 For more tangible examples of tactics firms and 
other actors are undertaking, see Mallett et al. 
(2009) and Lema and Lema (2012).
28 In a broad sense, technology transfer is ‘systemic 
knowledge for the application of a process’. It 
includes tacit know-how and the product as 
well as service- or process-related aspects of the 
technology (Sampatha & Roffe, 2012).
29  ltenburg and Pegels (2011) is an important ex-
ception.
30 A key problem is to ensure an element of com-
petition in the minigrids to green energy tech-
nologies to compete with brown energy tech-
nologies (Haslip, 2011). 
31 Sahoo, A., & Shrimali, G. (2013). The effec-
tiveness of domestic content criteria in India’s 
Solar Mission. Energy Policy, 62, 1470-1480.
32 Although standards are often perceived to re-
strict the behaviour of firms and thereby affect 
competiveness negatively, research has shown 
that the imposition of standards may also raise 
efficiency and quality, and ultimately reduce 
costs. In the developed world, high standards 
have often enhanced the competitive advan-
tage of firms and economies (Porter & van der 
Linde, 1995).
33 Oliver, H. H., Gallagher, K.S., Tian, D., & Jin-
hua, Z. China’s fuel economy standards for pas-
senger vehicles: Rationale, policy process, and 
impacts. Energy Policy, 37, 4720-4729.  
34 Secondment refers to the temporary relocation 
of a person from their regular organisation for 
assignment elsewhere, often made for the pur-
pose of interactive learning.
35 Private enterprises in BRIC countries are also 
using increasingly active forms of technology 
acquisition and collaboration. These include 
insertion into GVCs to obtain knowledge 
and technology transferred within the trade 
and investment-centred linkages. Involved are 
joint R&D with international firms and out-
ward foreign direct investment (OFDI), both 
brownfield (acquisition of firms) and greenfield 
(establishment of firms) in knowledge-intensive 
activities (Lema & Lema, 2012).
36 This emerging concept of Triangular Coopera-
tion can be seen as response to global power 
shifts toward the South and East (Ashoff, 2010). 
37 The distinction between projects and pro-
grammes is important.  Projects tend to be 
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more standalone activities, while programmes 
are often broader, more inclusive and holistic 
in nature, e.g., tackling a sector and includ-
ing activities both on the ground and capacity 
development efforts.
38 Please contact the Globelics Secretariat at sec-
retariat@globelics.org for copies of papers.

 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    111
Bibliography/ References
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity and poverty. New York: Crown 
Books. 
Altenburg, T., & Pegels, A. (2012) Sustainability-oriented innovation systems: Managing the green transformation. In-
novation and Development, 2, 5-22.
Andersen, A. D., & Wicken, O. (2013). Low-Carbon Infrastructures and Systems of Innovation. No transition without 
transmission? Presented at 11th Globelics International Conference - Entrepreneurship, innovation policy and devel-
opment in an era of increased globalisation, Ankara, Turkey
Arnold, E., & Bell, M. (2001). Some new ideas about research for development. In Partnerships at the leading edge: A 
Danish vision for knowledge, research and development. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida. Copenhagen, 279-319.
Arocena, R., & Sutz, J. (2000a). Interactive learning spaces and development policies in Latin America. DRUID Work-
ing Paper No. 00-13.
Arocena, R., & Sutz, J. (2000b). Looking at national systems of innovation from the south. Industry and Innovation, 7, 
55–75.
Arocena, R., & Sutz, J. (2002). Innovation Systems and Developing Countries. DRUID Working Paper No. 02-05.
Arocena, R., & Sutz, J. (2010a). Emerging neoperipheral structures and gardening policies. In Johnson, B., & Segura, 
O. (Eds.) Systems of innovation and development - Central American perspectives. Costa Rica: Heredia, EUNA.
Arocena, R., & Sutz, J. (2010b). Weak knowledge demand in the South, learning divides and innovation policies. Sci-
ence and Public Policy, 37, 571–582.
Arundel, A., Lorenz, E., Lundvall, B.-Å., & Valeyre, A. (2007). How Europe’s economies learn: A comparison of work 
organisation and innovation mode for the EU-15. Industrial and Corporate Change, 16, 6. 
Ashoff, G. (2010). Triangular cooperation: Opportunities, risks, and conditions for effectiveness. World Bank. Available 
on: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/6081 
112   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
Battaglini, A., Lilliestam, J., Haas, A., & Patt, A. (2009). Development of SuperSmart Grids for a more efficient utilisa-
tion of electricity from renewable sources. Journal of Cleaner Production, 17, 911–918.
Bell, M. (2009). Innovation capabilities and directions of development. STEPS Working Paper Brighton: STEPS Centre.
Belward, A. et al. (2011). ‘Renewable energies in Africa: Current knowledge. In Monforti, F. (Ed.) Joint Research Centre, 
European Commission.
Bergek, A., Berggren, C., Magnusson, T., & Hobday, M. (2013). Technological discontinuities and the challenge for 
incumbent firms: Destruction, disruption or creative accumulation. Research Policy, 42, 1210-1224.
Berkhout, F., Verbong, G., Wieczorek, A. J., Raven, R., Lebel, L. and Bai, X. M. (2010), ‘Sustainability experiments 
in Asia: innovations shaping alternative development pathways’, in Environmental Science & Policy, Vol. 13. No. 4. 
261-271.
Bloomberg. (2010). Global trends in renewable energy investment 2011: Analysis of trends and issues in the financing 
of renewable energy. Environment Programme and Bloomberg New Energy. 
Botero, G. (1979). The magnificence and greatness of cities. Amsterdam: Theatrum Orbis Terrarum.
Boulding, Kenneth, E. (1966), ‘The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth: Boulding, Kenneth, E. and Jarrett, H 
(eds.), Environmental quality in a growing economy, Resources for the Future, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
Boyle, G. (2012). Renewable energy: Power for a sustainable future. ( Ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
BP. (2013). Statistical review of world energy. British Petroleum. Available on: http://www.bp.com/ 
Brook, C. (2010). Sustainable development: What does it really mean? Available on: http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_
do/where_we_work/madagascar/news_madagascar/?201029/Sustainable-development---what-does-it-really-mean
Bucknall, J. (2013). Cutting water consumption in concentrated solar power plants. The Water Blog. Available on: 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/water/cutting-water-consumption-concentrated-solar-power-plants-0
Byrne, R., & Ockwell, D. (2013). Low-carbon development, poverty reduction and innovation system building. Paper 
presented at Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation, and Low-Carbon Development. Copenhagen.
Carbon Tracker. (2013).Unburnable Carbon 2013: Are the world’s financial markets carrying a carbon bubble? London: 
CTI.
CCDI – Low Carbon Cities Development Index (2012). Available on:  http://www.lowcarbondevelopmentindex.net/
Chaudhary, A., Sagar, A. D., & Mathur, A. (2012). Innovating for energy efficiency: A perspective from India. Innova-
tion and Development, 2, 45-66.
Cimoli, M., Ferraz, J., & Primi, A. (2009). Science, technology and innovation policies in global open economies: 
Reflections from Latin America and the Caribbean, in Globalization, Competitiveness & Governability, Georgetown 
University-Universia, Vol. 3. No. 1.
Cozzens, S., & Sutz, J. (2012). Innovation in informal settings: A research agenda. Mimeo.
 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    113
Dubash, N. K. et al. (2013). Indian climate change policy. Economic & Political Weekly, 48, 47.
EC - European Commission. (2010), Brief on Power Generation ROADMAP 2050: A practical guide to a prosperous, low-
carbon Europe. http://www.roadmap2050.EU/
Edquist, C., & Bjørn, J. (1997). Institutions and Organisations in Systems of Innovation. In  Edquist, C. (Ed.). Systems 
of Innovation. London: Pinter.
Ehrlich, P. R. (1968). The population bomb. New York: Ballantine Books.
EIA – Energy Information Administration. (2013). International Energy Outlook.  Washington, DC: Energy Informa-
tion Administration
________. (2013a). International Energy Outlook. Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration
________. (2013b). Annual Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040. Washington, DC: Energy Information 
Administration
Ellis, K., Bryn, B., & Alberto, L. (2009). Policies for low carbon growth.  ODI Research Report. London: Overseas De-
velopment Institute.
European Commission/public opinion. Available on: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm 
Fagerberg, J., Schrolec, M., & Verspagen, B. (2010). Innovation and economic development.  In Hall, B. H. & Rosen-
berg, N. ( Eds.) Handbook of the economics of innovation, Vol. 2, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF. (2013), Global trends in renewable energy investment 2012. Frankfurt:  Frank-
furt School of Finance and Management.
Freeman, C. (1996). The greening of technology and models of innovation. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
53, 27-39.
Freeman, C. (2001). A hard landing for the ‘New Economy’? Information technology and the United States national 
system of innovation. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 12, 115–139.
Freeman, C., & Lundvall, B.-Å., (1988). Small countries facing the technological revolution. London and New York: 
Pinter.
Fry, J. P., Laestadius, L. I., Grechis, C., Nachman, K. E., & Neff, R. A. (2013). Investigating the role of state and local 
health departments in addressing public health concerns related to industrial food animal production sites. PloS one, 
8, e54720.
Fu, X., Pietrobelli, C., & Soete, L. (2011). The role of foreign technology and indigenous innovation in the emerging 
economies. Technological change and catching-up. World Development, 39, 1204–1212.
Galleano, E. (1971). The Open Veins of Latin America. London: Serpent’s Tail.
Garud, R., & Karnøe, P. (2001). Path creation as a process of mindful deviation. In Path dependence and crea-
tion, Mahwah: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, 1-138.
114   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
Geels, F. W. (2002). Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: A multi-level perspective and a 
case-study. Research Policy, 31, 1257-1274.
Ghosh, S., & Nanda, R. (2010). Venture capital investment in the clean energy sector. Working paper 11-020. Harvard 
Business School.
Glaeser, E. (2011). Triumph of the city. New York: MacMillan.
Grävingholt, J., Leininger, J., & Von H, C. (2012). Effective statebuilding: A review of studies and evaluations of interna-
tional support for statebuilding in fragile contexts. Copenhagen: Danida.
Hall, B. H. & Rosenberg, N. ( Eds.) Handbook of the economics of innovation, Vol. 2, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Hall, P. (1998). Cities in civilization, culture, innovation, and urban order. London :Phoenix Giant.
Hallegatte, S., Heal, G., Fay, M., & Treguer, D. (2012). From growth to green growth: A Framework.  Working paper. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, 17841. 
Hammons, T. J. (2008). Integrating renewable energy sources into European grids. International Journal of Electrical 
Power and Energy Systems, 30, 462–475.
Haselip, J. (2011). FIT for use everywhere? Assessing experiences with renewable energy feed-in tariffs. UNEP Risoe 
Centre, Denmark. Available on: http://techaction. org/Perspectives/FITuseEverywhere.pdf 
IDRC – International Development Research Centre. (2012a). Innovating for development, strategic framework 2010-
2015. Available on: http://www.idrc.ca/EN/AboutUs/Accountability/StrategicDocuments/IDRC percent27s per-
cent20Strategic_framework_2010-2015.pdf 
___________. (2012b). Projects for Environment. Available on: http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Themes/Environment/Pages/
ProjectsList.aspx
___________. (2012c). Innovating for development, Canada’s contribution.  Available on: http://www.idrc.ca/EN/
AboutUs/Accountability/AnnualReports/Annual percent20Report percent202011-2012.pdf
___________. (2012d). Innovating for Development, Strategic Framework 2010-2015. Available on: http://
www.idrc.ca/EN/AboutUs/Accountability/StrategicDocuments/IDRC percent27s percent20Strategic_
framework_2010-2015.pdf 
IEA/ETP – International Energy Agency/ Energy Technology Perspectives (2012). Energy technology perspectives 2012. 
Paris: International Energy Agency. 
Iizuka, M. (2013, April). Diverse and uneven pathways toward low carbon society in emerging economies. Paper pre-
sented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenhagen, Denmark.
IMF – International Monetary Fund (2013). Energy subsidy reform: Lessons and implications. Washington D.C.: IMF.
 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    115
IPCC. (2007). Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. Contribution of working group I to the Fourth Assess-
ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  Cambridge, UK, and New York:  Cambridge 
University Press.
IRENA – International Renewable Energy Agency. (2012). Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2012 : An Overview.
Bonn: International Renewable Energy Agency
Jackson, T. (2009).  Prosperity without growth?: The transition to a sustainable economy. London:  Sustainable Develop-
ment Commission. 
Jacobs, J. (1969). The economy of cities. New York:  Vintage Books.
Jacobsson, S., & Bergek, A. (2004). Transforming the energy sector: The evolution of technological systems in renew-
able energy technology, Industrial and Corporate Change, 13, 815-849.
Jacobsson, S., & Bergek, A. (2011). Innovation system analyses and sustainability transitions: Contributions and sug-
gestions for research. Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 1, 41–57.
Jacobsson, S., Bergek, A., Finon, D., & Lauber, V. (2009). EU renewable energy support policy: Faith or facts? Energy 
policy. Vol. 37, 2143-2146.
Jakob, M., Luderer, G., Steckel, J., Tavoni, M., & Monjon, S. (2012). Time to act now? Assessing the costs of delaying 
climate measures and benefits of early action. Climatic Change, 114, 79-99.
Jianghua, Z., & Xielin, L. (2012). Diffusion of Solar Thermal in China’s BoP Market. Paper presented at the 10th 
Globelics Conference, Hangzhou, China.
JMP – Joint Monitoring Programme. (2012). Progress on drinking water and sanitation. World Health Organisation. 
New York: Geneva and UN. ICEF.
Johnson, B., & Andersen, A. D. (Eds.) (2012). Learning, innovation and inclusive development – New perspectives on 
economic development strategy and development aid. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press.
Johnson, B., Poulsen, T. G., Hansen, J. A., & Lehman, M. (2011). Cities as development drivers: From waste problems 
to energy recovery and climate change mitigation. Waste Management & Research, Vol. 29. No. 10, 1008-1017. 
Johnson, O. (2013). Exploring the effectiveness of local content requirements in promoting solar PV manufactur-
ing in India. Discussion Paper 11/2013, Bonn: German Development Institute. http://ideasforindia.in/article.
aspx?article_id=195#sthash.scvvARmP.dpuf
Jonsson, D. (2000). Sustainable infrasystem synergies: A conceptual framework. Journal of Urban Technology, Vol. 7. 
No. 3, 81-104.
Jordan, A., Bauer, M. W., & Green-Pedersen, C. (2013). Policy dismantling. Journal of European Public Policy, 20, 5, 
795-805.
116   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
Juma, C., Fang, K., Honca, D., & Huete, P.  J. (2001). Global governance of technology: Meeting the needs of devel-
oping countries. Journal of Technology, 22, 629–655. Available on:  http://inderscience.metapress.com/index/
kreuqu72c8n9fgc0.pdf
Kartha, E. & Peter, E. (2011). ‘Comparison of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 pledges under the Cancun Agreements.  Stock-
holm: Stockholm Environment Institute. 
Kemp, R., & Soete, L. (1992). The greening of technological progress: An evolutionary perspective. Futures, 24, 437-
457.
Kraemer-Mbula, E., & Wamae, W. (Eds.). (2010). Innovation and the Development Agenda. Ottawa: OECD Publishing 
and  International Development Research Centre (IDRC). 
Kubiszewski et al. (2013), Beyond GDP: Measuring and achieving global genuine progress. Ecological Economics, 93, 
57–68.
Kuznets, S. (1971). Economic Growth of Nations.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lay, J., Ondraczek, J., & Stoever, J. (2012). Renewables in the energy transition: Evidence on solar home systems and 
lighting-fuel choice in Kenya. Energy Economics, 40, 350-359. 
Lazonick, W., & Mazzucato, M. (2013). The risk-reward nexus in the innovation-inequality relationship: Who takes the 
risks? Who gets the rewards? Industrial and Corporate Change, 22, 1093-1128.
Lema, R., Berger, A., & Schmitz, H. (2013). China’s impact on the global wind power industry. Journal of Current 
Chinese Affairs, 42, 37-69.
Lema, R., & Lema, A. (2012). Technology transfer? The rise of China and India in green technology sectors. Innovation 
and Development, 2, 23-44. 
Lema, R., Berger, A., Schmitz, H., & Song, H. (2011). Competition and Cooperation between Europe and China in 
the Wind Power Sector. Institute of Development Studies. IDS Working Papers, Vol. 2011 No. 377, 1-45. 
Linaweaver, S. 2003. Catching the boomerang: EIA, the World Bank, and excess accountability: A case study of the 
Bujagali Falls Hydropower Project Uganda. International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology, 10, 
283-301.
López, M., & Johnson, B. (2010). Systems of innovation and development. In Johnson, B., & Segura, O. (Eds.) Systems 
of Innovation and Development. Central American Perspectives. Costa Rica: Universidad Nacional.
Lundvall, B.-Å. (2009). Handbook of innovation systems and developing countries: Building domestic capabilities in a global 
setting.  Cheltenham, UK, and  Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Lundvall, B.-Å., Patarapong, I., & Jan, V. L. (2006).  Asia’s innovation systems in transition. Cheltenham, UK, and 
Northampton, MA: E. Elgar.
Lundvall, B.-Å. (Ed.). (1992). National systems of innovation – Toward a theory of innovation and interactive learning. 
London: Pinter.
 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    117
Malerba, F., & Sunil, M. (2009). Sectoral systems of innovation and production in developing countries : Actors, structure 
and evolution. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Mallett, A. (2013). Technology cooperation for sustainable energy: A review of pathways. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Energy and Environment, 2, 234-250.
Markard, J. (2011). Transformation of infrastructures: Sector characteristics and implications for fundamental change. 
Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 17, 3, 107-117.
Markusson, N., Kern, F., Watson, J., Arapostathis, S., Chalmers, H., Ghaleigh, N., & Russell, S. (2012) A socio-
technical framework for assessing the viability of carbon capture and storage technology. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 79, 903–918.
Mauthner & Weiss. (2013) Solar Heat Worldwide: Markets and contribution to the energy supply 2011. IEA Solar 
Heating & Cooling Programme 
Mazzucato, M. (2013). The entrepreneurial state: Debunking public vs. private sector myths.  London & New York: An-
them Press.
Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J., & Behrens, W.H. (1972). The limits to growth : A report for the Club of 
Rome’s project on The Predicament of Mankind. New York: Potomac Associates.
Mitchell, J., Marcel, V., & Mitchell, B. (2012). What next for the oil and gas industry? London: Chatham House - The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Mulugetta, Y., & Frauke, U. (2010). Deliberating on low carbon development. Energy Policy, 38,  7546-7549.
Ndichu, J., Kemp, R., Adeoti, J., Obayelu, E. A., & Blohmke, J. (2013). The adoption of Energy Efficiency measures 
by companies in the Cassava processing and Maize milling industries in Nigeria and Kenya, Mimeo
Nelson, R. R. (1993). National innovation systems : A comparative analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nishimoto, T., & Nuttall, N. (2013). Green economy set to strengthen South-South and triangular cooperation. Tack-
ling Global Challenges Through Triangular Cooperation, Tokyo: JICA., 33.
NOAA/ESRL. (2013). Mauna Loa CO2 annual mean data. Boulder, CO: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-
istration (NOAA); Earth System Research Laboratory (ESRL).
Ockwell, D., & Mallett, A. (2013). Low carbon innovation and technology transfer. In Urban, F., &Nordensvärd. J. 
(Eds.). Low Carbon Development: Key Issues. London & New York: Routledge.
Ockwell, D. G., Watson, J., Mackerron, G., Pal, P., & Yamin, F. (2008). Key policy considerations for facilitating low 
carbon technology transfer to developing countries. Energy Policy, 36, 4104-4115.
Ockwell, D., Ely, A., Mallett, A., Johnson, O., & Watson, J. (2009). Low carbon development: The role of local innova-
tive capabilities. STEPS Working Paper 31, Brighton: STEPS Centre and Sussex Energy Group, SPRU, University 
of Sussex.
118   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2011a). Green growth at the OECD: Selected 
areas of ongoing work. Available on: http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/49313167.pdf 
________. (2011b). The green growth strategy: Reshaping the OECD’s work agenda for the years to come. Available 
on: http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/48302542.pdf
________. (2012). Inclusive green growth: For the future we want. Available on: http://www.oecd.org/green-
growth/50480040.pdf
OECD/IEA – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ International Energy Agency. (2012). 
Technology roadmap: High-efficiency, low-emissions coal-fired power generation. Paris: OECD/IEA. http:/www.iea.org/
OECD/IEA – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ International Energy Agency. (2012). 
WEO - World Energy Outlook. Paris: OECD/IEA. http:/www.iea.org/
________. (2013). World Energy Outlook Special Report: Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map.  Paris: OECD/IEA. http:/
www.iea.org/
Ondraczek, J. (2013). The sun rises in the east (of Africa): A comparison of the development and status of the solar 
energy markets in Kenya and Tanzania. Energy Policy, 56, 407-417.
Porter, M. E., & Van der Linde, C. (1995). Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, 97–118. 
Remmen, R. (2013/April). Access2Innovation. Paper presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and 
Low-Carbon Development, Copenhagen, Denmark.
REN 21 – Renewable Energy. (2011). Renewables 2011: Global Status Report. Paris: REN21 Secretariat.
REN 21 – Renewable Energy. (2012). Renewables 2012: Global status report. Paris: REN21 Secretariat.
________. (2013). Renewables 2013: Global status report. Paris: REN21 Secretariat.
Ridley, T., Yee, C. L., & Juma, C. (2006). Infrastructure innovation and development. International Journal of Technol-
ogy and Globalisation, 2, 268–278.
Rockstrom, J., Steffen, W., Noone, K., Persson, A., Chapin, F.S., Lambin, E.F., & Foley, J.A. 2009. A safe operating 
space for humanity. Nature, 461, 472-475.
Rodrik, D. (2007). One economics, many recipes: Globalization, institutions, and economic growth.  Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press.
Sagar, A. D. (2005). Alleviating energy poverty for the world’s poor. Energy Policy, 33, 1367–1372.
Sagar, A. D. (2013). Paper presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, 
Copenhagen.
Sagar, A. D., Bremner, C., & Grubb, M. (2009). Climate innovation centres: A partnership approach to meeting energy 
and climate challenges. Natural Resources Forum, 33, 274–284.
 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    119
Sahoo, A., & Shrimali, G. (2013). The effectiveness of domestic content criteria in India’s Solar Mission. Energy Policy 
Vol. 62, 1470-1480.
Sampath, G., & Roffe, P. (2012). Unpacking the international technology transfer debate: Fifty years and beyond. Issue 
Paper 36. Geneva: ICTSD.
Scheer, H. (2012). The energy imperative. New York: Earthscan.
Schmitz, H., & Becker, B. (2013). From sustainable development to the green transformation: A rough guide. Briefing 
Paper, Brighton: IDS.
Schumpeter, J. A. (2010/1942). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. London: Routledge.
Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. London: Allen Lane.  
SIDA – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (2011). Distribution of support within the Special 
Climate Change Initiative. Available on: http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/our-fields-of-work/Environ-
ment-Climate-Change-and-Sustainable-Services/The-Governments-Special-Climate-Change-Initiative/Distri-
bution-of-support-within-the-special-climate-change-initiative-  
_________. (2012a). Our fields of work. Available on: http://www.sida.se/English/About-us/our-fields-of-work/ 
_________. (2012b). Programmes and projects within sustainable development. Available on: http://www.sida.
se/English/About-us/our-fields-of-work/Environment-Climate-Change-and-Sustainable-Services/Pro-
grammes-and-projects/
Singh, S. (2009). World Bank-directed development? Negotiating participation in the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower 
Project in Laos. Development and Change, 40, 487-507.
Smil, V. (2010). Energy myths and realities: Bringing science to the energy policy debate. Washington D. C.: AEI Press.
Smil, V. (2011). Global energy: The latest infatuations. American Scientist, 99, 212.
Smith, K. (2005). Innovation infrastructures. In Geenhuizen, S. V., Gibson, D. V., & Heitor, M. V. (Eds.). Regional 
development and conditions for innovation in the network society.  Purdue:  Purdue University Press.
________. (2009). Climate change and radical energy innovation: The policy issues. TIK Working Papers on Innovation 
Studies 20090101.  Oslo:  Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture, University of Oslo.
 ________. (2013/April). Transitions to renewable energy systems: The innovation and policy issues.  Paper presented at 
the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Smith, K. R. (2002). In praise of petroleum. Science 19(5), 589-600. 
SOFI – State of Food Insecurity. (2012). State of food insecurity in the world. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organisation 
of the United Nations.
Sovacool, B. K. (2012). The political economy of energy poverty: A review of key challenges. Energy for Sustainable 
Development, 16, 272–282. 
120   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
Stegmaier, P., & Kuhlmann, S. (2013). Discontinuation governance as a neglected dimension in STI studies. In 2013 
EU-SPRI Forum Conference - Management of Innovation Policies. Madrid. http://www.euspri-madrid2013.org/
pdf/1140.pdf
Tawney, L., Bell, R. G., & Ziegle, M. (2011). High wire act: Electricity transmission infrastructure and its impact on the 
renewable energy market. Power and Energy.  Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
Turnheim, B., & Geels, F. (2012). Regime destabilisation as the flipside of energy transitions:  Lessons from the history 
of the British coal industry (1913–1997). Energy Policy, 50, 35–49.
UN - United Nations (1987). Our common future. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment. Available on: http://www.un-documents.net/ocf-02.htm#IV
__________. (2011). Working toward a balanced and inclusive green economy: A United Nations system-wide per-
spective. Available at http://www.unemg.org/Portals/27/Documents/IMG/GreenEconomy/report/GreenEcono-
my-Full.pdf
__________. (2011). World Economic and Social Survey 2011: The great green technological transformation. Geneva: 
United Nations Publications.
__________. (2012a). Climate change mitigation. Available on: http://www.unep.org/climatechange/mitigation/ 
__________. (2012b). Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability. Available on: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
environ.shtml 
__________. (2012c). Energy. Available on: http://www.unep.org/energy/Analysis/tabid/79457/Default.aspx  
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2010). World investment report 2010. Available 
on: http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/WIR-Series.aspx
UNDESA - United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. ( 2011). The great green technological trans-
formation. New York:  United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York. 
UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme. (2010). The emissions gap report: Are the Copenhagen Accord 
Pledges sufficient to limit global warming to 2 C or 1.5 C? A preliminary assessment. Technical summary.
UNEP RISØ. (2013). Climate Technology Centre and Network launched in Copenhagen, Denmark Copenhagen: 
UNEP. Available at: http://www.uneprisoe.org/Feature-Story---CTCN-launched-in-Copenhagen-Denmark.
UNFCCC - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (1992). International environmental treaty 
negotiated at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), informally known as 
the Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro, 1992
UN-Habitat. (2008). State of the world cities 2010-2011: Bridging the urban divide. London & Sterling: Earthscan.
UNIDO – United Nations Industrial Development Organisation. (2011). Industrial development report 2011.
Unruh, G. C. (2000). Understanding carbon lock-in. Energy policy, 28, 817-830.
 LOW-CARBON INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT    121
Unruh, G. C., & Carrillo, H. J. (2006). Globalizing carbon lock. Energy Policy, 34, 1185–1197.
Urban, F., & Nordensvärd, J. (2013). Low carbon development: Key issues. London and New York: Routledge.
Viotti, E. (2002). National learning systems: A new approach on technological change in late industrializing economies 
and evidences from the cases of Brazil and South Korea.  Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 69, 653–680.
Wales, A. (2013). The water-food-energy nexus.  Making It: Industry for Development, 12, 8-9.
Walz, R. (2007). The role of regulation for sustainable infrastructure innovations: The case of wind energy. International 
Journal of Public Policy, 2, 57–88.
_______. (2013/April). How do LCD innovations differ? Specificities of low carbon technologies and energy systems. 
Paper presented at the Globelics Seminar on Learning, Innovation and Low-Carbon Development, Copenhagen.
WAVES - Wealth accounting and the valuation of ecosystem services. (2012). Available on: http://www.wavespartner-
ship.org/waves/ 
WCED - World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987). Our common future. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Wolf, Martin. (2012). Living with limits: growth, resources, and climate change. In Climate Policy, Vol. 12, No. 6, 
772-783.
Wooldridge, A. (2010). First break all the rules: the charms of frugal innovation. A special report on innovation in 
emerging markets. Economist, 15, 3-4.
World Bank. (2011a). Carbon finance for sustainable development. Available on: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trends_Updated_June_2011.pdf 
_________. (2011b) State and trends of the carbon market 2011.  Available on:  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/State_and_Trends_Updated_June_2011.pdf
_________. (2012a). Inclusive green growth – FAQ. Available on: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSDNET/
Resources/Green-Growth-RIO-FAQ.pdf  
_________. (2012b). Climate change & the World Bank. Available on: http://climatechange.worldbank.org/
overview#context
_________. (2012c). From growth to inclusive green growth: The economics of sustainable development. Available on: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSDNET/Resources/RIO-BRIEF-Economics-Sustainable-Dev.pdf
World Coal Institute. (2012). Coal meeting the climate challenge. Report available on http://www.worldcoal.org/re-
sources/wca-publications/
WWDR – World Water Development Report. (2012). The United Nations World Water Development Report. United 
Nations. 
122   GLOBELICS THEMATIC REVIEW
WWF International. (2008a). A roadmap for a living planet.  Available on: http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/
roadmap_sign_off_fin.pdf 
_________. (2008b). Building a sustainable future. Available on: http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/all_publica-
tions/wwf_institutional_publications/  
_________. (2012a). WWF conservation projects around the world.  Available on: http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_
do/where_we_work/project/ 
_________. (2012b). Living planet report. Available on: http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/1_lpr_2012_on-
line_full_size_single_pages_final_120516.pdf
_________. (2012c). Resource efficiency indicators.  Available on: http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf_re-
sponse_to_the_resource_efficiency_indicators_consultation.pdf
Zhang, S., & He, Y. (2013). Analysis on the development and policy of solar PV power in China. Renewable and Sus-
tainable Energy Reviews, 21, 393-401.
The Global Network for the Economics of 
Learning, Innovation, and Competence 
Building Systems (Globelics) is an open and 
diverse community of scholars working on 
innovation and competence building in the 
context of economic development. The ma-
jor purpose of the network is to contribute 
to building capacity and create a forum for 
exchange worldwide in the innovation and 
development research field.
This booklet is the second in the series of 
annual thematic reviews from the Globelics 
Secretariat. Aalborg University and SIDA, the 
Swedish International Development Coop-
eration Agency, support the series. For more 
information, visit www.globelics.org 
